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Report on European competitiveness since the 1994
Industry Council Resolution that established the basis
for the Competitiveness Report. Competitiveness is
understood to mean high and rising standards of
living of a nation with the lowest possible level of
involuntary unemployment on a sustainable basis.
The present Report continues the analysis of produc-
tivity developments initiated with the 2001 edition. It
presents a comparison and a decomposition of
productivity growth in Europe relative to the US. The
use of hourly data on labour productivity, in addition
to data on productivity by employed person, repre-
sents a novelty in comparison to previous editions.
Recent evidence suggests that the combination of
organisational improvements with other types of enter-
prise modernisation measures, such as new ICT equip-
ment, constitutes an essential characteristic of those
firms that have experienced robust productivity
growth. The Report reviews the theoretical basis for this
and provides new empirical evidence from establish-
ment level data from Germany. The Report also uses a
new set of regional data to identify those factors, prin-
cipally R&D– and knowledge–related ones, that appear
to determine the performance of regions in terms of
labour productivity growth (or regional competitive-
ness) in a sample of over 200 NUTS–2 EU regions.
Europe’s industrial landscape is likely to change after the
forthcoming EU enlargement. The Report examines the
competitiveness of the acceding countries using indica-
tors of productivity, labour costs and market shares, and
discusses the likely impact of the enlargement on
economic structures in a wider European Union.
Growth, productivity 
and employment
Economic growth in the EU slowed markedly in the
aftermath of the Lisbon European Council of March
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2000. More recently, growth in several Member
States has slowed to a standstill. Compared to other
slow growth periods, employment first remained
more resilient with over 2.5 million jobs having
been added in 2001 and 2002, but in 2003
employment stopped growing and unemployment
began to rise. Many of the new jobs are part-time,
leading to a decrease in average hours per worker.
In an accounting sense, sustaining job creation (or
preventing job destruction) during a slow growth
period implies weak productivity growth. Indeed, in
the past two years productivity per person
employed increased by less than half a percentage
point and per hour productivity by 0.9 % annually.
On average, growth rates in 2001-2002 were not
dissimilar in the EU and in the US. However, labour
productivity growth in the US remained resilient
during this period of slow growth and into 2003. In
the US, productivity per person employed and
productivity per hour worked both rose by 1.6 %
per year in 2001-2002. In the EU, productivity
growth has been modest since the mid-1990s when
productivity developments in the EU and in the US
started to diverge. The cumulative US–EU difference
in real GDP growth over the period 1996-2002
amounts to around 8 percentage points, while the
cumulative difference in productivity growth
amounts to 9 percentage points when measured
per person employed and 4.5 percentage points
when measured in terms of hours worked. Thus, the
superior productivity performance of the US
compared to the EU since the mid-1990s is not
restricted to measures per person employed but
also holds, albeit less markedly, for productivity
measures based on hours worked.
In terms of the standards of living, measured by
GDP per capita, growth rates in the US and in the
EU have been comparable, both advancing cumula-
tively by some 14 percentage points during the
Executive summary
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period 1996–2002. This reflects principally the
higher population growth in the US compared to
the EU during this period (almost 10 % in the US
and around 2 % in the EU), which eroded the
advantage of the higher real GDP growth in the US.
Similar growth rates of GDP per capita implied that
the gap between the EU and the US remained
unchanged: in 2002, average GDP per capita in the
Union was nearly 30 percent below that in the US.
Among the EU Member States, Ireland, Greece and
Spain recorded real GDP growth rates significantly
above the EU average in the most recent years. In
contrast, growth was particularly slow in Germany.
In the second half of the 1990s, growth accelerated
to 2.7 % in the EU. While all the Member States
except Germany registered an acceleration of
growth, only Ireland, Finland and Luxembourg had
growth rates higher than the US. Ireland, Greece,
Finland, Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg outper-
formed the US also in terms of productivity (per
hour) gains in the period from 1996 to 2002.
Earlier editions of the Report have suggested that the
deviation of the EU standards of living (measured by
GDP per capita) from the US can be attributed princi-
pally to the lower employment rate in the EU and also
to the lower EU labour productivity. The new data
used in the present edition of the Competitiveness
Report allow a finer disaggregation using the – in
many ways superior – measure of hourly labour
productivity. Data for 2002 show the EU/US gap in
the standards of living amounting to around 30
percentage points (i.e. the EU at 70 percent of the US
level). According to the Commission’s Structural Indi-
cators compiled by Eurostat, 13 percentage points
can be attributed to higher hourly productivity in the
US, 4 percentage points to lower average hours
worked in the EU, and 12 percentage points to the
lower employment rate in the EU.
Though other data sources point to different values
for the contribution of the various elements used to
decompose the EU/US gap in GDP per capita, the
fact remains that independently of the source, the
same variables – employment rate, hours worked
and hourly labour productivity – account, not
surprisingly, for the largest part, leaving virtually no
role to the demographic factor. All three factors –
average working time, the employment rate and
the efficiency of work – are essential ingredients of
policies to raise the standards of living.
The previous two editions of the Competitiveness
Report suggested that investment and diffusion of
information and communication technologies (ICT)
have played an important role in the productivity
revival in the US and that similar gains are still to be
realised in the EU. The present Report re-examines
the relevant data, looking in particular at the contri-
bution of ICT capital to hourly labour productivity
growth in the EU, the Member States and the US.
While the EU recorded annual hourly productivity
growth more than 1 percentage point above the US
growth rate during the period 1990–1995, the situa-
tion was reversed in the period 1996–2001 when
average annual growth in the US exceeded that in
the EU by some one third of a percentage point. The
superior US performance in terms of hourly produc-
tivity growth was due to larger contributions from
both capital deepening and total factor productivity
growth; in the early 1990s, the EU had performed
better than the US in both areas. Within capital deep-
ening, the EU however recorded a higher contribu-
tion from non-ICT capital throughout the 1990s.
The contribution of ICT capital to the growth of
hourly labour productivity was higher in the US
than in the EU during both the first and the second
half of the 1990s. In the first half of the 1990s, ICT
capital contributed 0.2 percentage points to hourly
productivity growth in the EU and 0.32 percentage
points in the US. In 1996–2001, ICT contributed
0.34 points in the EU and 0.57 points in the US.
Thus, the ICT contribution to productivity growth
was not only higher in the US than in the EU, but it
also increased by a larger amount after 1995.
Among the EU Member States, the contribution of
ICT investment to the acceleration of labour
productivity between the periods 1990–1995 and
1995–2001 was largest in Ireland, Finland and
Sweden and smallest in Portugal, Spain and
Germany.
Until 1995, the EU converged rapidly towards the US
level of hourly labour productivity. Subsequently, due
to the superior US performance in the late 1990s, the
gap widened again. In 2002, average labour produc-
tivity per hour in the EU was 13 percent below that in
the US. In Luxembourg, Belgium and France, hourly
labour productivity is higher than in the US while
Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy have productivity
levels comparable to the US.
Performance across EU nations differed in the 1990s.
The only country that increased both productivity
and employment faster than the US was Ireland.
During the 1990s, Ireland surpassed the EU average
in terms of GDP per head and in terms of productivity
per hour (while it still remains below the EU average
in terms of Net National Product and in wages per
head). Of the catching-up countries, Greece and
Portugal recorded above-average growth rates.
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Among the countries with medium or high income,
the performance of Sweden, Finland, the Nether-
lands and Denmark can be considered as particularly
successful, allowing a combination of high wages
and comprehensive welfare systems. The strategy of
these countries – in addition to fiscal prudence and
institutional reforms - has been to enforce educa-
tion1, research and the diffusion of new technologies,
which are the main elements of the Lisbon strategy.
Among the larger countries, ICT played a large role in
productivity growth only in the UK. In the UK, the
level of hourly productivity remains low compared to
the EU average, but employment has risen markedly
in recent years. France spread employment by
reducing working hours; it has a high level of produc-
tivity, while per capita income is slightly above the EU
average. Germany is beginning to address more thor-
oughly the rigidities that have inhibited productivity
and output growth and to implement the necessary
structural reforms in order to restore the economy’s
ability to grow and generate jobs.
There are persistent differences in productivity,
income, and working hours between the EU and US
on the one hand and across the Member States on
the other. The differences partly reflect different
choices between income and leisure or are the
result of different policy choices. Facilitating part-
time work has successfully been used to increase
the flexibility of labour markets and to raise the
employment rate. For some workers, part-time work
is preferred to full-time work, for others it is invol-
untary and limits earnings and upward mobility.
Reducing the cost of low skilled labour, or limiting
wage increases are other strategies to increase
employment and the employment content of
growth. Higher incomes can be achieved only by
measures that increase the long-term growth
potential of an economy. Removing growth barriers
and investing in the future, i.e. in innovation,
education and diffusion of new technologies,
contribute to this. Each European country is facing a
unique combination of structural constraints; some
countries seem to be on track to increase produc-
tivity and employment. The Lisbon strategy
provides a core set of policies to raise potential
growth through research, education and the diffu-
sion of new technologies. A precondition for this
approach – as demonstrated by some of the smaller
countries in the European Union – is to foster inno-
vation, thus retaining flexibility for policies in a
changing environment.
In the second half of the 1990s the EU under-
performed the US both in labour productivity
and in standards of living. The period 2001-2002
saw a partial reversal in these patterns. Stan-
dards of living in EU grew faster than in the US
but the resilience of the US productivity
performance contrasted with a halving of the
EU’s productivity growth leading to an increased
productivity gap relative to the US. The counter-
part of the EU’s productivity deceleration was a
rather resilient employment situation with job
creation, in contrast with a decline in employ-
ment in the US. 
The EU gap in standards of living relative to the
US amounts to 30 percentage points of which 25
points can be attributed, in almost equal parts,
to a lower employment rate and to a lower
hourly productivity in the EU. This suggests that,
to bridge the difference in standards of living
between the two regions, the EU will have to
rely on an improvement in both employment
performance and in the efficiency with which
labour is used in the production process. 
The natural limits to long run increases in
employment rates together with the increased
weight of less skilled/lower productivity workers
inherent to increases in the overall employment
rate (at least in the short run), bring labour
productivity developments to the centre stage of
a sustainable long-term improvement in living
standards. Despite the modest narrowing of the
EU gap in standards of living in the period 2001-
2002, the fact remains that sustainable long-
term increase in living standards and conver-
gence towards US levels will require a strong
improvement in the productivity performance of
the EU.
Structural reforms leading to more flexible
labour and product markets, investments in
innovation and education, further diffusion of
new technologies are all crucial elements in
reversing the present trends and bring produc-
tivity and employment to levels compatible with




A growing body of literature and empirical evidence
point to complementarities between information
and communication technologies (ICT) on the one
1 References to investments in education should be interpreted in the wider
sense of lifelong learning, embracing all aspects of education, including
notably initial and continuing vocational training.European competitiveness report 2003
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hand and organisational capital (such as enterprise
modernisation or new working methods) on the
other. In order to exploit fully the potential of the
new information and communication technologies,
changes are needed in the way enterprises operate.
Investments in organisational change may have
been insufficient as enterprises may not have fully
recognised their importance, or because of the high
costs of organisational reform, often significantly
exceeding the costs of acquiring ICT capital goods.
Of the different types of organisational reforms, the
Report looks at e-business applications and their
effect on productivity growth.
Most large firms in the EU use some e-business appli-
cations such as enterprise resource planning or online
procurement. Data from the e-business watch of the
European Commission for four EU Member States
(Germany, France, Italy and the UK) indicate that
industries with a higher skill intensity or with a higher
information technology intensity tend to use certain
e-business applications – in particular knowledge
management solution systems and customer rela-
tionship management systems – more frequently.
The adoption of e-business applications is often
accompanied by additional investments in hardware,
software and training. The organisational changes
which accompany the adoption of e-business appli-
cations can be substantial and may have an impact
on virtually every business process or function within
the organisation: applications such as enterprise
resource planning require changes in the organisa-
tion chart, job descriptions, responsibilities, internal
power structures, and in the organisation’s culture.
Empirical analysis based on data from the e-business
watch suggests that the frequency of the use of
enterprise resource planning and online procure-
ment across industries is positively correlated with
labour productivity growth. On the other hand, no
correlation was found between productivity growth
by industry and the implementation of other types
of e-business applications, such as supply chain
management or customer relationship manage-
ment.
Case studies and academic research also document
cases where the implementation of enterprise
resource planning failed. The failures were due to
reasons such as inadequate complementary organi-
sational reforms, poor project management, insuffi-
cient training or an underestimation of the time
needed for the implementation.
An empirical analysis of firm–level data for Germany
does not identify a unique reorganisation measure
or bundle of measures that is available in the
majority of establishments. Large establishments
with training and ICT investments and modern
equipment introduce organisational changes that
increase the participation of employees. In addition,
expected qualification gaps and anticipated
increases in training efforts also have a positive
impact on the propensity to change the organisa-
tion structure.
The analysis of German firm-level data looked at
three types of organisational reform which increase
the participation of employees: shift in responsibility
to lower levels of hierarchy, introduction of team-
work and the establishment of autonomous work
groups. The results indicate that the three measures
complement each other and establishments that
introduced all these measures have an additional
productivity advantage. The simultaneous introduc-
tion of all three measures in the years 1996 or 1997
increased the average productivity of a representa-
tive sample of German establishments by 8 % in the
period 1997-2000.
Finally, data from the Community Innovation
Survey for Finland show a significant positive rela-
tionship between labour productivity growth by
industry on the one hand, and the frequency of
new or significantly changed organisational struc-
tures on the other. In other words, industries with
an above-average growth rate of labour produc-
tivity, such as telecommunication services and elec-
trical machinery, have a higher share of firms with
new or significantly changed organisational struc-
tures. However, for the other EU Member States
covered by the data (Germany, Austria and
Sweden) this relationship is not statistically signifi-
cant.
Evidence from the Community Innovation Survey
also points to the complementary nature of
different organisational changes. For all the four EU
Member States covered by the data, there was a
strong correlation between the frequency, across
industries, of the implementation of advanced
management techniques (which may include e-
business applications such as enterprise resource
planning or supply chain management) on the one
hand, and the frequency of significant changes in
organisational structures on the other.
Despite the widespread availability of different
e-business applications, their adoption remains
limited in particular in small enterprises. The
European Commission has put forward policy
recommendations to improve the managerial
understanding of and the skills needed for e-
business in SMEs, to promote the availability ofExecutive summary
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SME friendly e-business solutions, and to facili-
tate the effective participation of SMEs in elec-
tronic marketplaces and business networks.
Managers and system users need to acquire the
skills required for a successful integration of e-
business applications into the overall company
operation. Enterprises can facilitate the adoption
of e-business applications by providing training
that gives attention to issues such as organisa-
tion culture and work organisation. Given the
positive externalities associated with human
capital, governments also have a role – in partic-
ular in the areas of tertiary education, worker
training and lifelong learning. Some Member
States, notably the UK, have already established
SME business support networks, which typically
aim at providing targeted knowledge and prac-
tical assistance to SMEs i.e. in their efforts to
adopt e-business applications.
The key role of ICT in organisational change
suggests a role for governments in the provision
of a high quality ICT infrastructure. At the EU
level, the e-Europe Action Plan has defined a
roadmap to facilitate the transition to an infor-
mation society throughout the Union and all the
Member States. Governments can also dissemi-
nate information on the benefits and costs of
ICT–enabled organisational change. This is
particularly important for small and medium
sized firms, as well as for firms in low skill inten-
sive industries such as food and beverages;
textiles; leather and clothing, which appear to
be late adopters of e-business practices.
Regional aspects 
of competitiveness
The EU is characterised by substantial regional
diversity in wealth, and competitiveness conditions
differ substantially across regions. While a process of
convergence has taken place, assisted by the contri-
bution of the Structural Funds, this process has
been slow and, therefore, fostering regional cohe-
sion remains a critical policy challenge. The Report
reviews some central issues about regional compet-
itiveness in the EU. Regional competitiveness is
understood as strong productivity performance,
measured by regional GDP per hour worked.
Data constraints limit the number of available indi-
cators, both across regions and across time, with
which to undertake empirical analysis. However, a
sufficient number of indicators were available to
measure productivity in 15 sectors across the NUTS-
2 regions over 1980-2000. Similarly, proxies were
identified to measure the importance of knowledge
in the regional economy. 
Data analysis suggested a positive correlation of
productivity with R&D intensity, specialisation in
high-tech activities, and the number of students in
tertiary education. Decomposition of regional
productivity data showed that in the majority of
successful regions, market services accounted for a
large part of the recorded productivity gains. 
The results also suggest that high productivity in one
region is positively related to similar results in the
neighbouring areas. Nevertheless, this does not mean
that peripheral areas always exhibit low productivity
and low competitiveness – in favourable circum-
stances, ‘pockets of success’ can exist in any location.
A negative relationship was found between produc-
tivity growth and its starting level, providing
support for the hypothesis of (unconditional)
regional convergence. In other words, regions
which start off with lower productivity levels register
higher productivity growth and gradually move
closer to the productivity levels of the better
performers. Econometric results support the
hypothesis of productivity convergence across the
EU NUTS-2 regions, both with a simple model
structure (explaining growth only by catch-up
effects) and a more complex formulation (allowing
for other knowledge-based factors such as R&D
expenditure and workforce skills). Nevertheless, the
pace of convergence is very slow and substantial
disparities still remain across the regions.
Additional case study work was performed on five
successful regions: Oberbayern and Darmstadt in
Germany, Sterea Ellada in Greece, Île de France in
France and Niederösterreich in Austria. These regions
were selected since their productivity performance
was stronger than one would expect on the basis of
their levels of R&D expenditure and other knowledge-
based indicators, and after accounting for possible
catch-up effects. Analysis of the regions revealed char-
acteristics which were not captured in the empirical
work but were likely to have contributed to a strong
productivity performance. These included:
— Good connections to all major forms of transport,
in particular access to an international airport,
and a modern telecommunications network;
— A strong entrepreneurial culture that provided a
bridge between research undertaken in univer-
sities and innovation activity in business;European competitiveness report 2003
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— The presence of high-tech clusters in areas such
as bio-technology;
— An active public authority which provided links
between the academic and business communi-
ties and promoted the region in the face of
forthcoming challenges;
— Spillover effects from networking, and a
common vision among regional stakeholders.
The fastest growing regions host enterprises that
have successfully integrated into the international
competitive system. The role of public policy has
been subtle but critical in the successful regions,
providing an infrastructure which supports business
innovation. The evidence of the Report points to a
role for the EU and the Member States in contin-
uing to remove barriers to trade and to open up
regions to competition across the Internal Market.
The evidence on the importance of human knowl-
edge in raising regional competitiveness is varied,
often difficult to tie down but ultimately
compelling. The fastest growing regions are those
with enterprises which are better at harnessing
human knowledge. This is supported both by the
cross–regional statistical analysis and by the case
studies. The success of clustering in the high tech-
nology and especially in biotechnology industries
also points to the importance of human knowledge
factors. Clusters not only confer advantages
through common access to human knowledge
resources, such as the science and research base of
higher education, or indeed capital resources, but
also facilitate inter-firm communication and entre-
preneurial activity.
Public support for improved competitiveness can
come from concerted programmes operating at
different levels, ranging from pan-European to
regional, and covering associated physical and non-
physical infrastructure requirements. Such support
should aim at better transport and communications
infrastructure and at fostering a regional entrepre-
neurial culture that allows businesses to build close
links with well-funded and well-organised networks
of, especially science-based, higher education institu-
tions. Policy support at regional level appears critical
in the better-performing regions. Support at regional
level is instrumental in making regional stakeholders
subscribe to a common vision and public-private
partnerships help taking this vision forward.
Though productivity levels across regions have
converged at least since the 1980s, the differences
are still very significant and invite a reflection on
the possible factors of success for regional
competitiveness. A positive association between
productivity and a number of variables measuring
the potential in terms of knowledge-based activi-
ties – such as R&D intensity, human capital and
specialisation in high-tech activities – indicate the
importance of a knowledge base for regional
competitiveness. The analysis also suggests the
presence of spillover effects across adjacent
regions showing that proximity matters. 
The study of particularly successful regions iden-
tifies a number of common features likely to
have played a crucial role in their productivity
developments. Again, knowledge is given a
pivotal role, as is the ability to establish links
between academic work and innovation at the
firm level – both through active public support
and by means of a strong entrepreneurial
culture. The common thread appears to be the
potential to connect the different economic
actors – both in the physical sense through good
transport and communication networks and in a
more intangible way through a common vision
among regional stakeholders as well as through
collaboration between the academic and the
business world.
These findings suggest a number of policy areas
where action would help addressing the still
significant competitiveness differentials. The
identification of knowledge factors as engines of
success makes the development of policies
supporting innovation and knowledge-base
activities, as well as those ensuring that human
capital is available to exploit the innovation
potential, instrumental in speeding up the
process of regional convergence. To enlarge the
positive effects of these knowledge-supporting
policies, clustering of knowledge-based and
innovative activities should be encouraged to
take advantage of spillover effects. Equally
important is to make sure that the Internal
Market functions well across all regions and that




While the process of integration across the candi-
date countries and the present EU members has
already advanced significantly, the forthcoming EU
enlargement will imply further changes in Europe’s
industrial landscape. The Report reviews the likelyExecutive summary
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implications of the accession of eight Central and
East European countries for the manufacturing
industry in an enlarged Europe.
The acceding countries underwent a pronounced
process of systemic change and structural adjust-
ments during the 1990s. The strengthening of their
trade and production links with Western Europe
played a major role in this process. Major shifts of
resources between the main sectors of the economy
have brought the broad economic structures of the
acceding countries closer to those in EU-15.
Closer integration of the acceding countries
following their entry into the EU will contribute to
raising productivity and competitiveness in the Union
as a whole. Although the overall production and
trade volumes of the acceding countries are too small
to have large aggregate effects on prices, employ-
ment and production in the EU, specific regions and
sectors are likely to be affected. The acceding coun-
tries are likely to become more attractive as invest-
ment locations and can increasingly exploit their cost
advantages. Enlargement could lead to some
production re-location to the acceding countries –
not necessarily only from the present EU Member
States – and to more pronounced patterns of special-
isation according to comparative advantage. Indus-
tries within the enlarged EU are likely to expand
where internal or external economies of scale are
important.
Since 1995, economic growth in the acceding
countries has exceeded that in the EU, marking the
start of a catch-up process. Productivity growth
(GDP per employed person) in the acceding coun-
tries accelerated strongly during the 1990s, but this
was to a large extent linked to declining employ-
ment. Low employment growth, as well as low
employment levels in some acceding countries,
constitute a major policy challenge. Although
productivity catch-up has taken place, with particu-
larly strong gains in the manufacturing industry of
the acceding countries, average labour productivity
in these countries is still only half that in EU-15.
Prospects for further catch-up remain uneven across
countries and industries.
For the manufacturing sector as a whole, complying
with the existing stock of EU legislation, the ‘acquis
communautaire’, will not be easy and will require addi-
tional investments. While foreign direct investment
has contributed to modernisation and has brought
new management skills into the acceding countries,
the ability of many domestically owned enterprises to
cope with increased competition in the Single Market
remains weak.
Some of the acceding countries have dramatically
reduced – or even completely lost – their specialisa-
tion into labour–intensive, low-skill branches and
made some inroads into technology–driven and
skill–intensive branches, while others have been
‘locked in’ in labour–intensive, low–skill sectors. The
present industrial structure in the majority of the
acceding countries is between that of the industri-
ally less advanced southern EU (Greece, Portugal
and Spain) and that of the more advanced large
Member States (Germany, France, Italy and the UK).
The ten Central and East European acceding and
candidate countries – the eight countries acceding
in May 2004 together with Bulgaria and Romania –
account for 21 % of all manufacturing jobs in an
‘enlarged EU’ comprising themselves and the
present 15 EU members. Excluding Bulgaria and
Romania, their employment share is 15 %. The
largest employers are the food and beverages
industry, textiles, basic metals and fabricated
metals, as well as mechanical engineering.
The ten Central and East European acceding and
candidate countries account for about 11 % of total
manufacturing production (using purchasing power
parities) in an area comprising themselves and the
present EU-15. However, their share is larger in
industries such as wood products and furniture,
non-metallic minerals, as well as food and bever-
ages. In contrast, paper and printing, chemicals,
machinery and equipment, as well as electrical and
optical equipment have a smaller weight in total
manufacturing than they have in EU-15.
Productivity growth in manufacturing in recent
years has outpaced that of EU-15 by more than 6
percentage points per year and the process of
productivity convergence is bound to continue. But
in contrast to EU-15, where manufacturing employ-
ment has remained stable, productivity catch-up in
the acceding countries has been associated with
persistent job losses. Among the individual indus-
tries, the best productivity performance was
recorded in the electrical and optical equipment
industry, followed by transport equipment and
furniture. Weaker productivity growth was regis-
tered in food and beverages, textiles, leather, wood
products, paper and printing and chemicals. In
general, industries which are technologically more
sophisticated have strongly improved their produc-
tivity performance, while traditional sectors using
standard techniques and low-skilled labour have
been falling behind.
Overall labour costs in the ten Central and Eastern
European acceding and candidate countries are soEuropean competitiveness report 2003
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low that the cost advantage more than compen-
sates for their lower productivity relative to the
present EU-15. Unit labour costs vary between
17 % (Bulgaria) and 72 % (Slovenia) of the EU-15
average. If the current productivity catch-up
continues and if wage increases remain moderate,
the acceding countries can further improve their
unit labour cost competitiveness. Such competitive-
ness gains have already been registered in sectors
which have successfully been restructured. Enter-
prises with foreign participation have posted partic-
ularly strong performance in terms of productivity
growth and related cost advantages. Nevertheless,
appreciation of the currently undervalued curren-
cies of some acceding countries could partly or
wholly offset the gains in terms of unit labour costs.
During the 1990s, trade integration between the EU
and the acceding and candidate countries in Central
and Eastern Europe progressed swiftly. In most
sub–sectors of manufacturing, trade with EU-15
already accounts for a very high share of the total.
Manufacturing trade of the Central and East Euro-
pean acceding and candidate countries with EU-15
has become increasingly focused on a few key indus-
tries: textiles and textile products, basic metals and
fabricated metal products, electrical and optical
equipment and transport equipment. Over the 1995-
2001 period, these countries gained market shares in
a wide spectrum of industries, largely at the expense
of France, Germany, Sweden, Belgium and Denmark
(Austria, Spain, Ireland and Portugal also increased
their market shares in total EU trade). There is ample
evidence of growing intra-industry trade, especially
between the more advanced acceding countries and
EU-15, and of product and quality upgrading of the
exports of the more advanced acceding countries.
Following major economic transformations after
the early 1990s, the economic structures of the
acceding countries in Central and Eastern Europe
are now much more similar to those in the EU-15
than they were ten years earlier. The previously
small services sector has grown in importance;
the most advanced acceding countries have
shifted their production towards more sophisti-
cated technology-intensive industries and
upgraded their exports’ product quality. Despite
these encouraging developments some chal-
lenges remain.
In the Central and East European acceding and
candidate countries, the export-oriented indus-
tries – often dominated by large enterprises and
where largest FDI flows have gone – are rela-
tively well prepared for the EU acceding. In
contrast, there are still major challenges in many
domestically oriented industries and, in general,
small businesses are still not well aware of the
changes which EU membership will require.
The low level of unit labour costs gives a
competitive advantage to the Central and East
European acceding countries. Major currency
realignments, or wage convergence towards EU-
15 levels over and above a productivity catch-up,
may risk undermining the cost advantage.
In terms of overall manufacturing competitive-
ness, the ten Central and East European
acceding and candidate countries fall into two
groups. Countries in the first group, with higher
labour productivity and higher wages, are
increasingly shifting their production specialisa-
tion towards technology-driven high-skill indus-
tries. The second group - the Baltic States,
Bulgaria and Romania - displays lower produc-
tivity levels and competes essentially on the basis
of lower labour costs. There is a danger that the
countries in the second group might be locked in
labour-intensive or natural resource-intensive
patterns of production.
The impact of enlargement on enterprises in the
present EU-15 is likely to be largest in the areas
bordering the acceding countries, in particular
Germany and Austria. In the long run, the rela-
tively high human capital endowments of the
acceding countries should allow them to
compete in principal with the industries located
essentially  in the Northern EU-15 members.
Analysis of recent trade flows however points to
a relative specialisation of the acceding countries
in capital- and labour-intensive production; in
the latter industries they would compete in
particular with Greece and Portugal.This is the seventh edition of the Commission’s
Report on European competitiveness since the 1994
Industry Council Resolution that established its
basis. As in previous editions, competitiveness is
understood to mean high and rising standards of
living of a nation with the lowest possible level of
involuntary unemployment on a sustainable basis.
The present Report continues the analysis of
productivity developments initiated with the 2001
edition and continued in the 2002 Report. 
The present edition consists of five topics. First,
there is a comparison and decomposition of
productivity growth in Europe and the US.
Secondly, recent evidence suggests that the combi-
nation of organisational capital with other types of
enterprise modernisation measures constitute an
essential characteristic of those firms that have
experienced robust productivity growth. The Report
reviews the theoretical basis for this and provides
new empirical evidence from sectoral and establish-
ment level data from Germany. Third, the Report
also examines empirically, on the basis of a new set
of data, some hypotheses derived from recent
developments in economic geography. The purpose
here is to identify those factors, principally R&D
intensity and knowledge–related ones, that appear
to determine the above–average performance of
regional labour productivity growth (or regional
competitiveness) in a sample of over 200 NUTS–2
EU regions. Fourth, as Europe’s industrial landscape
is likely to change, perhaps radically, after enlarge-
ment, the Report examines various aspects of the
enlargement process and discusses the likely impact
of the enlargement on economic structures in a
wider Europe. 
The Competitiveness Report is one of several
Commission instruments directed at analysing
competitiveness developments in the EU. The
importance of competitiveness has been explicitly
Introduction
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recognised in the EU’s growth strategy, the Lisbon
strategy. The ultimate goal of the Lisbon strategy is
for the EU to become, by the end of the present
decade, the most competitive and dynamic knowl-
edge–based economy in the world capable of
sustainable economic growth with more and better
jobs and greater social cohesion. Achieving this goal
clearly requires durable and strong productivity
growth sustained over a number of years. 
The emphasis of the Lisbon strategy on structural
reform and renewal, and on competitiveness that is
based on science and on knowledge, provides a
new direction for the EU. It clearly recognises that
the old structures and the old ways of thinking
about economic growth have become less relevant
for the EU of the 21st century. Indeed, for an
advanced industrial economy such as ours the
sources of economic growth and of prosperity must
be found in our intangible resources – knowledge,
science, entrepreneurship and risk taking – on
which we need to build to enable us to achieve our
ambitious social and environmental objectives. The
need for reform is clearly all–encompassing,
extending beyond the economic and into the social
and environmental fields. 
The forthcoming enlargement, while presenting us
with many opportunities, also adds to the chal-
lenges that the EU is confronting almost midway
into the Lisbon strategy. The strategy, of course,
remains very relevant for the acceding nations
where the needs for reform and modernisation are
perhaps most marked. Attaining the objectives of
the original Lisbon vision has now become urgent,
and decisive progress must be made, especially in
the present EU Member States, if the goals are to
remain attainable.
In the period since the Lisbon European Council of
March 2000 economic developments in the EU have
IntroductionEuropean competitiveness report 2003
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been disappointing. The Lisbon European Council
saw at the time that “the Union (was) experiencing
its best macro-economic outlook for a generation”.
The reality has been far from this assessment. The EU
has since been under–performing without much of
secure evidence that the outlook will improve deci-
sively in coming quarters. Even more worrying has
been the substantial slowdown in productivity
growth that has been registered in several Member
States including the larger ones. Clearly, without a
reversal of these trends, the ambitions of the EU will
not be realised and the challenges ahead will be diffi-
cult to surmount.
Previous editions of the Competitiveness Report have
discussed the issue of the slowdown of productivity
growth in the EU using data on output per person
employed across the EU and in the Member States
and notably in comparison with the US. The present
Report continues this reflection, examining different
aspects of the productivity performance of the EU. 
Chapter 1 discusses EU/US and Member States
productivity comparisons and presents an empirical
analysis. Using data for 2002 from the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre and from the
Structural Indicators, the EU/US gap in the standards
of living amounts to around 30 percentage points
(the EU variable was around 70 percent of the US
variable). Between 8 (Groningen) and 13 (Structural
Indicators) percentage points can be attributed to
higher hourly productivity in the US, between 15
(Groningen) and 4 (Structural Indicators) points to
lower average hours worked in the EU, and between
6 (Groningen) and 12 (Structural Indicators) points
to the lower employment rate in the EU. Similar
remarks can be made for each of the Member States.
This chapter also discusses the apparent conundrum
of “having to choose” between employment and
productivity growth and uses examples from the
Member States to highlight some policy choices.
There might, however, be some temporary trade-off
in that with the growing share of low-skills services
sector in GDP the inevitable might be that produc-
tivity growth in the EU would remain weak. Raising
the standards of living through an increase in the
employment rate is a key aspiration of the Lisbon
strategy but it is important to recognise that there
are limits to the extent this can be sustained over
the medium term. After all, there is a finite volume
of labour input (employment and hours worked)
that can be mobilised out of a given labour force,
thus leaving productivity growth as the single most
important determinant of the growth in the stan-
dards of living over the medium term. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature and provides
evidence on the complementarity of ICT applica-
tions and enterprise re-organisation. The key idea is
that ICT–type innovations will not yield their full
productivity benefits unless they are accompanied
by investment in organisation capital. Enterprises
that invest in ICT applications must also invest in
complementary organisational changes to make
effective use of the potential of new technologies. 
The Report examines the specific role of e-business
applications in promoting productivity growth.
Most large EU firms use e-business applications
often accompanied by complementary investments
in hardware, software and training. Sectoral data for
Germany, France, Italy and the UK suggests that
there is positive correlation between the use of
some types of organisational initiatives and labour
productivity growth, and that certain e-business
applications are positively correlated with either
sectoral skill intensity or information technology
intensity. Also, industry data from Finland show that
there is a positive relation between labour produc-
tivity growth and the percentage of enterprises with
new or significantly changed organisational struc-
tures, but this relationship is not supported in data
from other EU Member States. 
The key role of ICT in organisational change
suggests that governments must ensure the provi-
sion of an efficient infrastructure, especially a high
quality ICT infrastructure, in view of the externalities
involved. Finally, firm–level data from Germany indi-
cate that the simultaneous introduction of three
organisational measures – teamwork, autonomous
work groups and the reduction of hierarchies – in
the years 1996 or 1997 increased the average
productivity of a representative sample of German
establishments by 8 % in the period 1997-2000. 
Chapter 3 of the Report examines regional aspects
of competitiveness. Regional competitiveness is
understood to mean productivity, that is, regional
GDP per hour worked. The scope of the analysis is
limited by the availability of indicators, although
indicators were available to measure productivity of
15 sectors across the NUTS-2 regions over 1980-
2000, and to identify a selection of knowledge-
based proxies such as R&D expenditure, and
students enrolled in higher education.
Decomposition of the regional productivity data
shows that the majority of successful regions (those
with higher than average productivity growth) were
supported by large contributions from market services
– in particular other market services and financial inter-
mediation. Correlations suggest that productivityIntroduction
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growth is positively related to R&D intensity, speciali-
sation in high-tech activities, and the proportion of
students in tertiary education. Productivity growth is
negatively related to its starting level, indicating that a
process of regional convergence is underway. Further-
more, the data indicate that spillover effects are likely
to be present and that high productivity in one region
is positively related to similar results in neighbouring
areas. This does not mean that peripheral areas always
exhibit low productivity and low competitiveness, as
pockets of success can always emerge if the conditions
are right. Evidence from more detailed analysis of five
“outlying” regions reveals that a range of factors have
likely contributed to a superior productivity perform-
ance. 
The evidence also reinforces the key role of the EU
and the Member States to continue to remove
barriers to trade and open up regions to competition
across the Single Market. Problems of peripheral
regions need to be specifically addressed through
improved transport and communications, especially
telecommunications, and policy everywhere needs to
address human capital requirements. 
Chapter 4 examines the implications of the forth-
coming enlargement and, in particular, its likely
implications for the manufacturing industry in an
enlarged Europe. The EU enlargement could cause
production re-location to the acceding countries
and an improved resource allocation. Industries
within the enlarged EU are likely to expand where
internal or external economies of scale are impor-
tant, while the acceding countries could become
more attractive as investment locations and will
increasingly exploit their cost advantages. An even
closer integration of the acceding countries
following their entry into the Union will help to
raise productivity and competitiveness in the EU as
a whole. 
In recent years, significant sectoral shifts have taken
place in the acceding countries bringing their struc-
tures closer to the broad economic structures in the
EU. The productivity catch-up has been especially
pronounced in manufacturing industry even though
levels of labour productivity are still less than half of
the EU average. The majority of the acceding coun-
tries have an industrial structure that is positioned
somewhere between the industrially less advanced
southern EU countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain)
and the more advanced northern Member States
(Germany, France, Italy and the UK).
Productivity growth in manufacturing in recent
years, closely linked to employment losses, has
outpaced that of the EU by more than 6 percentage
points per year and the process of productivity
convergence is bound to continue. Labour cost
gaps in acceding countries relative to the EU are
much larger than gaps in productivity, implying
substantial cost advantages in terms of unit labour
costs. Productivity growth and related cost advan-
tages have been particularly high in enterprises with
foreign investment participation.
During the 1990s, trade integration between the EU
and the acceding and candidate countries in
Central and Eastern Europe progressed swiftly. Over
the period 1995-2001, the latter group of countries
has gained market shares in a wide spectrum of
industries, gains that occurred largely at the
expense of market shares of France, Germany,
Sweden, Belgium and Denmark. 
Some of the Central and Eastern European acceding
or candidate countries have dramatically reduced
(or even reversed) their specialisation in
labour–intensive, low-skill branches and made some
inroads into technology–driven and skill–intensive
branches. Others, however, show specialisation
structures that are ‘locked in’ in the labour–inten-
sive, low–skill sectors. While accession will not bring
about additional dramatic changes for industry,
owing to the already high degree of integration,
there will be some sectors and regions that might
be adversely affected.1.0 Introduction 
The European economy is currently in the midst of
a slow growth period, with some countries in reces-
sion. Overall growth in the European Union was
about 1.3 % in each of the past two years while,
according to the Commission’s Spring 2003
Economic Forecasts, growth in 2003 is estimated at
around 1 %. Compared to other slow growth
periods, employment proved to be rather robust,
increasing at about 0.9 % per year and creating
2.6 million jobs in two years. However, there has
been low growth in labour productivity.
Economic growth continues to be higher in the
United States. Real economic growth was lower in
2001 but in 2002 and in 2003 US growth will again
be higher than in the European Union. In contrast
to Europe, US growth was determined primarily by
an increase in productivity, while employment was
stagnant. This reflects both substantial layoffs in the
formerly booming ICT sector and the high utilisa-
tion of labour. Employment increased by 20 million
or 16.7 % in the 1990s, and the employment rate
increased from 73.5 % to 75.1 %.
This chapter discusses comparisons of productivity
and employment growth in Europe and the US in
recent years and investigates country differences
across these variables within the EU. Comprehensive
studies on the EU-US comparisons and on determi-
nants of growth differences are available in previous
Competitiveness Reports2 and in the literature, as
shown in Box 1.1. This chapter provides new
evidence based on new data. In particular, it provides
a comparison of EU performance against that of the
US in per capita income, productivity per person
employed and per hour worked. Conflicting data
have been presented in the past on these important
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indicators of the standards of living. Moreover, the
chapter reviews the determinants of productivity
growth over the past decade in the EU, in the
Member States and in the US and, in particular, the
role played by information and communication tech-
nology (ICT) in these differences.
A widely accepted definition of competitiveness is
the ability of an economy to provide its population
with high and rising standards of living and a high
level of employment for all those willing to work on
a sustainable basis. The central ingredient of
competitiveness is productivity growth. Raising
productivity growth in a sustainable manner and
increasing the rate of employment over the
medium term constitute crucial (albeit not the only
ones) objectives of the Lisbon strategy.
The present chapter is organised as follows: Section
1.1 reviews some recent evidence over the period
2001 – 2002 on developments in productivity and
uses data on productivity per hour worked for the
EU and the US for this purpose. Section 1.2 discusses
developments in 2002 in output per capita, output
per person employed and output per hour worked
and it also takes a longer term perspective over the
past quarter century on the growth rate of these
variables as well as on employment trends.
Reviewing data spanning a longer term period is
important since many impressions about produc-
tivity developments and a widening of differences
between the EU and the US have been based on
data for the second half of the 1990s. This section
also reviews more detailed evidence by Member
State and considers the question of convergence
between the EU and the US. 
Section 1.3 examines the role of information and
communications technology (ICT) in productivity
growth and provides a comparison, in greater detail





2 See in particular European Commission (2000a, 2001 and 2002a). European competitiveness report 2003
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Box 1.1: Recent studies on cross-country differences in economic growth
Author/Institution Title Scope Additional features
Aiginger, K., European  The New European Model Analysing performance Excellent performance of
Forum at Stanford  of the Reformed  differences in  reformed welfare states
University, Working  Welfare State Europe & determinants with specific innovation
Paper 2/2002 policy
Aiginger, K.,  Competitive Economic Productivity comparison Impact of differences
Landesmann, M., WIFO  Performance:  EU vs. US: determinants in industry structure
Working Papers 179/2002 The European View on prospect
Ark Van et al., GGCG,  ICT Investments and  Contribution of ICT Structural impact in product
2003 Growth Accounts for the  or growth in EU and US and labour markets may 
European Union 1980-2000 limit growth
European Commission,  Choosing to grow: Progress of Lisbon Strategy Role of knowledge,
2003a Knowledge, innovation and  innovation and jobs
jobs in a cohesive society
European Commission, European Economy Structural reforms Impact of reforms
European Economy 6,  in labour and product on GDP and employment
2002b markets growth
European Commission,  The EU Economy 2002 Macroeconomic  Convergence of Accession
European Economy 6,  Review Development countries
2002b
European Commission,  The EU Economy 2000 Is there a new pattern  Prospects and challenges
European Economy 71,  Review of growth emerging? for Europe
2000b
European Commission,  European Competitiveness Productivity growth Human capital, 
2002a Report 2002 in services environmental performance
European Commission,  European Competitiveness  Productivity and innovation Increasing gap to US;
2001 Report 2001 industry study on 
biotechnology
European Commission,  European Competitiveness Competition in quality Industry study on service
2000a Report 2000 inputs, pharmaceuticals
Gordon, R.J.,  Two Centuries of  Performance Europe vs.  Specific differences in 
Northwestern University,  Economic Growth:   US in the long  per capita and 
2002 Europe Chasing  and short run per hour performance
the American Frontier
McMorrow, K., Roeger, W.,  Potential Output:  New Economy effect on Growth scenarios for the EU
European Commission,  Measurement Methods potential growth and the US
Economic papers no 150, 
2001
OECD, 2003 The Sources of Economic  Econometric evidence and  Impact of regulation and 
Growth in OECD Countries growth determinants public sector human capital
OECD, 2001 The New Economy:  Explaining differences in Policy conclusions
beyond the hype, Final report growth performance 
on the OECD Growth Project of OECD countries
Pichelmann, K., Roeger, W., The EU Growth Strategy Impact of ageing on  Changes in work incentives 
Review of International  and the Impact of Ageing growth and stability pact needed
Economics, 2003 
(forthcoming)Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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Report, of the performances in the EU, the Member
States and the US. A novel aspect of this work is a
decomposition of hourly productivity acceleration
in the second half of the 1990s compared with the
first half of the decade into the contribution of ICT
capital, non-ICT capital and total factor productivity
growth. While the overall characteristics of EU
productivity growth in recent years, as reported in
the 2001 and 2002 editions of the Competitiveness
Report, are confirmed once more the analysis
provides some new and interesting insights.
One key reason for the lower level of GDP per
capita in the EU is that work time is shorter than in
the US. This is both a policy and a choice variable.
Given the importance of this factor, section 1.4
considers policy choices and strategies about the
employment rate and the labour content of growth,
and discusses the policy efficiency of measures
implemented to facilitate the employment of
women or of low wage workers. Finally, section 1.5
summarises and concludes.
1.1 Evidence from 
2001-2002: EU, US 
and the Member States 
EU and US
There has been considerable debate among growth
economists over the reality of a lasting rebound in
global productivity growth in the US since 1995
and the so-called emergence of a “new economy”
based on production and diffusion of information
and communication technologies (ICT). In parallel,
there are significant questions about the apparent
inability of the EU to profit from the possibilities
offered by IC technology3.
Critics of the “new economy” paradigm believe that
the period of 1995 to 2000 is exceptional (see
debates in Gordon, 2000, Oliner and Sichel, 2000).
Yet, despite scepticism, and notwithstanding the
stock market bubble associated with “new economy”
exuberant expectations, the evidence from US data
confirms that there has been a substantial produc-
tivity renaissance in the US since the mid-1990s.
Data for 2001 and 2002 show that labour produc-
tivity growth in the US has remained strong4. Yet,
this period is very different from the high growth
period of 1995-2000. In 2001-2002 real GDP
growth in the US was 1.3 % after a 4 % increase
per annum in the second half of the 1990s (see
Table 1.1). Population increased by 0.9 %, thus
limiting GDP per capita growth to 0.3 %. 
GDP per employee on the contrary rose by 1.6 %
reflecting principally a substantial decline in employ-
ment. With stable hours worked per employee,
output per hour worked in the US rose also by 1.6 %.
These developments contrast with long-term trends,
where growth in income is higher than productivity
growth (see Table 1.1 and Section 1.4), with employ-
ment increasing faster than population. On the basis
of the conventional productivity cycle one would
have predicted a decrease in productivity at the
beginning of a recession (2001), but it appears that
US firms have reacted quickly by laying off workers in
this cycle. At the same time, it is clear that with fewer
workers in employment, output per person
employed and per hour increased relatively fast as
compared to the slow growth of output. This
suggests that previous organisational and technolog-
ical investments on the part of US enterprises are ulti-
mately paying off in the form of continuous and
robust productivity growth during the downturn.
Economic growth in the EU was higher than in the
US in 2001 but lower in 2002, averaging around
1.3 % during this two-year period in either of the
two regions. With stagnant EU population growth
(0.3 %), GDP per capita growth was 1 %. EU
employment growth was 0.9 % and GDP per
person employed increased by 0.4 %, that is,
substantially less than the growth recorded in the
US. While the shortfall of EU productivity growth
relative to the US was somewhat less in terms of
hours worked (0.9 % against 1.6 %) the cumulative
growth of US hourly productivity over the period
1995-2002 surpassed the corresponding EU growth
by nearly 4.5 percentage points. 
Graph 1.2 shows trends in EU and US productivity per
hour worked since the mid-1980s to 2002 that
confirm that the EU convergence towards the level of
US productivity, which advanced rapidly until 1995,
has come to an end and a divergence is now charac-
terising the data. Indeed, during 2001-2002 a more
marked divergence in productivity developments has
emerged (1995 has been selected as the base year in
Graph 1.2 to reflect the beginning of this divergence).
4 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ estimate (6 March 2003) US
hourly labour productivity in the business sector rebounded in 2002 to
4.8 %, a record surpassing all of the past records since the end of WWII
(except 6.9 % in 1950) after a 1.1 % increase in 2001, which was a recession
year. This increase for 2002 results from a 2.7 % increase in output and a
strong decline in hours worked (2.1 %).
3 The impact of ICT is discussed in Section 1.3 of this chapter and in Chapter
2; Ark van (2000), European Commission (2001), Aiginger and Landesmann
(2002) and OECD (2001), among others, credit ICT with an important role
in the acceleration of productivity growth.European competitiveness report 2003
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Graph 1.1: Growth of real output and productivity, EU and US
(Average annual increase in percent, 2001-2002)
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Table 1.1: Trends in GDP employment and productivity growth: US and EU
Growth of
Real  GDP GDP  Productivity Employment Productivity 
per capita per worker per hour
EU US EU US EU US EU US EU US
1990 3.03 1.75 2.43 0.67 1.83 0.50 1.19 1.24 2.06 1.08
1991 1.89 -0.50 1.21 -1.54 2.36 0.41 -0.47 -0.90 3.57 1.04
1992 1.20 3.06 0.98 1.96 2.09 2.39 -0.87 0.66 2.30 2.89
1993 -0.35 2.67 -0.81 1.59 1.20 1.16 -1.53 1.49 1.70 0.29
1994 2.79 4.08 2.44 3.07 2.94 1.71 -0.14 2.33 2.86 1.10
1995 2.46 2.70 2.16 1.75 1.71 1.19 0.74 1.50 1.86 0.39
Growth p.a. 1990-1995 1.59 2.39 1.19 1.35 2.06 1.37 -0.46 1.01 2.46 1.14
1996 1.67 3.61 1.39 2.66 0.97 2.13 0.69 1.45 1.02 2.21
1997 2.59 4.43 2.21 1.58 1.79 2.13 0.78 2.25 1.86 1.58
1998 2.91 4.28 2.68 3.07 0.88 2.77 2.02 1.47 0.94 1.92
1999 2.66 4.11 2.41 2.93 0.89 2.54 1.76 1.54 1.29 2.09
2000 3.45 3.75 3.17 2.63 1.61 2.43 1.81 1.29 2.03 2.05
Growth p.a. 1995-2000 2.66 4.04 2.37 2.57 1.23 2.40 1.41 1.60 1.43 1.97
2001 1.63 0.25 1.36 -0.69 0.29 0.35 1.33 -0.10 1.29 0.38
2002 0.95 2.30 0.71 1.36 0.52 2.81 0.43 -0.50 0.47 2.81
Growth p.a. 2001-2002 1.29 1.27 1.03 0.33 0.40 1.58 0.88 -0.30 0.88 1.59
Accumulated growth  16.95 25.00 14.74 14.30 7.15 16.16 9.15 7.60 9.23 13.78
1995-2002
Growth p.a. 1995-2002 2.26 3.24 1.98 1.93 0.99 2.16 1.26 1.05 1.27 1.86
Source: WIFO and CEPII calculations using data from Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC web site at
http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc/homeggdc.html).Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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Box 1.2: Convergence paths of EU to US performance: Some illustrative scenarios
In order to make the data presented in Table 1.1 more concrete and to understand their implications for the possibility
of convergence of the EU towards the US variables, three hypothetical questions can be asked. The answer to each ques-
tion is based on the data used in the chapter. 
A word of caution is in order here. The answers to these hypothetical questions (in particular questions I and III) should
in no way be seen as describing a real situation and have by no means any forecasting merit. These are illustrative
scenarios based on mechanical extrapolation of current trends. However, they are enlightening because they show (in
perhaps a dramatic manner) the extent of some challenges if the present trends are not reversed. Another important
caveat is that these exercises have been run for the EU–15. Should the EU–25 level be considered, two aspects would
have to be factored in. First, given the significantly lower standards of living (and productivity) levels in the acceding
nations, the enlarged EU average is lower and therefore the answers to the questions would have to be revised accord-
ingly. Specifically, the catching–up process with the US will be harder, or will take longer, for the enlarged and on average
poorer EU–25. On the other hand, this lower starting level of the new Member States is likely, by the convergence
hypothesis, to be associated with a faster growth rate of these countries relative to the incumbents and therefore it is
reasonable to expect higher growth rates for the enlarged EU.
The questions
I — Time required to double the standards of living (GDP per capita)
On the assumption that GDP per capita in the EU will grow on average at the same pace as during the period 1996-
2000, how long will it take until the standards of living in the EU double? 
Table I: How long will it take to double the standards of living
Growth during GDP per capita (%) Years before doubling
(annual growth rate)
EU US EU US
2002 0.71 1.36 98 51
2001-2002 1.03 0.33 68 210
1996-2000 2.36 2.57 30 27
1996-2002 1.98 1.93 35 36
Table I answers this question for the EU and the US using growth rates over different periods4. Between 1966 and 2000
the US has enjoyed a doubling of its standards of living as have most EU Member States during the same period (GDP
per capita in the US rose from USD 15 900 in 1966 to USD 31 700 in 2000. Data for the EU are not easily available, but
for each Member States they do exist). 
Depending on the growth rate used, the time it would take for the standards of living to double again in the EU varies
between almost a century – if growth proceeds at the 2002 pace – and a mere 30 years if the situation during the period
1996-2000 can be replicated in the future. The US would have to wait as much as over two centuries to double it stan-
dards of living if the sluggish pace of the period 2001-2002 (due to a negative performance in 2001) persists into the
future. If, on the contrary, the good performance of the period 1996-2000 materialises in the future, 27 years would be
enough for the US to have twice its present GDP per capita.
II — Additional growth required for catch up
Given the present divergence in the standards of living between the EU and the US by how much should the EU outper-
form the US in order to catch up 20 years from now? Similarly, by how much should the EU outperform the US in order
5 The number of years before doubling (n) is computed as n = ln 2 /ln (1+r) where r is the growth rate used.to reach the same level in productivity per worker (GDP per person employed) and in productivity per hour (GDP per
hour worked)?
Table II: By how much should the EU outperform the USA
For catch up within: Standards of living  Productivity per worker Productivity per hour 
(%) (%) (%)
20 years 1.62 1.2 0.34
50 years 0.65 0.48 0.14
In 2002, GDP per capita in the EU was 71.7 % of the corresponding level in the US. For the standards of living in the EU
to catch up with those in the US within the coming 20 years, the EU would have to experience, on average, an annual
growth rate in GDP per capita 1.7 percentage points higher than the US growth rate. An equalisation of standards of
living in a longer horizon of 50 years would require an over-performance of the order of 0.7 percentage points6.
Reflecting the fact that the EU gap relative to the US is narrower in terms of labour productivity than in standards of
living, the extra EU productivity growth required to catch up within 20 (50) years is 1.3 (0.5) percentage points for per
worker productivity and 0.5 (0.2) for hourly productivity. This is suggestive of the difficult task of outperforming US
productivity performance on the basis of current trends.
III — What would the gap be in the future?
What will be the difference in the US–EU standards of living 10 years from now if the growth differential for this variable
(GDP per capita) remains the same as for the period 1996–2000? Similarly, how much will the level of productivity differ-
ential be, per worker and per hour, against the US if trends over a given period do prevail over the next 10 and 20 years?
The results are presented in Table III7 where the data represent the percentage difference between the EU and the US
variable in question measured against the US.
Table III: Judging from the past, what will the gap be in the future?
Standard of living Productivity per worker Productivity per hour
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
difference difference difference difference difference difference
in 10 years in 20 years in 10 years in 20 years in 10 years in 20 years
2002 32 36 37 50 26 41
2001-2002 22 17 30 38 13 19
1996-2000 29 30 30 37 11 16
1996-2002 27 27 30 38 12 17
In 2002, the gap in standards of living between the EU and the US was of the order of 28 %. If the relative growth
performance between the two regions witnessed during the period 2001–2002 were to prevail into the future, the gap
would decrease to 23 % 10 years from now and to 18 % 20 years into the future. This suggests that the EU would be
converging to the US standards of living. If, on the contrary, the relative performance in the years to come is similar to
that experienced in the period since 1996, the next 10 or 20 years will not see much of a change in this gap.
The projection of past relative performances in terms of productivity growth into the future depicts a less encouraging
situation. If the EU performance in productivity per worker of the last two years, and those since 1996, were repeated
over the next 10 years this would imply an increase of 8 percentage points in the productivity gap (from 23 % in 2002)
and up to an extra 16 points 20 years from now. For hourly productivity, the results go in the same direction though to
a lesser extent. The gap in hourly productivity, which was 8.5 % in 2002, would increase by around 6 percentage points
within 10 years and by around 10 percentage points in 20 years.
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6 The differential in growth rates (d) required for the EU to catch up with the US in the coming N years is computed as d = (US/EU)1/N – 1, where EU and US
are the variable’s level for each region in 2002.
7 The gap (g) N years from t is computed as g = 1 - (EU/US)t ((1+rEU)/(1+rUS))N where (EU/US)t stands for the relative level of the variable at time t (2002 in
this exercise) while rEU and rUS stand for the growth rate of the EU and the US variables respectively.Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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This exercise should not conceal the fact that productivity developments and the associated improvements in living stan-
dards are driven (or hindered) by a multitude of factors such as the human capital content of the labour force, levels and
quality of capital stock, regulatory environment and macroeconomic conditions. Therefore, judging whether the mainte-
nance in the future of the recent past performance is realistic, or whether the growth rate necessary to fulfil a certain
objective is likely to materialise, would require an assessment of the likely future developments in these factors. Never-
theless, this simple exercise stresses two important, though not surprising, messages:
— Becoming the most competitive economy in the world, if understood as catching up with the economic performance
of a benchmark such as the US, will require a significantly superior performance relative to the US through the coming
years. This is particularly true for standards of living and for productivity per worker. Current trends are clearly at vari-
ance with such a possibility and they do not support such a conjecture.
— Though the EU gap relative to the US is narrower in terms of productivity than in standards of living, if the relative
performance of the two regions in recent years (since 1996) does not change substantially, the productivity differen-
tial will increase further in the future. This implies that convergence towards the US standards of living would have to
depend, ceteris paribus, on an important improvement in EU participation and/or employment rates relative to the US.
Graph 1.2: Productivity (GDP per hour) in the EU and US (1995=100)
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The Member States
The performance of the individual Member States
during this period has also been quite diverse. Only
three countries recorded average GDP growth
above 2 % in 2001-2002: Ireland, Greece and
Spain. All three are considered to be catching up
countries, although Ireland enjoys well above
average growth after surpassing the EU productivity
level (see Table 1.2). The UK, Sweden and France
registered an average growth of about 1.5 % while
Germany had the lowest growth rate followed by
the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Portugal and
Italy with GDP growth rates near or below 1 %.
Seven countries created more employment than the
average (0.9 % in the EU on average): Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden and
Luxembourg. As a consequence, their measured
productivity performance is much lower than their
growth performance. All other countries recorded
an improvement in productivity performance
through adjustment in total hours of work. Conse-
quently, Denmark, Germany, Greece, France, the
Netherlands and Finland had a higher increase in
productivity per hour than in GDP. Compared to
the US, on current trends the EU is experiencing a
widening of its divergence in terms of productivity
per hour worked by an average 0.7 % per year.
This, of course, is a substantial worsening of the EU
performance compared to the US. With the excep-
tion of Ireland, Greece, France, and Denmark, all EU
countries had a lower increase in hourly produc-
tivity than the US during the period 2001-2002.
Graph 1.3 plots the average per worker productivity
growth in 2001-2002 against the average employ-
ment growth in the EU, in the Member States and
in the US. A minority of nations registered either
employment declines but positive productivity
growth – Germany and Greece – or (sometimes
strong) employment growth coupled with negative
productivity growth –the Netherlands, Italy and
Spain. Clearly, the case of Ireland stands out with
substantial productivity and employment growth
during this period. The majority of the Member
States cluster in the region of slow productivity





This section considers levels and trends in labour
productivity in the EU, in the US and in the individual
Table 1.2: GDP, GDP per capita and productivity (Average annual increase in percent, 2001-2002)
Growth of
Real GDP GDP Productivity Productivity Real GDP
per capita per worker per hour
2001/2002 1991/1995 1996/2000
Belgium 0.85 0.68 0.36 0.43 1.60 2.81 
Denmark 1.07 0.76 0.86 1.60 1.97 2.66
Germany 0.48 0.38 0.67 1.18 2.05 1.79
Greece 3.82 3.61 4.10 4.10 1.25 3.42
Spain 2.28 2.10 -0.51 -0.56 1.51 3.80
France 1.42 0.96 0.53 2.41 1.06 2.68
Ireland 4.72 3.55 2.79 3.28 4.70 9.89
Italy 1.04 0.85 -0.62 -0.12 1.27 1.87
Luxembourg 0.99 0.33 -2.02 -1.96 3.93 6.76
Netherlands 0.61 0.06 -0.42 0.87 2.13 3.68
Austria 0.87 0.63 0.85 0.85 2.05 2.57
Portugal 1.03 0.84 -0.08 -0.08 1.70 3.81
Finland 1.16 1.00 0.45 1.25 -0.67 5.05
Sweden 1.45 1.43 0.49 1.18 0.59 2.96
UK 1.85 1.52 1.07 0.98 1.76 2.83
EU 1.29 1.03 0.40 0.88 1.59 2.66
US 1.27 0.33 1.58 1.59 2.39 4.04
Note: GGDC does not include Luxembourg so OECD data are used for this country.
Source: WIFO calculations using data from Groningen Growth and Development Centre.Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
27
Member States against the aggregate EU perform-
ance. Two measures of labour productivity are used,
GDP per person employed and GDP per hour
worked. Both are contrasted with performance in
GDP per capita. The purpose of this material is to
present an encompassing picture of the determi-
nants of the standards of living and especially the
message of different measures of productivity. First,
the level of EU productivity is discussed relative to the
US and a preferred estimate for 2002 is contrasted
with alternative estimates. Secondly, relative EU/US
GDP per capita level is presented with the focus on
the relative importance of labour force participation
and the labour leisure trade-off. Finally, growth across
time and issues of convergence of productivity in the
EU towards the US level complete this section.
1.2.1 The level of EU and US
productivity in 2002
A comparison of estimates
Table 1.3 presents estimates of the level of GDP per
capita and labour productivity in the EU relative to the
US, based on three alternative estimates: OECD data,
estimates from the University of Groningen Growth
and Development Centre (GGDC) which underlie the
results in the Conference Board (2003) and estimates
from EUROSTAT Structural Indicators (SI). 
All three estimates demonstrate consistently that
GDP per capita in the EU is nearly 30 % lower than
in the US.
Discrepancies appear when examining the two esti-
mates for labour productivity. First, all three sources
suggest again a large US lead in GDP per person
employed, but the lead implicit in the SI is signifi-
cantly below that in either OECD or GGDC data. In
contrast, both OECD and GGDC indicate a lower
US lead over the EU in output per hour than does
the SI estimate. 
Understanding these differences requires further
examination of the components that make up the
underlying estimates – these are shown in the
second panel of Table 1.3. The OECD estimates
suggest a marginally lower level of GDP in the US
relative to the EU than the remaining two measures.
All three estimates employ essentially the same
population numbers, but there are variations in the
two labour input components. Thus, in contrast to
the other two estimates, SI implies that the level of
EU employment relative to the US in 2002 was only
Graph 1.3: Productivity per worker and employment growth in the EU, in the Member States and in
the US, 2001-2002
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15 % higher compared to more than 20 % in
GGDC and OECD. This is more than compensated
by the fact that the SI estimates imply annual
average working hours only about 5 % lower in the
EU than the US, in contrast to about 15 % lower EU
average hours in both GGDC and OECD. 
There are four variables that are key in arriving at esti-
mates of the level of productivity, namely the
purchasing power parities (PPP) employed to convert
output in national currency units into a common
currency; the definition of employment; the methods
used to calculate hours worked; and methods to
adjust for the informal economy. Details for all four
are outlined in Box 1.3. Since the three sets of esti-
mates use consistent, albeit different, methods and
data sources it is difficult to choose between them.
The remainder of this section uses GGDC data as
these are the estimates where both comparative
numbers and the component series are most readily
available and cover the longest possible period. The
same data has also been used subsequently in several
Graphs in other sections for the same reason.8
Productivity levels in the EU and the US in 2002
Table 1.4 presents, relative to the US, levels of GDP
per capita, GDP per person employed and GDP per
hour for the EU and the Member States in 2002. 
With the exception of Luxembourg, all Member States
had levels of GDP per capita significantly below that of
the US in 2002. However, within the EU there is much
variation so that the countries with the highest levels
(Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands) enjoy
average standards of living some 70 % above those in
the poorest nations (Greece, Portugal). There is less
variation in levels of GDP per capita among the coun-
tries with the highest population (Germany, France,
the UK and Italy clustering around 73 % of the US
level) but Spain falls well behind this mark.
Data on GDP per person employed show a somewhat
different picture even though, once more, the US leads
all EU Member States bar Luxembourg. There remains
a large gap between the highest and lowest produc-
tivity per person employed across countries, but the
identification of the leaders changes. In this case the
highest productivity countries include some of the
larger countries, i.e. France and Italy. Finally, the GDP
per hour worked data demonstrate that many Member
States are reaching productivity levels above or close to
the US, namely Luxembourg, Belgium, France, the
Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and Germany. The Member
States with the lowest per capita incomes (Greece,
Portugal and Spain) remain those with the lowest levels
of per hour and per employee labour productivity.
Underlying the divergence in labour productivity are
marked cross-country differences in the sectoral
distribution of economic activity. Thus, the US
continues to enjoy a significant lead over all EU
Member States in manufacturing, but its lead is less
8 Note that the GGDC data and the Structural Indicators display closely
comparable growth rates, but not levels, for the variables relevant here.
Table 1.3: EU/US comparisons: Alternative estimates for 2002 (US = 100)
OECD data GGDC Structural Indicators
GDP per capita 72.4 71.7 71.2
GDP per person employed 79.0 77.1 82.6
GDP per hour worked 90.0 91.5 86.8
Components:
GDP 95.2 94.4 93.7
Population 131.5 131.7 131.5
Persons employed 120.6 122.4 113.4
Annual average hours worked 87.7 84.2 95.2
Total hours worked 105.7 103.2 107.9
Notes: OECD estimates have been computed based on data received from OECD – in particular OECD does not publish a total EU estimate. GGDC
does not include Luxembourg in its estimate for the total EU – for completeness OECD data are used for Luxembourg The components for the Struc-
tural Indicators were derived implicitly by comparing relative levels of GDP per capita, per person engaged, per hour worked and population. 
Sources: OECD: GDP in 2001 USD and population from National Accounts, vol.1, 2002, OECD, persons employed from Labour Force Surveys, 1981-
2001, OECD, Annual average hours worked from Employment Outlook, 2002, OECD; GGDC: GDP in 1999 USD employing Purchasing Power Parities
and Real Expenditures 1999 Benchmark year, Edition 2002, OECD, updated to 2001 using growth in constant price GDP from National Accounts,
vol.1, 2002, OECD, persons employed from Labour Force Statistics, 2002, OECD, annual average hours worked, various sources including Employment
Outlook, 2002, OECD, national statistical offices web-sites e.g. US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), for most EU countries levels were extrapolated from
Angus Maddison (1995), Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, OECD – see GGDC web site http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc/homeggdc.html for
more detail; SI: Eurostat Structural Indicators for relative levels of GDP per capita, per person employed and per hour worked,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat. Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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Box 1.3: Relative levels of GDP and labour input: why do they differ? 
There are four primary variables that are used in estimates of the level of productivity, namely the purchasing power pari-
ties (PPP) employed to convert output in national currency units into a common currency; the definition of employment;
the methods used to calculate hours worked; and possibly the adjustments to account for the informal economy. 
PPP: At present there are three sets of PPP that can be used to convert GDP to a common currency, the 'rolling' or
'current price' estimates of OECD/Eurostat and of the Structural Indicators for 2002 and the fixed base estimates for 1999
preferred by the GGDC. In the 'rolling' estimates, for non-European countries OECD employs national deflators through
three year full PPP benchmarks, whereas EUROSTAT makes use of annual survey information. As indicated in Table 1.3 the
choice of which of the three variants to use makes very little difference to the relative levels of GDP.
Employment – Jobs versus persons: There are currently two employment measures published in official statistics - number
of persons and number of jobs - the difference between the two being the number of persons with two or more jobs.
Multiple jobs are much more prevalent in the US (which has about 5% second jobs) than in the EU (which has about
3% of second jobs). The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) counts jobs, whereas Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS)
estimates refer to resident persons. For the US, EUROSTAT uses the BEA national accounts source whereas GGDC uses
persons. An added complication is that, after adjusting for second jobs, BEA employment totals are about 5 % higher
than BLS sources, which is largely due to BEA adjusting for under-reporting of small firms, in particular non-farm sole
proprietorships and partnerships. Somewhat surprisingly, BEA also publishes data on total hours worked but these refer
only to employees, so that a corresponding adjustment is not made for the hours of the self-employed. Data from the
Statistical Abstract of the USA suggest that hours for self-employed are considerably greater than for employees. An adjust-
ment for self-employed, using these data, was carried out by O’Mahony and DeBoer (2001). Nevertheless such adjust-
ments tend to be crude so that there is an argument for using the published BLS persons and jobs per person estimates
where such adjustments are not required. Employment in EU countries' national accounts is derived from a combination
of jobs-based and headcount-based sources, whereas the labour force survey estimates refer to resident persons
employed (but miss non-resident workers). A correction is applied in national accounts for cross-border workers. It is not
clear a-priori, which of these two concepts is best in measuring productivity per person employed. For the US, EUROSTAT
uses the BEA national accounts source whereas GGDC uses the BLS source.
Annual average hours worked: Of utmost importance is that the hours estimates be consistent with the employment
concept, where hours worked are derived from the product of employment and average hours. Hours per person will by
definition be higher than hours per job. Both OECD and GGDC use hours per person for the US based on data supplied
by BLS. In the case of the US, the Structural Indicators use total hours worked data derived by the US BLS from both BLS
and BEA underlying sources. One possible inconsistency could be introduced with the use of “direct” versus “compo-
nent” methods. The “direct” method employs survey evidence on the actual number of hours worked for persons
surveyed. If the survey is undertaken with high frequency, this method should yield an accurate estimate. The “compo-
nent” method starts with usual weekly hours worked and deducts hours paid, but not worked due to holidays, sick leave,
strikes etc. and adds any additional hours due to overtime. The “component” method frequently draws information from
a large number of - possibly inconsistent - sources whereas the “direct” method is based on a single source, i.e. a survey.
In practice, surveys are often carried out quarterly or on a longer delay so that they may be influenced by seasonal
patterns (holidays, sickness) and ad hoc events. A further complication is that surveys may be based on persons or enter-
prises with the results not always consistent. In the estimates in Table 1.3 OECD hours are direct estimates based on a
mixture of EU sources and on data from business and household surveys (CES and CPS) and on data from employer
surveys from BLS for the US. GGDC generally employs the component method, but their US hours are from the same
source as OECD. The Structural Indicators generally follow the same sources as the OECD for EU countries, allowing for
the timing of new data availability. Again, it is unclear which is the better estimation method but potential improvements
in the timeliness and measurement of labour force surveys, at least in the EU, may lead them to be considered the most
appropriate and comparable measure of average hours worked in the future. 
The informal economy: The estimates may also vary with respect to adjustments for the informal economy. Arguably,
most service sector jobs, regardless of how low paid, are picked up in US official statistics. In the EU, substantial work has
been undertaken to ensure that national accounts data are exhaustive. Nevertheless, while there is international agree-
ment that the 'informal economy' should be measured, in practice national statistical offices vary in the methods they
employ to deal with this problem and there are questions on how far GDP and employment adjustments are fully consis-
tent with each other. The three estimates in Table 1.3 deal with this issue to a great extent but perhaps not entirely. European competitiveness report 2003
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pronounced in services. In 1999, the most recent
year for which data are available, value added per
person employed in the US manufacturing was
nearly 60 % higher than in the EU, whereas the Amer-
ican lead in the much larger market service sector
was much less, about 20 % (O’Mahony, 2002)9.
Cross-country differences between the level of GDP
per capita and GDP per person employed reflect
differences in the rate of labour force participation
and in the rate of employment. In turn, cross-country
differences between GDP per person employed and
GDP per hour worked reflect differences in the preva-
lence of part-time work, the length of the standard
work week and days paid but not worked per year,
the latter primarily due to annual holiday leave.
Cross-country differences in some of these compo-
nents are illustrated in Table 1.5.
The first column of Table 1.5 shows the ratios of
working age (aged 16-64) to total population as
reported in the Structural Indicators data set (figures
within brackets use GGDC data). There is little varia-
tion across countries or between the EU and the US in
this ratio. The second column shows the participation
rate (ratio of the labour force to working age popula-
tion), also relative to the US. It is clear that participa-
tion is much higher in the US than in the EU and
higher than in most EU Member States10. However,
Luxembourg has a higher participation rate than the
US and a number of other countries (Denmark,
Sweden, the UK, Portugal and the Netherlands) have
rates at or near those of the US. The ratio of employ-
ment to working age population (employment rate,
shown in the third column) is lower in the EU than in
the US, but its variation across Member States is high.
Among the countries with a large population size,
France, Italy, Germany and Spain all show lower
employment rates and higher unemployment rates
than the US. The United Kingdom is the only large
country with an employment rate similar to that
achieved by the US. Luxembourg displays a higher
employment rate than the US while Denmark is at
par. The final column shows relative annual average
hours worked. Average annual working time is longer
in the US than in the EU though Greece, Spain,
Portugal, Finland, the UK and Ireland have annual
average working hours at or above US levels. Dutch
and German workers have the shortest hours
followed by Denmark, France, Belgium and Austria. 
9 Market services comprise transport, communications, distributive trades,
financial and business services and private personal services. 
Table 1.4: Relative level of productivity in 2002 (US = 100)
GDP per capita GDP per person employed GDP per hour worked
SI (GGCD) SI (GGCD) SI (GGCD)
Belgium 77.3 (76.2) 99.5 (92.2) 109.0 (112.0)
Denmark 80.8 (84.9) 80.8 (78.7) 91.30 (99.8)
Germany 73.1 (75.0) 80.3 (79.2) 93.1 (101.5)
Greece 47.4 (49.3) 68.3 (62.5) 59.5 (61.1)
Spain 60.1 (60.1) 77.0 (69.8) 71.0 (72.2)
France 73.6 (72.8) 93.2 84.6) 101.9 (107.8)
Ireland 86.8 (89.5) 99.2 (94.0) 99.2 (105.5)
Italy 73.0 (73.4) 91.3 (83.1) 95.2 (97.2)
Luxembourg 133.9 (133.0) 106.8 (98.0) 110.9 (112.0)
Netherlands 80.3 (80.2) 80.1 (76.0) 99.7 (103.8)
Austria 78.6 (78.2) 81.2 (79.7) 89.1 (98.6)
Portugal 49.3 (52.2) 52.0 (49.3) 51.0 (52.7)
Finland 72.6 (74.0) 83.8 (76.0) 81.9 (88.5)
Sweden 72.4 (73.0) 76.4 (70.2) 80.9 (82.3)
UK 73.5 (72.7) 76.6 (72.0) 75.2 (81.7)
EU 71.2 (71.7) 82.6 (77.1) 86.8 (91.5)
US 100 (100.0) 100 (100.0) 100 (100.0)
Note: Using gross national product rather than GDP for Ireland would imply that that country was close to the EU average for the measures in the
Table above. The difference is due to transfer pricing with the gap between NNP and GDP large and increasing over time in Ireland. Hence output is
inflated by the difference between these two measures of aggregate activity; the gaps between GDP and GNP are small for remaining countries.
Source: GGCD: data from Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC web site at http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc/homeggdc.html). GGDC does
not include Luxembourg so OECD data are used for this country. SI: Structural Indicators data from Eurostat, (release 13-06-2003,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/).
10 In what follows, the comments on the relative position of countries refer to
the structural indicators’ values.Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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Comparing the EU with the US, the single most
important factor behind the 29 percentage points
gap in GDP per capita11 in 2002 is lower produc-
tivity, contributing 13 percentage points to the gap,
followed by lower participation rate, accounting for
10 percentage points, see Table 1.6. 
The demographic factor, the ratio of working age to
total population, plays no role in the EU gap. Again
there is considerable diversity across Member States
in the direction and magnitude of these various
contributions. In general the participation rate and
the hourly productivity effects dominate followed
by the effect of lower average hours worked12.
To conclude, total working time across the EU tends
to be lower than in the US either due to lower partic-
ipation, to higher unemployment or to shorter hours
worked on average by each worker. If it is true that
this difference could partly reflect a stronger prefer-
ence for leisure on the part of the EU population, it
can not be excluded that the institutional environ-
ment (by constraining people’s choice of working
time) may also be responsible for this difference.
Labour market regulations that effectively restrict
part-time work, norms on holidays and on standard
working week and cultural factors that constrain the
participation of certain groups, e.g. married women,
may all lead to a sub-optimal leisure/work pattern.
These issues are discussed further in Section 1.4.
1.2.2 Productivity Growth
This section reviews data on trends in GDP per
capita, in output per person employed and in
11 The difference between country A’s GDP per capita and the corresponding value in country U, expressed as a percentage of the country U’s value, is decomposed
into the contribution of five factors (demographic structure, participation rate, unemployment rate, average hours worked and hourly productivity) according to the
following method: 
where Yi,Pi, Wi, Li, Ei, Hi
represent respectively, GDP, population, working age population, labour force, employment and total hours worked in country i. Note that this
decomposition method implies that the contribution from hourly productivity is given exactly by the gap in A’s hourly productivity relative to country U; this iden-
tity between contribution to GDP per capita gap and gap in the factor itself does not hold for the remaining four factors. Note further that the sum of the second
and third terms (participation rate and unemployment contribution) is the contribution from the employment rate. 
12 Note that although the estimates of the EU/US difference in GDP per capita do not significantly differ in the two sources used in Table 1.6, the contribution of each
factor varies substantially between the two sources reported. For instances while in the Structural Indicators differences in hourly productivity account for the largest



















































































































































Table 1.5: Labour and hours ratios, EU member states relative to the US, 2002 (US = 1)
Working age Labour force  Employment to  Annual average
in % of in % of working  working  hours worked 
total population age population age population
SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC)
Belgium 0.99 (0.99) 0.80 (0.85) 0.79 (0.98) 0.91 (0.82)
Denmark 1.00 (1.00) 0.98 (1.06) 1.00 (1.01) 0.89 (0.79)
Germany 1.01 (1.01) 0.93 (0.96) 0.90 (0.97) 0.86 (0.78)
Greece 1.01 (1.01) 0.71 (0.81) 0.68 (0.96) 1.15 (1.02)
Spain 1.03 (1.03)  0.81 (0.89) 0.76 (0.94) 1.08 (0.97)
France 0.98 (0.98) 0.83 (0.91) 0.81 (0.97) 0.91 (0.78)
Ireland 1.02 (1.02) 0.85 (0.92) 0.86 (1.01) 1.00 (0.89)
Italy 1.02 (1.02) 0.81 (0.90) 0.79 (0.97) 0.96 (0.85)
Luxembourg 1.00 (1.00) 1.19 (1.30) 1.23 (1.03) 0.98 (0.87)
Netherlands 1.02 (1.02) 0.95 (1.00) 0.98 (1.03) 0.80 (0.73)
Austria 1.01 (1.01) 0.94 (0.95) 0.95 (1.02) 0.91 (0.81)
Portugal 1.02 (1.02) 0.96 (1.07) 0.93 (0.96) 1.02 (0.94)
Finland 1.01 (1.01) 0.86 (0.96) 0.87 (1.01) 1.02 (0.86)
Sweden 0.97 (0.97) 0.97 (1.06) 0.97 (1.01) 0.94 (0.85)
UK 0.99 (0.99) 0.96 (1.01) 0.97 (1.01) 1.02 (0.88)
EU 1.01 (1.01) 0.88 (0.94) 0.86 (0.98) 0.95 (0.84)
Note: Working age population in 2002 was estimated using the 2001 working age to total population ratio applied to 2002 total population.
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output per hour worked in the EU and in the US
over a period starting in the late 1970s to 2002, but
also during shorter sub-periods in the 1990s. 
Graph 1.4 shows the path of changes in GDP per
capita in the EU relative to the US for the period
1979 to 2002. In general, the ratio of EU to US GDP
per capita has fluctuated around 72%. Exceptions
appear in the beginning of the 1980s and in the
beginning of the 1990s. It is clear that no conver-
gence has taken place towards the US level of this
critical variable during the past quarter century. 
There have, however, been significant breaks in the
trend paths of the underlying components. Thus,
GDP per person employed and GDP per hour worked
have been growing steeply through to the mid-
1990s when the decline in European productivity
growth emerged. The rapid convergence towards
the corresponding US level of either variable has
been reversed since 1995. Convergence during the
period prior to 1995 was stronger in terms of GDP
per hour than GDP per person employed13. The
period from1995 onwards has been characterised by
a sharper decline in GDP per person employed than
in GDP per hour worked. A prevailing view is that the
US productivity renaissance of the second half of the
1990s is a reflection of the importance of ICT and of
the associated technological and organisational
modernisation of enterprises (see section 1.3). 
Table 1.7 shows growth rates of hourly productivity
(GDP per hour) for the EU, the Member States and the
US during the first half of the 1990s and the period
1996-2002. The data confirm that the deceleration of
EU productivity growth relative to the US during the
latter period, which has been recorded in terms of
productivity per person employed, has also been
registered in productivity per hour worked. Graph 1.5
plots hourly productivity growth in the periods 1996-
2002 and 1990-1995. It is clear, first, that hourly
productivity accelerated in the US while the EU expe-
rienced a deceleration; and, secondly, a few EU
Member States have also recorded acceleration of
productivity growth comparable to if not better than
the US in the second period (Austria, Greece and
Ireland). These have been either lagging significantly
behind the US (Greece) or nations with prominent
high technology production (Ireland). France saw a
marginal acceleration while in all remaining Member
States hourly productivity decelerated.
13 Similar stages of convergence have been analysed in Aiginger, Landesmann
(2002).
Table 1.6: Decomposition of the GDP per capita gap between EU countries and the US in 2002
Gap in GDP 
per head Components
in percentage points
Working age  Participation Unemployment Employment Hours  Productivity 
population rate rate rate worked per hour
SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC)
Belgium -23 (-24) -1 (-1) -20 (-14) -2 (-1) -22 (-15) -10 (-20) 9 (12)
Denmark -19 (-15) 0 (0) -1 (5) 1 (1) 0 (6) -10 (-21) -9 (0)
Germany -27 (-25) 1 (1) -6 (-3) -2 (-2) -8 (-5) -13 (-22) -7 (1)
Greece -53 (-51) 1 (1) -19 (-11) -3 (-3) -22 (-14) 9 (1) -40 (-39)
Spain -40 (-40) 2 (2) -14 (-7) -4 (-4) -18 (-11) 6 (-2) -29 (-28)
France -26 (-27) -2 (-2) -15 (-8) -3 (-3) -18 (-11) -9 (-23) 2 (8)
Ireland -13 (-11) 1 (1) -15 (-7) 1 (1) -14 (-6) 0 (-11) -1 (5)
Italy -27 (-27) 1 (1) -16 (-8) -3 (-3) -19 (-11) -4 (-14) -5 (-3)
Luxembourg 34 ( 33) 1 (1) 21 (31) 3 (3) 24 (34) -2 (-14) 11 (12)
Netherlands -20 (-20) 2 (2) -4 (0) 3 (3) -1 (3) -20 (-28) 0 (4)
Austria -21 (-22) 1 (1) -5 (-4) 1 (1) -4 (-3) -8 (-19) -11 (-1)
Portugal -51 (-48) 1 (1) -2 (3) -2 (-2) -4 (1) 1 (-3) -49 (-47)
Finland -27 (-26) 1 (1) -12 (-3) 1 (1) -11 (-2) 1 (-13) -18 (-11)
Sweden -28 (-27) -2 (-2) -3 (4) 1 (1) -2 (5) -5 (-12) -19 (-18)
UK -26 (-27) -1 (-1) -3 (1) 1 (1) -2 (2) 1 (-10) -25 (-18)
EU -29 (-28) 0 (0) -10 (-4) -2 (-2) -12 (-6) -4 (-15) -13 (-8)
Note: The column ‘Employment rate’ corresponds to an alternative decomposition and represents the contribution of the employment rate which is
identical to the combined contribution of the participation rate and the unemployment rate (sum of columns 3 and 4).
Source: See Table 1.5.Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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Graph 1.4: Evolution of GDP per capita, productivity per person employed and productivity per hour
worked in the EU relative to the US (US=100)
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Table 1.7: Growth in output per hour, 
1990-1995 and 1996-2002
1990-1995 1996-2002


















Source: GGDC: GDP in 1999 USD employing Purchasing Power
Parities and Real Expenditures 1999 Benchmark year, Edition 2002,
OECD, updated to 2001 using growth in constant price GDP from
National Accounts, vol.1, 2002, OECD, annual average hours
worked, various sources including Employment Outlook, 2002,
OECD, national statistical offices web-sites e.g. US Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), for most EU countries levels were extrapolated from
Angus Maddison (1995), Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-
1992, OECD – see GGDC web site for more detail. GGDC does not
include Luxembourg in its estimate for the total EU.
1.3 The contribution of ICT
to productivity growth
Productivity growth from the mid-1990s to date has
been higher and accelerating in the US, but low and
decelerating in the EU. There are important differ-
ences across Member States, however. Some, as
noted previously, have enjoyed acceleration and
productivity growth similar to that of the US. In this
section both the differences between the US and the
EU, as well as the differences across European coun-
tries are examined using the growth accounting
approach. This approach investigates which part of
the productivity increase (defined here as GDP per
hour) is attributable to changes in inputs (capital
deepening), and which part is left unexplained and
assumed to be the result of technical progress (called
total factor productivity, multi-factor productivity or
Solow residual). The approach is based on the Solow
model of economic growth and the work of
Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) who have developed
the methodology. Our specific aim is to assess the
impact of information and communication tech-
nology on productivity growth.14 The data also
14 There have been numerous studies trying to measure the “new economy”,
analysing the contributing factors such as ITC, but very few of these studies
can make a valuable international comparison due to lack of internationally
consistent data. Only the GGDC and OECD have been able to gather such
information, they have broadly similar results, but as we need to use data
consistent with the other sections of the report we chose to use GGDC data.European competitiveness report 2003
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permit to distinguish between the impact of ICT on
capital formation and on technical progress. Box 1.4
presents in more detail the methodology.
The ICT revolution, at least as it has been understood
both in the EU and in the US, has had some key impli-
cations. The growth accounting approach calculates
the share of investment in the new (ICT) technology
and provides estimates of its impact on economic
growth. Specifically, it calculates that part of capital
deepening which is due to ICT investment. On the
demand side, the ICT revolution has resulted in new
products and new services growing at two-digit rates
in the period up to the end of the last decade.
Furthermore, this demand by firms and consumers
has been fuelled by steep price declines that
contributed to strong economic growth with low
inflation. According to some early views, the “new
economy” encompassed both low inflation and high
productivity and output growth, and rising employ-
ment. Finally, ICT–producing sectors contributed to
high and steeply rising productivity15. 
1.3.1 Comparing US and EU
performance 
New data based on hourly productivity and a growth
accounting framework have been used here to esti-
mate the contribution of ICT to economic growth. 
Oliner and Sichel (2000) launched the debate about
the resurgence of economic growth in the US associ-
ated with an acceleration of productivity gains due to
the increased use of ICT. Schreyer (2001) and van Ark
et al. (2003) have produced comparable results for
Graph 1.5: Productivity (GDP per hour) growth in the EU and US






























































15 The contribution of the ICT sectors to the increase in total factor productivity
is the second element of the “ICT contribution” to the increase in labour
productivity (see Table 1.8).Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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Box 1.4: The analytical framework
The analysis follows the standard growth accounting method which decomposes output growth into contributions from
factor inputs, both quantities and qualities, and a residual, most commonly known as total factor productivity. Details of
the method and an application to US growth is set out in Jorgenson et al. (1987), with additional theoretical discussion
in Hulten (2000). 
The growth accounting method begins with a general value added production function of the form:
Yt = F(Kt,Lt,At) (1)
where Kt are aggregate capital services, Lt are aggregate labour services and At is total factor productivity.
By differenciating (1) with respect to time, under the assumptions that all inputs are paid their marginal products and
that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, we can derive the continuous form of the output growth
decomposition, with the growth in factor inputs weighted by their shares in value added. This derivation is known as the
Divisia index and is invariant to the functional form chosen for the production function. 
In practice data are only observed at discrete intervals so the implementation of the Divisia index requires some addi-
tional assumptions on the form of the production function. Jorgenson et al. (1987) assume a Translog production func-
tion, rather than the more usual Cobb-Douglas, to allow for substitution between factor inputs at each point in time. This
then allows for a discrete approximation to the Divisia Index, the discrete-time Tornqvist index, which is an exact index
number if it is applied to the Translog function (Hulten, 2000). This is given by:
(2)
where ∆ is the first difference operator, and  are the shares of capital and labour in value added, averaged
across time periods t and t-1. Constant returns implies that
The contribution of each factor input to output growth is given therefore by the input growth rate in volume weighted
by its return share of value added. The evolution of changes in the quality of the input are incorporated in the analysis
by breaking up aggregate capital and labour into a number of types, e.g. new technology and traditional assets, or types
of skilled labour. By estimating aggregate inputs as share weighted growth rates of their components, the method allows
for substitution of higher quality for lower quality inputs through time. Suppose there are j types of capital and l types of
labour. This method of adjusting for quality, due originally to Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), replaces aggregate capital
and labour in (2) by:
∆ lnKt = Σ
j
– vKj,t∆ lnKj,t  (3a)
∆ lnLt = Σ
l
– vLl,t∆ lnLl,t  (3b)
Departures from the assumptions underlying the growth accounting method may bias results, notably the productivity
residual. In particular, by assuming that production inputs are totally compensated in the market against the services they
render, this method does not allow for the presence of external effects or spillovers associated with factor inputs - such
as the possible externalities due to the use of information technology equipment. Nevertheless the growth accounting
method is a powerful tool of analysis in describing the sources of the growth in output.
Capital services
The implementation of the formula in (3b) for labour inputs is straightforward since we can observe wages for different
types of labour in the market. The construction of capital services is more complicated and involves taking account of the
efficiency of each type of asset. Data on investment at constant prices allows for differences in the performance of the
1 , , = + t L t K v v
t L v , t K v ,
t t t L t t K A L v K v Yt ln ln ln ln , , ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆European competitiveness report 2003
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the EU and confirm the role of ICT in the productivity
divergence between the EU ,and US in recent years.
The results reported here cover the period 1990-2001.
This, however, has three potential disadvantages. First,
the data are only provisional and will undoubtedly be
revised. Second, the 1995-2001 period may not be
typical since it does not correspond to a consistent
business cycle period (the period 1995-2000 would be
preferable for this reason); this is due to the fact that
2001 is a recession year for the US and a low growth
year for the EU, and productivity developments are at
their most uncertain at the start of a recession. Finally,
2001 was one of the worst years in decades for the ICT
industry due to the burst of the internet bubble.
Nevertheless, and despite these reservations, the data
suggest that the “new economy” thesis has some
considerable support as does the notion of a widening
gap between the US and the EU in hourly labour
productivity growth discussed in the first section of
this chapter.
As mentioned previously, productivity growth during
the second half of the 1990s accelerated in the US
but decelerated in the EU. The EU saw high growth in
productivity per hour in the first half of the 1990s and
was leading the US, but the pattern was reversed
during the second period. As seen in Section 1.2,
during the period 1996-2002 EU hourly labour
productivity growth declined by more than one
percentage point, and in the US it rose by somewhat
more than half a percentage point, compared to the
first half of the 1990s (see Table 1.7). These develop-
ments are summarised in Table 1.8 which also shows
a decomposition of the contributions of capital deep-
ening and total factor productivity to hourly labour
productivity growth, in the two periods 1990-1995
various assets whereby the price series used to deflate the investment series at current prices reflect the efficiency of
assets. For some assets like computers and some parts of communications equipment, hedonic prices are used (for
instance in the US and France). The asset price is regressed upon a set of related qualitative characteristics (e.g. speed of
processing) in order to allow for quality change and construct a constant quality price index. The weights in equation
(3a) are based on user costs of capital, composed of the rate of return plus depreciation minus capital gains, rather than
the acquisition price of capital assets. Thus the relatively high contributions of information and communications tech-
nology capital to output growth, evidenced for the US in recent years (see e.g. Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000), stems from
the high growth in quality adjusted investment. But the high contribution of ICT capital is also influenced by these assets’
very high depreciation rates and the fact that their owners can expect capital losses. The market return must be suffi-
ciently high to cover the latter two effects in addition to the normal rate of return. 
Decomposition of labour productivity growth
By rearranging equation (2), the contribution of factors of production to the growth in hourly labour productivity can be
expressed in the form:
(4)
with: ; 
where H represents total hours worked.
Thus, growth in hourly labour productivity stems from:
— “Capital deepening”, or substitution of capital for labour, arising from capital accumulation – this can be divided into
new technology and traditional asset effects,
— Improvements in labour quality defined as the difference between the rate of growth of the weighted labour input
and hours worked, and 
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and 1995-2001. For a description of the decomposi-
tion method see Box 1.4.
The deceleration of hourly productivity growth in
the EU amounts to 1.03 percentage points. The
contribution of capital deepening to this amounts
to 0.71 percentage points while the remaining
(0.33 points) reflects a decline in total factor
productivity growth. Within capital deepening,
however, there was a decline in the contribution of
investment in non-ICT capital (0.83 percentage
points in other non-residential capital) while the
contribution of ICT capital was positive but
amounted to a modest 0.12 points. 
Moreover, the contribution of each component of
ICT capital reported in Table 1.8 was greater in the
second period compared to the first. Thus, it is
clear that for the EU hourly productivity perform-
ance of recent years the contribution of the ICT-
linked capital formation has been positive and it is
rather the joint contribution of the traditional
forms of capital and of total factor productivity
growth that is responsible for the decline in
productivity growth. 
In the US, hourly productivity growth accelerated
by 0.56 points between the two periods in ques-
tion. This acceleration is due to ICT capital invest-
ment (0.25 percentage points) and to an accelera-
tion in total factor productivity growth
(0.31 percentage points)16. The contribution of
other non-residential capital remained unchanged
at 0.71 points between the two periods. At the
same time, all three components of ICT capital
(office and computer equipment, communications
equipment, and software) made an increased
contribution during the comparison periods. Thus,
almost half of the labour productivity acceleration
in the US can be attributed to an increased contri-
bution of ICT investment.
Turning now to the comparison between the EU and
the US, it is clear that while during the earlier period
capital deepening accounted for the largest part of
the superior hourly productivity performance of the
EU (some 0.86 points), followed by total factor
productivity (0.44 points), in the latter period both
capital deepening and total factor productivity
growth posted a worse performance than in the US.
This pattern holds across all categories of ICT-linked
investment but the superiority of the EU in the
contribution of other non-residential investment
continues to hold albeit at a much reduced rate.
Overall, EU productivity growth fell short by some
0.30 percentage points relative to the US during the
second period. 
The empirical analysis, therefore, suggest that the
larger part of the difference between the US and EU
productivity growth (some 0.30 percentage points)
during the 1995-2001 period is accounted for by lower
contribution of ICT investment (0.23 percentage
points) and by lower growth in total factor productivity
(0.21 percentage points). Partly offsetting this is the
superior contribution of non-ICT capital in the EU
(0.13 percentage points).
16 Estimates by van Ark et al. (2003) show that for the 1995-2000 period, a
gain of 0.17 in TFP growth originates in ICT producing sectors and 0.43 in
non-ICT producing sectors. 
Table 1.8: Contributions to hourly labour productivity growth, EU and US (in percentage points)
1990-1995 1995-2001
EU US EU-US EU US EU-US
difference difference
Growth of hourly labour productivity (a) 2.42 1.13 1.29 1.39 1.69 -0.30
Contributions from:
Capital deepening (b), of which from 1.89 1.03 0.86 1.18 1.28 -0.10
– ICT capital 0.22 0.32 -0.10 0.34 0.57 -0.23
– Office and computer equipment 0.09 0.15 -0.06 0.18 0.25 -0.07
– Communication equipment 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.09 0.14 -0.05
Software 0.06 0.12 -0.06 0.08 0.18 -0.10
Other non-residential capital 1.67 0.71 0.96 0.84 0.71 +0.13
Total factor productivity (c)  0.54 0.10 0.44 0.21 0.41 -0.21
(a) GDP per hour worked in total economy, GDP excluding imputed and actual rents
(b) Capital services per hour worked
(c) Including changes in the quality of labour
Source: Estimates based on GGDC unpublished data and CEPII calculations. EU excluding Belgium, Greece and Portugal.European competitiveness report 2003
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1.3.2 Member States where TFP growth
has accelerated
The framework used to analyse the determinants of
hourly labour productivity growth is applied to the
Member States. However, for some Member States
(specifically Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg) the
necessary data is not available and the analysis
cannot be applied to them.
The Member States can be grouped into those that
saw an acceleration of total factor productivity
growth during the 1995-2001, compared to the
period 1990-1995, and those that saw a deceleration.
Table 1.9 shows the decomposition of labour
productivity growth for the first group of Member
States.
For four Member States the acceleration of TFP was
greater than half percentage point, and in the group
it ranges from 0.84 percentage points in France to
0.08 points in Sweden17. In all these countries the
contribution of ICT investment has also been clearly
positive, ranging from 0.08 percentage points in
France to 0.41 percentage points in Ireland. But the
contribution of non-ICT investment has been nega-
tive except in the case of Ireland where it amounts to
0.92 percentage points. 
The data suggest that these countries had a mixed
performance in terms of hourly labour productivity
growth. While in Ireland and in Austria hourly labour
productivity growth accelerated markedly during the
second period, it did less so in the case of France and
it fell in the case of Finland and Sweden. 
It is clear that ICT and non-ICT investment alone
could not be relied upon to raise hourly labour
productivity growth. Nor could the efficiency gains
made in the second half of the 1990s in these
Member States, as reflected in the acceleration in
total factor productivity, be sufficient to raise labour
productivity growth. While this accounting analysis
does not provide a formal causal view of the exact
contribution of each of these factors to labour
productivity growth, it at least suggests that total
factor productivity growth is crucial and, in some
cases (Ireland, Austria and France) combined with
the contribution of ICT capital, produced gains in
labour productivity growth. (For some more
comprehensive evaluation of economic perform-
ance including ICT, research input and human
capital, see Box 1.5).
1.3.3 Member States where TFP has
decelerated
Seven Member States (the Netherlands, Denmark,
the UK, Portugal, Germany, Italy and Spain) have
seen a deceleration in total factor productivity in
the period 1995-2001 compared to the earlier
period 1990-1995. These have also seen a substan-
tial deceleration in hourly labour productivity. The
contribution of ICT capital has uniformly increased
during the second period, but the contribution of
non-ICT capital has uniformly decreased. Yet, one
great concern ought to be the evidence associated
with the weak contribution of ICT capital, except
perhaps in the case of the UK. Table 1.10 provides a
decomposition of the change in labour productivity
growth according to these factors. 
Six of the seven Member States in this group saw a
decline in TFP growth of more than 0.6 percentage
points, ranging from 1.30 percentage points in the
case of Spain to 0.67 percentage points in Portugal.
Only in the Netherlands does the data suggest that
TFP growth did not change perceptibly between
the two periods, but even there the decline in
labour productivity growth has been substantial.
17 However, here the contribution of ICT investment had been high for that
country in the first part of the 1990s.
Table 1.9: Member States with accelerating TFP 
Difference in growth rates, 1995-2001 minus 1990-1995
ICT   Non ICT  Total factor  Labour 
Investment Investment productivity productivity
Finland 0.35 -1.23 0.83 -0.05
Ireland 0.41 0.92 0.56 1.88
Austria 0.10 -0.04 0.77 0.83
France 0.08 -0.69 0.84 0.23
Sweden 0.25 -0.48 0.08 -0.15
Source: GGCD data and CEPII calculations; see Appendix 1.2 for detailed data.Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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Four of the largest EU Members States (Germany,
Italy, the UK and Spain) registered a decline larger
than 1 percentage point in hourly labour produc-
tivity growth. However, the causes for these
declines are different. 
— In Germany, the decline in non-ICT investment
and in total factor productivity growth account
for virtually all of the decline in labour produc-
tivity growth. During the early 1990s, Germany
registered a construction boom as a conse-
quence of German reunification. The end of the
boom and the difficulties encountered in the
catching-up process of the former East
Germany are among the major explanations for
the negative contribution of non-ICT capital
investment. ICT capital investment made a
modest positive contribution. At the same time,
the decline in TFP growth is very worrying.
— Graph 1.6 presents data on Germany’s GDP per
capita, productivity per person employed and
productivity per hour worked relative to the US
over the period 1979 to 200118. Germany’s
hourly productivity grew fast up to the early
years of the 1990s but it has subsequently stag-
nated. Productivity per person employed has
actually shown a modest diminishing trend
while GDP per capita has declined markedly.
— The data on Germany’s GDP per capita and
GDP per person employed suggest that there
have been two periods generally characterised
by stagnation or strong decline, from 1983 to
1989 and from 1993 to 2002. In between,
however, there was a marked increase. This
contrasts with the persistent strong increase in
hourly productivity. Taken together, these
developments mean that there has been a
reduction in average hours worked, without an
increase in GDP per employee. Since hours
worked had been longer in East Germany, unifi-
cation resulted in a reduction in average hours
worked associated with the application of regu-
lations in use in West Germany. Since 1995,
GDP per hour has been fairly stable as
compared to the US. 
— In the case of Italy, the major cause (about
two-thirds) of the decline in labour productivity
was the deceleration of TFP growth, followed
by a substantial negative contribution associ-
ated with non-ICT capital spending. ICT capital
has contributed positively but modestly. 
— The UK case is to some extent a paradox. The
UK invests heavily in ICT and the contribution
of ICT during the 1995-2001 period
(0.52 percentage points, see Appendix 1.3) is
large by the standards of other countries (only
Finland, Ireland and Sweden saw comparable
results). The UK even saw an increased ICT
contribution compared to that of the US
between these two periods. Nevertheless, the
growth in hourly labour productivity fell by
over 1 percentage point during the second
period due principally to the decline in the
contribution of TFP and to the lesser, albeit still
substantial, decline in non-ICT investment
contribution. It is possible that these findings
reflect developments in the manufacturing
sector, in general, as well as, in particular, the
impact of the appreciation of the sterling in the
18 It is clear that the unification process has been a major statistical and
economic problem. Statistically, before 1991 the national income accounting
in the Democratic Republic was based on the concept of the measure of the
net material product with administrative price valuations. Economically these
were two different regions, one with a developed market economy and high
efficiency notably as far as productivity is concerned, the other with very
high social standards and a high employment ratio, but with very low
productivity.
Table 1.10: Member States with decelerating TFP 
Difference in growth rates, 1995-2001 minus 1990-1995
ICT   Non ICT  Total factor  Labour 
Investment Investment productivity productivity
Netherlands 0.16 -0.52 -0.03 -0.40
Denmark 0.13 0.23 -1.07 -0.71
United Kingdom 0.23 -0.56 -0.72 -1.07
Portugal 0.01 -0.70 -0.67 -1.36
Germany 0.04 -0.85 -0.84 -1.64
Italy 0.13 -0.48 -0.90 -1.25
Spain 0.03 -1.44 -1.30 -2.71
Source: GGCD data and CEPII calculations; see Appendix 1.2 for detailed data.European competitiveness report 2003
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mid- to late 1990s on the performance of this
sector. This appreciation contributed to a
reduction in the growth of the manufacturing
sector through the decrease in exports and the
strong increase of imports (see O’Mahony and
Robinson, 2003, for a discussion of the UK
manufacturing productivity slowdown). 
— In  the Netherlands, total factor productivity
growth remained virtually unchanged between
the two periods. The major cause of the decline in
labour productivity growth is the negative contri-
bution of non-ICT investment. The contribution
of ICT spending was modest (0.16 of a point). 
— In the case of Denmark, both ICT and non-ICT
capital contributed positively (the latter more
than the former) to labour productivity growth,
yet there has been a significant fall in TFP
growth which swamped all other effects,
yielding a significant reduction in labour
productivity growth. 
— Finally, in the case of Spain and Portugal, ICT
investment has made virtually no contribution
and the decline in labour productivity growth is
associated with substantial declines in the
contribution of non-ICT capital and in total
factor productivity growth in almost identical
measure.
This review suggests that ICT investment has played
a major role in the US productivity revival of recent
years. It has also played an important but lesser role
in those EU Member States that have seen a gener-
ally favourable productivity performance. The
contribution of ICT tends to be small in the coun-
tries that have seen a decline in total factor produc-
tivity growth and, generally, insufficient ICT invest-
ment appears to be one of the reasons for the




1.4.1 Long run trends in employment
and working time
The large and persistent difference between the EU
and the US in per capita income amounting to
about 30 % has been strikingly stable over several
Graph 1.6: Germany: GDP per capita, per person employedand per hours worked (US=100)
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decades. Another characteristic of recent years has
been the coming to an end of the productivity
convergence process, which has contributed to
maintaining the gap between EU GDP per capita
and that of the US.
Within the EU, and excepting Ireland, productivity
in the leading Member States is of the order of
twice as high as that of the lagging EU Member
States. This constitutes another feature of the data.
While there has been some convergence of the less
wealthy Member States towards the standards of
living of the advanced ones, the catching up
process appears to have come to a halt in the latter
part of the 1990s. Employment rates differ widely
across Member States as does the number of hours
worked per employee. 
It appears that while there are signs of slow conver-
gence, driven by technological developments – for
example, ICT – that have an impact across all
economies, there remain important underlying
differences in institutions and even in preferences
that likely inhibit faster convergence. At the same
time, such differences in institutions and prefer-
ences, as they might exist, offer opportunities for
Member States to adapt their policy approaches to
new challenges. 
Graph 1.7 shows the trends in hourly productivity
over the period 1985-2002 for each Member State
relative to the EU average.
The relationship between productivity and working
hours is complex. Higher productivity makes
possible the production of the same volume of
output with fewer hours worked and permits a
reduction of either the number of workers or of the
number of average hours worked or both. Over the
medium term, increasing productivity lowers the
relative price of products produced in high produc-
tivity sectors, raises real incomes, improves interna-
Box 1.5: In search of the best performing European countries in recent years
Some European countries came close to the US in terms of output growth and productivity, some in employment rates
and employment growth; but none in all four dimensions. The strongest performer was Ireland, which experienced an
extremely successful catching up process, surpassing the EU average in GDP/capita (though not in GNP/capita). Rela-
tively successful in boosting output and productivity are Sweden and  Finland, whereas the Netherlands increased
employment partly on a part-time basis (see Section 1.4).
Even among these relatively successful countries, the performance looks rather different across indicators (Aiginger,
2002). Finland enjoyed productivity increases, specifically in the manufacturing and technology sectors but its unem-
ployment is still rather high. Sweden also experienced high productivity growth in manufacturing, but low increases in
employment and after several devaluation episodes during the past years its per capita GDP is now close to the EU
average. Government expenditure shares and taxes decreased in relation to GDP but are still high. Overall performance
in very recent years has been impressive as it has happened despite difficulties in some of its largest firms and the general
downturn in the ICT industries.
The Netherlands has excelled in employment creation and in lowering significantly the rate of unemployment. It has
encouraged part-time work, has focused on research, and has enjoyed high employment, low unemployment rates, and
employment growth. But a rather large part of the employment potential has been classified as disabled and shifted into
schemes meant to protect people with a disability. The Netherlands has had low increases in productivity per person
employed, although starting from high levels (see Section 1.4).
Should one seek common elements among these Member States, the structural and institutional characteristics of these
countries appear as a first candidate. These four countries are small open economies, belonging to the group of
Northern–type welfare states with high costs and taxes. Policy–making involves tripartite–type decisions encompassing
the government, trade unions and employers’ representatives. All four are countries with a consistent long run consensus,
rated as countries with the highest “trust” or “social capital” (see Temple, 1999).European competitiveness report 2003
Graph 1.7: Hourly labour productivity in the Member States (1995=100)
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There are also common elements in policy strategies that have been pursued by these Member Sates. These are the
following:
— The overriding strategy objective has been to increase the medium-term rate of economic growth. All these countries
invested in research, education and in the production or diffusion of ICT. Finland and the Netherlands increased their
research expenditures dramatically, even in a period when total government expenditure was reduced. Sweden rein-
forced the production and diffusion of telecommunications to become the leader in most ratings for the information
society. On average these four countries increased R&D in relation to GDP from 1.6 % (1981) to 2.4 % (1995) and
finally to 2.8 % in 2000, as compared to 1.9 % for the total EU area in the same year. Sweden and Finland are leading
in expenditures on education, and Finland is leading in the PISA ranking in the quality of education. In the Nether-
lands the share of those in the labour force with secondary and tertiary education is above the EU average.
— The second strategy objective has been to bring costs and productivity in balance again. Additionally, all countries
have reduced the corporate tax rate, which itself had been below the personal income tax rate.
— The third and crucial strategy objective has been to improve the incentive structure. Unemployed workers in these
Member States have a high probability of re-employment and assistance if they look for a new job. This policy
combines flexibility for firms with security for employees due to a high probability for them to find a new job. 
Aiginger (2002) claims that the most important of the three objectives has been the first, namely the active investment
into future growth. This is, of course, well in line with the goals of the Lisbon strategy. The other two objectives have
aimed more specifically at improving competitiveness conditions and the third objective in particular was intended to
strengthen the role of individuals making important economic decisions.
Graph 1.8: Productivity growth (GDP per hour) and change in labour input
(Average annual percentage change)






































2European competitiveness report 2003
44
tional competitiveness and contributes to raising
potential output and employment. At the same
time, reducing working hours may stimulate inno-
vations and could lead to increasing productivity or,
alternatively, to increasing prices, depending on the
wage-price characteristics. 
Graph 1.8 shows the relationship between produc-
tivity growth and the growth in average hours
worked in the EU, the Member States and in the US
during the period 1996-2002. The US saw an
increase in hourly productivity during this period
and an increase in hours per worker; the latter
increased by 0.3 % per annum. In contrast, hours
worked per person employed in the EU decreased
by around 0.3 % per year. Ireland and Spain offer
two extreme examples. Ireland was able to reduce
hours worked yet achieved a high rate of hourly
productivity and economic growth while in Spain
hours worked remained broadly constant and
hourly productivity declined. 
The data in Graph 1.8 suggests that during the
period in question the relationship between produc-
tivity growth and hours worked has been negative
but in about half of the Member States the reduc-
tion in average hours worked has been modest.
Larger reductions (greater than 0.5 %) were
recorded in Belgium, Finland and France. 
Graph 1.9 presents comparative data on the rate of
employment, on total hours worked and on hours
worked per person employed in the EU and in the
US over the last decades.
Over the long term, working time has been
decreasing and employment rates have been
increasing. Since 1870 there has been a decrease in
working hours from an annual average of 3,000
hours to less than 2,000 hours in the US and to
around 1,500 for EU countries19. In the 1990s the
reduction of working hours did decelerate, but in
some countries the opposite occurred, that is,
average hours worked increased (Sweden and US).
In the Netherlands hours worked declined while the
employment rate increased due to an increase in
part-time work. Within the EU, average hours
worked range from 1,376 hours per employee in
the Netherlands to 1,921 hours per employee in
Greece.
Historical data reveal that the ratio of employment
to the total population remained surprisingly
constant in Europe between 1870 and 1995, at
about 44 %. In contrast the ratio of employment to
population in the US exhibits an upward trend from
30 % in 1900, to 42 % in 1950 and 47 % by 1995.
The share of employment in working age popula-
tion in the US increased from 36.6 % in 1870 to
41.0 % in 1973 and then again to 49.1 % in 1998.
A secular rise in labour participation is to be
expected due to the rise in female labour participa-
tion. However, additional years spent in education,
increasing life expectancy and incentives towards
early retirement are working against this secular
trend. Relating employment to working age popula-
tion (instead of total population) underlines these
trends and highlights the differences between the
US and Europe.
The ratio of employment to working age (instead of
total) population from 1960 to 2002 is shown in
the first panel of Graph 1.9. The employment rate
in Europe was 66 % in 2002, practically the same as
in 1975. In the US, the employment rate increased
from 63 % in 1975 to 73 % in 2002. Thus the US,
which used to have a lower employment rate,
surpassed Europe in 1978 and saw an increase of 12
percentage points by the end of the 1990s. The
employment rate in the EU has increased in recent
years from a trough of 62 % in 1994 to 66 % in
2001 and 2002.
1.4.2 Economic growth and employment 
Economic growth plays a key role in the growth in
employment. The ratio between the percentage
change in employment and the percentage change
in output is the elasticity of employment with
respect to output. This elasticity is not constant over
time and varies substantially with the business cycle.
The estimates, presented in Table 1.11, are average
elasticity estimates obtained over the peak–to–peak
years 1979-1989-1996-and 200220.
The US has generated more employment per unit
of output than the EU during the two decades up to
1989. For each percentage point of GDP increase,
employment increased by 0.47 percentage points in
the US and by 0.27 points in Europe. However, over
time the output elasticity of employment in the US
has been decreasing. In the EU, the output elasticity
of employment was considerably lower than in the
US up to 1989 and then turned negative in the first
half of the 1990s. However, in the second half of
the 1990s it rose to 0.58 %, clearly surpassing the
19 Following Maddison (2001).
20 The true peak was 2000 but as the data are virtually identical, the latest data
available up to 2002 have been used. Employment elasticities for the 1996-
2000 period are 0.53 and 0.40 for the EU and US, respectively, compared to
0.58 and 0.31 for the 1996-2002 period.Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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Graph 1.9: Employment and working hours in the long run
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US. The increase in the output elasticity of employ-
ment in the EU appears to indicate a change in the
relationship between GDP and employment
growth. Whether this is durable it is difficult to say
at this stage. The increase is to some extent the
mirror image of the deceleration in productivity
growth.21 But this is only a partial view since fast
growing economies (Ireland, Finland and Sweden
for example) can boost productivity and employ-
ment at the same time.
1.4.3 Recent developments in
productivity and employment in France,
the Netherlands and the UK
This section presents a brief discussion of the expe-
rience of France, the Netherlands and the UK on
productivity and GDP per capita relative to the US
since 1979. These Member States offer evidence of
diverse experience based on different policy priori-
ties. However, what is common to the three
Member States is that they have emphasised
employment creation but also, predominantly the
UK, strengthening productivity growth. This discus-
sion should also be seen against the urgent need to
raise employment, a common feature virtually in all
the Member States during recent decades.
France
France has seen a persistent increase in unemploy-
ment from less than 3 % in the late 1960s to 12.7 %
in 1996. Partly in response to high unemployment,
France introduced shorter workings hours and a
reduction of the cost of employing low wage earners. 
Graph 1.10 presents the key data measured against
the US. Productivity per person employed followed a
steadily rising path up to the beginning of the 1990s
when the recession brought this process to an end.
Yet, hourly productivity continued to rise up to 1995,
thus supporting the convergence process towards
the level of US hourly productivity. What is striking,
however, is that since the early 1980s GDP per capita
relative to the US has been on a clear declining trend.
At the background of this development are princi-
pally the low participation rates, especially those of
young and less qualified people and older workers
(the participation rate of those aged 15 to 24 in 2001
was 29.9 % in France, 61.1 % in the UK and 73.6 %
in the Netherlands). 
Clearly, high productivity of the sort experienced in
France has been insufficient to support a secular rise
in GDP per capita relative to the US. The secular
21 Note that productivity growth can be written as GDP growth times the
complement of the employment elasticity. Therefore an acceleration in
productivity is compatible with an increase in employment elasticity provided
GDP acceleration is strong enough.
Table 1.11: Employment elasticity with respect to GDP
1979/2002 1979/1989 1989/1995 1995/2002 2001/2002
Belgium 0.17 0.01 -0.04 0.41 -0.29
Denmark 0.26 0.38 -0.28 0.33 0.13
Germany 0.02 0.23 -0.44 0.23 -1.26
Greece 0.35 0.58 0.45 0.06 0.06
Spain 0.47 0.13 -0.43 1.13 1.06
France 0.26 0.09 -0.11 0.60 -0.10
Ireland 0.34 -0.15 0.44 0.55 0.28
Italy 0.29 0.23 -0.44 0.75 5.63
Luxembourg 0.56 0.33 0.65 0.77 0.43
Netherlands 0.94 1.22 0.83 0.77 3.99
Austria 0.41 0.44 0.88 0.14 -0.72
Portugal 0.40 0.41 -0.66 0.62 1.50
Finland 0.08 0.25 5.23 0.47 0.00
Sweden 0.08 0.35 -3.64 0.43 0.00
UK 0.25 0.25 -0.29 0.46 0.33
EU 0.27 0.25 -0.29 0.58 0.45
US 0.47 0.57 0.42 0.31 -0.22
Source: CEPII calculations using data from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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decline in relative GDP per capita is a worrying devel-
opment. Together with the rise in unemployment,
this has posed a critical challenge to economic policy
in France. In the mid-1990s the government intro-
duced several measures aimed at reducing the dura-
tion of the workweek and at lowering the indirect
cost of low-wage workers22. In 2001, France had a
per capita GDP 2% above the EU average and
surpassed the EU average in hourly productivity and
in productivity per person employed by respectively
17% and 9%. 
The Netherlands23
In recent years the Netherlands has succeeded in
reducing its unemployment, maintaining a rather
generous welfare system and favouring part-time
work. At the same time, however, hourly produc-
tivity and GDP per person employed relative to the
US has seen a clear downward trend throughout
the period 1979–2001 while GDP per capita has
remained almost trendless during this period. These
developments are shown in Graph 1.11.
In 1982 the rate of unemployment stood at close to
11 % but it declined to reach 2.1 % in 2001. Hourly
productivity in the Netherlands, which was 45 %
higher than the EU average in the early 1980s, has
declined to just 15 % above the EU average in 2001.
In the period 1996–2002, hourly productivity growth
declined by 1.2 percentage points compared to the
period 1989–1995 but GDP growth was around half
of one percent higher. Despite the relative decline in
productivity, the Netherlands maintained a steady,
and modestly rising since the late 1980s, 1evel of
GDP per capita relative to the US. Underlying this
development has been a rising working age popula-
tion (growing faster than the EU average) and a high
employment rate, comparable to that of the UK. A
principal contributing factor in the growth of
employment has been the very rapid expansion of
part-time jobs24.
It appears, therefore, that through a mix of long term
policy commitments and decentralised negotiations
with social partners, including wage restraint, the
Netherlands succeeded in maintain it standards of
living yet at the cost of a declining level of produc-
tivity relative to the US. While there may still be some
potential for pursuing such policies and make further
gains in employment and output growth, the decel-
eration of productivity growth since 1995 suggests
24 The level of part-time employment in the Netherlands is twice the average
level in OECD countries.
22 Various studies indicate that a 1 % decrease in the labour cost of low wage
earners raises their employment by one percent, see L’Horty (2000).
23 See Sébastien (2000).
Graph 1.10: France: GDP per capita, per person employed and per hours worked (US = 100)
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that the limits to sustaining prosperity on the basis of
such policies may be emerging. 
The UK
GDP per person employed and per hour worked
in the UK followed a rising trend over the period
1979 until the mid-1990s, in a manner similar to
developments in other EU Member States. Indeed,
the catching up process to US levels of produc-
tivity was particularly evident in the case of hourly
productivity. Yet, compared to other EU Member
States, the early lead in per capita income has
been eroded, even though this has been partly
reversed in more recent years. GDP per capita
relative to the US has followed a modestly rising
trend. These developments are presented in
Graph 1.12. 
The UK has in recent years been characterised by
lower productivity than the EU average but rising
employment (unemployment in the 1990s in the
UK declined to levels not seen since the early
1970s). This has made possible the growth in the
standards of living measured by GDP per capita25.
Economic and technological modernisation, espe-
cially involving ICT and other modern technologies,
has also contributed significantly to this advance.
1.4.4 Some evidence on the trade off
between working hours and per capita
income
Per capita income is about 30 % lower in the EU than
it is in the US, a much larger difference than the
productivity difference. Section 1.2 suggested that
the difference can be accounted for by the lower
employment rate in the EU but primarily by lower
working hours per worker. In historical perspective,
these differences have evolved relatively recently
since Europe has had longer working hours per
person and higher employment rates than the US.
Reduction in working time has been a policy goal of
trade unions and has enjoyed broad support in ruling
political parties in Europe. Naturally, reducing the
employment rate has never been a policy goal even
though it has resulted from longer time spent in
education and early retirement and disability
schemes26.
Differences in labour force participation, as well as
differences in working hours per year, can be 25 Unemployment reached just over 1 million persons in 1999. Recent research
suggests a wide range of factors that have contributed to this decline,
including moderate wage growth in the 1990s, the decline in trade union
power, more flexible labour markets and changes to the benefit administra-
tion system – see Riley and Young (2001).
Graph 1.11: Netherlands: GDP per capita, per person employed and per hours worked (US = 100)
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induced either on the supply or on the demand
side. People may be willing to work a longer part
of their life, but do not find adequate employ-
ment and stay out of the labour market (discour-
aged workers). Or, people working fewer hours
may either voluntarily choose greater leisure for
reasons of family responsibilities and cultural inter-
ests or accept part-time work as a substitute for
insufficient full-time employment opportunities.
The institutional settings of labour relations and
working arrangements together with the cultural
background and traditions, as well as the educa-
tional system, the steepness of wage schemes with
experience and tenure, and the institutions for
child rearing all play a critical role in these
choices.
The reduction in statutory working time in Europe
relates to negotiated contracts or laws, which have
introduced maximum working hours and longer
holidays for full-time workers. In the more recent
years, average working time has declined as a
consequence of an increase in part-time work, and
flexible work contracts. A further reduction of
working time in Japan and France reflects legal deci-
sions, while reduction in working time in Germany
and the Netherlands has been the result of intensive
discussions with the trade unions. In Sweden,
working time has increased due to increasing
working hours for part-time workers, while in the US
the increase was due to increasing overtime hours.
However, historically, the reduction in working time
in all EU Member States has reflected the rise in the
standards of living associated with rapid productivity
growth. Indeed, this has been the crucial factor that
has made possible not only the rise in real incomes
but also the reduction in working time and the
increase in leisure time during the past decades.
Part-time work has become the main source of the
increase in labour participation and job creation in
Europe. Part-time jobs are nevertheless often
considered as low–quality jobs: wages are lower27,
as are the possibilities to benefit from professional
retraining, and it is often difficult to change from
part-time work to full-time work. These factors
indicate that part-time work is not always volun-
tary28. 
Table 1.12 shows that a large majority of workers
would choose to work more, if possible. Note,
1.12: UK: GDP per capita, per person employed and per hours worked (US = 100)
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27 Evidence on the effects of part-time work on hourly wages in the EU countries
is mixed: estimates presented in European Commission (2003b, p. 129)
suggest that in six of the twelve Member States for which data were avail-
able, part-time work appears to be associated with positive wage premia,
while in the other six, hourly wages (adjusted for job and worker character-
istics) are lower for part-time workers.
28 For a discussion of labour developments in recent years and the importance
of part–time work, see European Central Bank (2002).European competitiveness report 2003
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however, that this preference has become weaker
over time since the percentage of those preferring
to work more declined from 62 % in 1985 to 56 %
in 1994. Similarly, the share of those who would
prefer to work less and have reduced income rose
from 31 % in 1985 to 38 % in 1994. Thus,
between the years 1985 and 1994 the data
suggest that opinions have begun to shift in favour
of more leisure (except in two of the less wealthy
Member States, Greece and Spain, but not in
Portugal). 
It appears that a majority of women working part-
time are voluntarily doing so and are more satisfied
than full-time workers, and that more women would
like to have access to part-time work. It seems that
quality of life and the possibility to have time for their
children is to some extent acceptable at the price of a
reduced income. Increasingly, both partners of a
family would prefer some type of reduction of
working time during specific phases of their life cycle.
Several countries aim at distributing part-time jobs
more evenly between male and female workers,
encouraging male workers to take part in the
maternal/paternal leave or to share a reduction in
working time. If part-time work became more of a
choice or even a kind of “normality”, and if it would
not be confined to lower paid jobs, career opportuni-
ties and income expectations would not suffer after
short part-time periods.
There are some indications suggesting that there
are differences in preferences between the US and
Europe. There is no strong popular support, if any,
in the US to shorten the workweek or to increase
holidays, while in Europe trade unions have
actively sought longer holidays and shorter
working hours. If trade unions or labour councils
accept shorter working hours in exchange for
lower wage increases this implicitly reveals a pref-
erence for leisure. Revealed preference for greater
leisure is suggested in cases where workers volun-
tary agree to switch from full–time contracts to
part–time contracts, and where trade unions nego-
tiate the right of reducing work time for full-time
employees (see the legal possibility to switch to
part-time work in the Netherlands discussed in
Visser, 2002).
On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that
a low employment rate is not always voluntary: the
high rate of unemployment in several Member States
clearly points to a shortage of employment opportu-
nities. Some part-time employees would prefer full-
time work (see Table 1.12). Also the existence of insti-
tutional constraints – which give part-time
Table 1.12: Effective working hours and leisure/income trade off in the EU, 1985 and 1994
% employees who prefer Average annual hours 
worked by employees
Work more Work less 1985 1994 Ratio 
1994/1985
1985 1994 Ratio 1985 1994 Ratio
1994/1985 1994/1985
Belgium 58 48 0.83 36 40 1.11 1 643 1 603 0.98
Denmark 38 32 0.84 51 66 1.29 1 586 1 568 0.99
Germany 56 54 0.96 30 34 1.13 1 674 1 590 0.95
Greece 68 84 1.24 26 14 0.54 1 803 1 803 1.00
Spain 64 70 1.09 31 24 0.77 … 1 741 …
France 62 53 0.85 34 40 1.18 1 696 1 670 0.99
Ireland 78 59 0.76 19 37 1.95 1 815 1 747 0.96
Italy 55 54 0.98 39 39 1.00 1 710 1 682 0.98
Netherlands 46 43 0.93 47 52 1.11 1 654 1 447 0.87
Portugal 82 58 0.71 11 35 3.18 1 871b 1 847 0.99
UK 77 62 0.81 19 32 1.68 1 684 1 683 1.00
Unweighted  62 56 0.90 31 38 1.20 1 696 1 671 0.99
Average
… Not available.
(a) Data are only for those who make a choice.
(b) 1986.
Source: CEPII calculations using European Commission (1995, page 19) and EUROSTAT.Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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employees priority in switching to full-time jobs (at
the cost of outsiders) - points to an unsatisfied
demand for full-time jobs.29
1.4.5 Reducing the total cost of low
wage earners
Clearly, the low employment rate in the EU
compared to the US raises the question of whether
measures should be taken aimed at those with
greatest difficulties in obtaining a job – including,
though not exclusively, low-wage workers30. In a
rapidly changing competitiveness environment,
low–wage/low–productivity workers could be
favoured through training and education opportu-
nities and through reductions in the cost of their
employment. Efforts in both directions have been
undertaken in recent years and some Member
States have actively sought not only to help poorly
qualified workers entering into the market with
counselling and training, but also reducing the cost
of hiring low qualified people. Some countries have
been very active in that direction as can be seen in
Table 1.13.
A critical variable in this context is the tax wedge,
the difference between the wage paid by the
employer and the wage received by the employee.
Table 1.13 shows that in all Member States there
has been a considerable reduction in the tax wedge
on low wages since 1996. The size of the reduction
ranges from half a percentage point in Spain to
almost ten percentage points in Ireland. Despite the
general trend towards reducing the tax wedge on
low earnings, cross-country differences remain large
in the Union. In 2002, Ireland had the lowest tax
wedge on low-wage earners in the EU, amounting
to 17% of total labour costs. Ireland was followed
by the UK and Luxembourg, which respectively had
a tax wedge of 25% and 27%, levels which are
comparable to those in Japan and the US. At the
higher end of the range were Sweden, Germany
and Belgium, where income taxes and social secu-
29 Gordon (2002, pp.10ff) raises the question of whether “…Italian men who
retire early or housewives sitting at home are doing this because they chose
to, or because the economy or society does not provide sufficiently
rewarding jobs for them” and answers with the wild guess, that one-third of
the difference represents voluntary chosen leisure and two-thirds represent a
lack of employment opportunities. The consequence is that a welfare
corrected measure of efficiency of Europe relative to the US in 2000 is
“neither 77 % nor 93 %, but something closer to 85 %”.
30 The importance of low–skilled workers in employment growth in recent years
cannot be underestimated. While employment growth in the late 1990s was
greatest amongst those with the highest educational and professional quali-
fications, correcting for the relative size of educational groups, the employ-
ment rate increased the most amongst those workers with the lowest educa-
tional qualifications; see European Central Bank (2002) for a discussion.
Table 1.13: Total tax wedge as percent of labour costs for low-wage earners
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Change 
2002-1995
Belgium 50.5 49.5 51.1 51.0 49.9 49.1 48.9 -1.6
Denmark 41.3 41.7 40.4 41.3 41.2 40.6 40.4 -0.9
Germany 46.5 47.7 47.5 47.0 46.5 45.5 45.9 -0.6
Greece 34.9 35.0 35.1 34.3 34.3 34.3 34.3 -0.6
Spain 34.4 34.8 35.1 32.6 32.8 33.4 33.9 -0.5
France 44.3 41.6 42.5 40.3 39.6 38.4 37.8 -6.5
Ireland 26.5 24.9 23.4 21.5 18.1 17.3 16.6 -9.9
Italy 48.3 48.8 44.4 44.1 43.3 42.8 42.7 -5.6
Luxembourg 29.1 29.7 28.9 29.5 30.4 28.8 27.3 -1.8
Netherlands 39.3 38.8 39.2 40.2 40.6 36.8 37.2 -2.1
Austria 41.0 41.1 41.5 41.6 40.1 39.7 39.9 -1.1
Portugal 30.6 30.8 30.7 30.2 30.4 29.5 29.5 -1.1
Finland 44.4 44.2 44.0 42.6 42.4 41.0 40.4 -4.0
Sweden 48.6 49.2 49.3 48.7 47.9 46.8 45.9 -2.7
UK 26.8 28.4 28.5 25.8 25.3 24.5 24.7 -2.1
EU-15 40.6 40.8 40.3 39.1 38.6 37.7 37.8 -2.8
Japan 18.4 19.4 17.7 23.1 23.1 23.2 23.2 4.8
US 29.2 29.2 29.1 29.2 29.0 27.4 27.3 -1.9
Note: The tax rate is calculated for a single person without children earning 67 % of an average wage as a full-time production worker in manufac-
turing. The rate calculated is the average rate of tax on earnings and is defined as total income tax on gross earnings plus employee and
employer social security contributions.
Source:  Eurostat, Structural Indicators.European competitiveness report 2003
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rity contributions for low-wage earners ranged
between 46-49% of gross earnings.
While measures such as education and training and
reductions in the cost of hiring for the less qualified in
the labour force could conceivably contribute, ceteris
paribus, to raise the employment of low–wage
earners and, correspondingly, the employment rate,
there remains a potential conflict in that raising the
employment of low–wage/low–skilled employees
would, as a consequence, raise their share in employ-
ment. This would decrease productivity growth to
the extent that the share of low productivity sectors
where these workers will most likely find employment
(such as retailing, renovation work, etc) will increase
in our economies31. However, one should not lose
sight that the reason why productivity growth is
important is that there is a limit to the role played by
participation and employment rate improvements in
improving standards of living in the long run. A
decrease in productivity growth due to the phenom-
enon just described, if accompanied by a sufficient
increase in employment, will increase standards of
living and therefore should not cause the same
concern as a productivity deceleration resulting, for
instance, from insufficient technological upgrading
or lack of innovation efforts. Nevertheless, improving
standards of living through this type of employment
effect will only have, at best, a temporary impact and
does not constitute a sustainable way of ensuring
ever-higher living standards in the long run.
Thus, it is clear that the approach suggested by the
Lisbon strategy, of increasing the employment rate
and of enhancing the prominence of knowledge in
all facets of our economies, provides the most effec-
tive answer to our ambitions.
1.5 Concluding remarks
The EU is currently experiencing a slow growth
period, with three years of about 1 % growth per
year. Relative to other slow growth periods, employ-
ment has been surprisingly resilient. 2.6 million jobs
have been added in 2001 and 2002 combined, but
in 2003 employment has not been rising and the
unemployment rate will increase. A large share of
the new jobs are part-time, with hours per worker
decreasing by 0.5 %. However, at the background
of the increase in employment during this slow
growth period has been the low increase in produc-
tivity. In the past two years, productivity per person
employed increased by an average of around half a
percent point and productivity per hour worked by
somewhat less than 1 percent.
Despite the recent slow growth in the US, produc-
tivity per person employed and per hour worked has
increased on average by around 1.6 % while in the
EU this increase has been 0.4 % and 0.9 %, respec-
tively. Over the period 1995-2002, the cumulative
difference between the US and the EU in GDP growth
amounts to some 8 percentage points, while the
cumulative difference in productivity growth
amounts to 9 percentage points per person
employed and 4.5 percentage points in terms of
hours worked. Yet, there is hardly any difference in
terms of growth in GDP per capita (it has increased
by a cumulative 14.7 points in the EU and 14.3 points
in the US) because demographic expansion was
much stronger in the US, where population increased
by 9.4 % from 1995 to 2002, while the EU saw a
modest 2 % increase during the same period.
A key determinant of the superior US productivity
performance relates to ICT investment and use. The
contribution of ICT capital to hourly productivity
growth in the EU rose from 0.22 percentage points in
1990-1995 to 0.34 points in 1995-2001. In the US, the
average contribution of ICT capital during these
periods is estimated, respectively, at 0.32 points and
0.57 percentage points. Trends in hourly labour
productivity in the EU during the 1990s have been
influenced by capital deepening, in particular in the
area of other non-residential capital while the contri-
bution of ICT capital and of total factor productivity
has been of a lesser magnitude. In the US, the contri-
bution of non-residential capital has been on a smaller
scale than in the EU and the contribution of total factor
productivity growth has been greater. The contribu-
tion of ICT investment in the acceleration of hourly
labour productivity growth is largest in Ireland and
Finland and smallest in Portugal, Spain and Germany.
The insufficient productivity growth in Europe over
the last decade is important since it stopped or
reversed a decade long catching-up process
towards the US performance. Thus in the beginning
of the current decade the EU GDP per capita was
around 70 % of the corresponding US variable,
while GDP per person employed was around 82 %
and GDP per hour worked was 86 %32. 
The largest component determining the strikingly large
income difference (GDP per capita at purchasing
power parity) is the higher hourly productivity in the US
32 Note that previous estimates that showed the EU equal to the US in the level
of hourly productivity have not used consistent data for GDP per person
employed and hours per worker. 31 Carnot and Quinet (2000).Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
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as compared with Europe. The second component is
the lower fraction of the working age population active
in the labour market (participation rate). Differences in
age structure do not play a role. As far as convergence
is concerned there is surprisingly no convergence in
per-capita income, and the difference of about 30 %
has been stable over several decades. Production per
person employed did converge over the past decades
slowly, but steadily. This convergence stopped in the
1990s and the US increased its lead in the seven most
recent years. Cyclical stability, as well as higher invest-
ment or higher efficiency in growth drivers such as
research, education and the rapid diffusion of new
technologies seem to have reinforced the leading US
position. Employment rates have been increasing in the
US over more than two decades. The US overtook
Europe in 1978 and the difference in employment rates
has reached a maximum of 11.8 percentage points in
1997 but decreased to 8 percentage points in 2002.
However, these recent improvements may not be of
lasting nature if global growth remains weak. To
achieve decisive progress in employment growth more
structural reforms are needed. 
In hourly productivity, Europe was catching up fast
until 1995. Several European countries seemed to
have reached the US level in the beginning of the
1990s. The EU on average was lagging in 2002 by
around 13 percentage points. Belgium and Luxem-
bourg are the only Member States with consider-
ably higher productivity per hour than the US.
France, the Netherlands and Ireland rank equal to
the US, while Italy, Germany and Denmark rank
below the US (from 5 % to 9 % below). 
Performance across European countries differed in the
1990s. The only country that increased productivity
and employment faster than the US was Ireland. It
surpassed the EU average in GDP per head and per
hour, but is still below average in Net National
Product and in wages per head. Out of the countries
catching up, Greece and Portugal both enjoy above-
average growth. Among the countries with medium
or high income, the performance of Sweden, Finland,
the Netherlands and Denmark can be considered as
especially successful (in terms of macro-economic
performance), allowing a combination of high wages
and comprehensive welfare systems. The strategy of
these countries – in addition to fiscal prudence and
institutional reforms - has been to enforce education,
in a lifelong learning perspective, research and the
diffusion of new technologies, which are central
elements of the Lisbon strategy. 
However, even within this group there are different
strategies and unsolved policy issues. The Netherlands
favoured part-time work while Sweden and Finland
benefited from the ICT revolution, with the latter still
having a rather high unemployment rate. Among the
larger countries, only in the UK has the contribution of
ICT to productivity growth been large, allowing the
UK to overcome decades of below-average produc-
tivity growth. In the UK, the level of hourly produc-
tivity remains low compared to the EU average, but
employment has risen markedly in recent years.
France did spread employment by reducing working
hours; relative to the EU, it has a high level of produc-
tivity, but only slightly above average per capita
income. Germany did not close its gap in high-tech-
nology sectors. Restrictive macro-economic policy and
insufficient structural reforms resulted in the lowest
growth rate among the member countries.
The remarkably large and persistent differences in
productivity, income, and working hours between the
EU and US, and even within the EU itself, may partly
reflect choices between higher income and more
leisure. In addition, however, they also reflect
constraints in the functioning of labour markets or are
the consequence of policies to cope with competitive-
ness on the firm level or with unemployment on the
national level. Facilitating part-time work has success-
fully been used to increase labour market flexibility and
to increase the employment rate. For some workers
part-time work is preferred to full-time work but for
others it is involuntary and limits earnings and upward
mobility. Reducing the labour costs of low qualified
workers, or limiting wage increases are other strategies
to increase employment and the employment content
of growth. Raising incomes can finally be achieved only
by techniques that increase the long-term growth
potential of an economy. Removing growth barriers
and investing in the future i.e. innovation, education
and diffusion of new technologies does this. Although
each European country is facing a unique combination
of structural constraints, some countries seem to be on
track to increase productivity and employment.
A key goal of the Lisbon strategy is to raise the
employment rate to 70 % in the context of real GDP
growth of around 3 % per year. These employment
and growth ambitions limit, at first glance, the scope
for policies that encourage substitution of leisure for
income. However, the Lisbon strategy is an attempt
to embark on an autonomous growth path with
higher GDP and productivity growth and thus
creating room for manoeuvre. Becoming the most
competitive economy requires reducing existing
barriers to growth and encouraging activities that
increase the long-term growth path, such as
research, education and the diffusion of new tech-
nologies. In order for this approach to succeed it is
necessary to foster innovation, thus retaining policy
flexibility in a changing environment – as demon-
strated by some of the smaller countries in the EU.European competitiveness report 2003
54
1.6 References
Aiginger, K. (2002): ‘The New European Model of
the Reformed Welfare State’, European Forum
Working Paper 2/2002, Stanford University. 
Aiginger, K., Landesmann, M. (2002): ‘Competitive
Economic Performance, The European View’, WIFO
Working Paper 179/2002.
Ark, B. van (2000): ‘The renewal of the old
economy: Europe in an internationally comparative
perspective’, CCSO Quarterly Journal, 2(4).
Ark, B. van, Melka, J., Mulder, N., Timmer, M., Ypma,
G. (2003): ‘ICT Investments and Growth Accounts for
the European Union 1980-2000’, Research Memo-
randum GD-56, University of Groningen, Groningen
Growth and Development Centre.
BLS, NEWS, US Department of Labor, 6 March 2003.
Carnot, N., Quinet, A. (2000): ‘L’enrichissement du
contenu en emploi de la croissance: une tentative
de clarification’, in ‘Plein Emploi’, rapport N°32 de
Jean Pisani-Ferry, CAE, la Documentation Française.
European Central Bank (2002): ‘The Composition of
Employment Growth in the Euro Area in Recent
Years’, Monthly Bulletin, November.
European Commission (2003a): ‘Choosing to grow:
Knowledge, innovation and jobs in a cohesive
society’, Report to the Spring European Council,
Brussels.
European Commission (2003b): ‘Employment in
Europe 2003’, Brussels.
European Commission (2002a): ‘The EU Economy
2002 Review’, European Economy, No. 6, Brussels.
European Commission (2000b): ‘The EU Economy
2000 Review’, European Economy, No. 71, Brussels.
European Commission (2000a, 2001, 2002a): ‘Euro-
pean Competitiveness Report 2000, 2001, 2002,
Brussels.
European Commission (1995): ‘Performance of the
European Union Labour Market’, European Economy,
No. 3, Brussels.
Gordon, R. J. (2002): ‘Two Centuries of Economic
Growth: Europe Chasing the American Frontier’,
paper prepared for the Economic History Workshop,
Northwestern University, October 2002.
Gordon, R. J. (2000): ‘Does the ‘New Economy’
Measure up to the Great Inventions of the Past?’,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 4.
Hulten, Ch. R. (2000): ‘Total Factor Productivity: A
Short Biography’, NBER Working Paper 7471.
Jorgenson, D.W., Gollop, F.M. and Fraumeni, B.
(1987):  Productivity and US Economic Growth,
Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.
Jorgenson, D. W., Stiroh, K. J. (2000): ‘Raising the
speed limit: US Economic Growth in the Informa-
tion Age’, Economics Department Working Papers
No. 261 (ECO/WKP 2000-34), OECD, Paris.
Jorgenson, D. W., Stiroh, K. J. (2000): ‘U.S.
Economic Growth in the New Millenium’, Brooking
Papers on Economic Activity, 1. 
Jorgenson, D.W., Griliches, Z. (1967): ‘The Explana-
tion of Productivity Change’, Review of Economic
Studies, 34, 349-383.
L’Horty, Y. (2000): ‘Vertus et limites des allégements
de charges sur les bas salaires’, Conseil Supérieur de
l’Emploi, des Revenus et des Coûts, Document de
travail. 
Madisson, A. (2001): ‘The World Economy: A
Millenial Perspective, OECD Development Centre.
McMorrow, K., Roeger, W. (2001): ‘Potential
Output: Measurement Methods, “New” Economy
Influences and Scenarios for 2001–2010, A Compar-
ison of the EU15 and the US’, European Commis-
sion, Economic Papers No. 150.
OECD (2003): ‘The Sources of Economic Growth in
OECD Countries’, OECD, Paris.
OECD (2001): ‘The New Economy: beyond the
hype, Final Report on the OECD Growth Project’,
OECD, Paris.
OECD (2000): ‘Réduction du temps de travail et
emploi’, Special issue of Economie Internationale No.
83.
Oliner, S. D., Sichel, D. E. (2000): ‘The Resurgence
of Growth in the Late 1990s: Is Information Tech-Chapter 1 — Growth, Productivity and Employment
55
nology the Story?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives –
vol. 14, No. 4. 
O’Mahony, M. (2002): ‘Productivity and Conver-
gence in the EU’, National Institute Economic Review,
No. 180, pp. 72-82.
O’Mahony, M., Robinson, C. (2003): ‘The growth of
ICT and industry performance, Manufacturing in
the US and UK compared’, forthcoming, National
Institute Economic Review, Vol. 184.
O’Mahony, M., deBoer, W. (2001): ‘Britain’s Relative
Productivity Performance, Updates and Extensions’,
National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
Pichelmann, K., Roeger, W. (2003): ‘The EU Growth
Strategy and the Impact of Ageing’, Review of Inter-
national Economics 2003 (forthcoming).
Riley, R., Young, G. (2001): ‘The Macroeconomic
Impact of the New Deal for Young People’, NIESR
Discussion Paper, No. 184.
Schreyer, P. (2001): ‘Computer Price Indices and
International Growth and Productivity Compar-
isons’, STD/DOC (2001)1, OECD, Paris.
Sébastien, J. (2000): ‘Employment: The Lessons
from the Netherlands’, la lettre du CEPII, No. 187,
la Documentation Française.
Temple, J. (1999): ‘The New Growth Evidence’,
Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVII(1), pp.
112-156.
Visser, J. (2002): ‘The first part-time economy in the
world: a model to be followed?’ Journal of European
Social Policy Vol. 12(1), pp. 23-42. 
Appendix 1.1: Components of the gap between EU countries and the US in 2002
Gap in GDP 
per head Components
in percentage points
Working age  Participation Unemployment Employment Hours  Productivity 
population rate rate rate worked per hour
SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC) SI (GGDC)
Belgium -23 (-24) 4 (4) 87 (58) 9 (4) 96 (63) 43 (83) -39 (-50)
Denmark -19 (-15) 0 (0) 5 (-33) -5 (-7) 0 (-40) 53 (140) 47 (0)
Germany -27 (-25) -4 (-4) 22 (12) 7 (8) 30 (20) 48 (88) 26 (-4)
Greece -53 (-51) -2 (-2) 36 (22) 6 (6) 42 (27) -17 (-2) 75 (76)
Spain -40 (-40) -5 (-5) 35 (18) 10 (10) 45 (28) -15 (5) 73 (70)
France -26 (-27) 8 (7) 58 (30) 12 (11) 69 (41) 35 (85) -8 (-30)
Ireland -13 (-11) -8 (-9) 115 (64) -8 (-9) 108 (55) 0 (100) 8 (-45)
Italy -27 (-27) -4 (-4) 59 (30) 11 (11) 70 (41) 15 (52) 19 (11)
Luxembourg 34 ( 33) 3 (3) 62 (94) 9 (9) 71 (103) -6 (-42) 32 (36)
Netherlands -20 (-20) -10 (-10) 20 (0) -15 (-15) 5 (-15) 100 (140) 0 (-20)
Austria -21 (-22) -5 (-5) 24 (18) -5 (-5) 19 (14) 38 (86) 52 (5)
Portugal -51 (-48) -2 (-2) 4 (-6) 4 (4) 8 (-2) -2 (6) 96 (98)
Finland -27 (-26) -4 (-4) 44 (12) -4 (-4) 41 (8) -4 (50) 67 (42)
Sweden -28 (-27) 7 (7) 11 (-15) -4 (-4) 7 (-19) 18(44) 68 (67)
UK -26 (-27) 4 (4) 12 (-4) -4 (-4) 8 (-7) -4 (37) 96 (67)
EU -29 (-28) 0 (0) 34 (14) 7 (7) 41 (21) 14 (54) 45 (29)
Notes: How to read the table: Belgium has a gap of income per head of 24 %; most of it is explained by the low number of hours (83 %) and by its
low participation rate (58 %). Column 5 corresponds to an alternative decomposition and represents the contribution of the employment rate, which
is identical to the combined contribution of the participation rate and the unemployment rate (sum of columns 3 and 4).
Source: Population, employment and hours: GGDC, Ratio working age to total population: OECD (2001 estimates); unemployment rate: Eurostat; the
labour force is calculated as the sum of employment and unemployment.European competitiveness report 2003
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Appendix 1.2 Countries with high and accelerating growth in Total Factor Productivity
between 1990-1995 and 1995-2001
Growth contribution in percentage points 1990-1995 and 1995-2001
ICT Investment Non ICT Investment Total factor productivity Labour productivity
1990-1995 1995-2001 1990-1995 1995-2001 1990-1995 1995-2001 1990-1995 1995-2001
Finland 0.23 0.58 1.22 -0.02 1.29 2.12 2.73 2.68
Ireland 0.25 0.66 0.97 1.89 2.29 2.84 3.51 5.39
Austria 0.16 0.26 1.44 1.40 0.14 0.91 1.74 2.57
France 0.12 0.21 1.33 0.64 -0.04 0.80 -1.42 1.65
Sweden 0.28 0.53 1.13 0.65 0.46 0.54 1.87 1.72
Source: CEPII calculations using GGCD data (unpublished).
Appendix 1.3 Countries with deceleration in Total Factor Productivity between 1990-1995 
and 1995-2001
Growth contribution in percentage points 1990-1995 and 1995-2001
ICT Investment Non ICT Investment Total factor productivity Labour productivity
1990-1995 1995-2001 1990-1995 1995-2001 1990-1995 1995-2001 1990-1995 1995-2001
Netherlands 0.19 0.33 0.89 0.38 0.01 -0.03 1.07 0.67
Denmark 0.35 0.48 1.35 1.57 0.67 -0.40 2.37 1.66
UK 0.29 0.52 1.54 0.98 0.77 0.05 2.61 1.54
Portugal 0.25 0.26 2.21 1.51 0.92 0.24 3.38 2.02
Germany 0.23 0.28 1.71 0.86 1.47 0.63 3.41 1.77
Italy 0.23 0.35 1.40 0.92 0.65 -0.24 2.28 1.03
Spain 0.10 0.12 1.76 0.32 0.38 -0.92 2.24 -0.47
Source: CEPII calculations using GGCD data (unpublished).2.1 Introduction
Enterprises adapt to changes in their environment by
adjusting their organisational structures or by intro-
ducing new management techniques. Many such
changes have been necessitated by and linked to the
use of new information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT). In recent years, many companies have
invested heavily in e-business applications, such as
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP), Supply Chain
Management (SCM) and Customer Relationship
Management (CRM). 
E-business can be defined as “the use of electronically
enabled communication networks that allow business
enterprises to transmit and receive information”
(Fellenstein and Wood, 2000) and encompasses elec-
tronic business processes as well as e-commerce
(buying and selling). Examples of typical business
processes that may be carried out in electronic form
include customer support, marketing, advertising and
public relations, recruitment of new employees, infor-
mation resource sharing among employees, strategic
and tactical planning, distributed inventory control
functions, payroll and benefits management. Note
that none of these business processes involve the
direct buying and/or selling of materials but mainly
address the quality, flexibility and availability of the
product or service. The Internet plays a key role as the
supporting medium for various e-business practices
such as supply chain management and online
procurement. E-business processes are often referred
to as “ICT-enabled organisational change” (Kling and
Tillquist, 2000), “ICT-enabled business transforma-
tion” (Venkatraman, 1994) and “ICT-enabled Business
Process Reengineering (BPR)” (Davenport, 1993). 
Empirical studies find that the greatest benefits from
ICT investments are realised when they are combined
with organisational changes, such as new business
strategies and practices and new organisational struc-
Chapter 2 — ICT-Linked Firm Reorganisation and Productivity Gains
57
tures. ICT–enabled business practices can significantly
increase efficiency and productivity through improved
customer service, reduced cost and streamlined busi-
ness processes. At the same time, their implementation
can be difficult, time-consuming and expensive. There-
fore, it is essential for individual firms to understand
their cost and potential benefits. Given the importance
of ICT for the competitiveness of the wider economy, it
is also essential to explore and address possible policy
issues that may arise from their diffusion.
The chapter is divided into five main parts. The
section following the introduction provides a review
of the literature on the complementarity between
ICT and firm organisation as well as on the produc-
tivity effects of ICT enabled organisational changes.
Section 3 looks at the incidence of reorganisation,
particularly e-business practices and the relationship
between labour productivity and e-business practices
at the industrial sector level.. Section 4 investigates
the impact of reorganisation on productivity change
at the establishment level. As no data is available that
permit an analysis of the productivity effects of e-
business practices at the firm level, the focus is put on
new forms of work organisation and on the interac-
tion between the productivity effect of reorganisa-
tion and additional measures such as investment in
ICT and training. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2.2 Complementarity between
ICT and organisational change
and their productivity effects
2.2.1 Definitions of organisational
change
Organisational change can be defined as change in
the strategies, structures and practices of organisa-




including (Betcherman and McMullen, 1998,
Murphy 2002):
— Changes in organisational structure of the firm
including hierarchy, functional lines, and organ-
isational boundaries;
— Changes in the work process or new forms of
work organisation including the use of different
production inputs, the flow of work, job design,
work allocation, and the use of suppliers and
subcontractors;
— Innovative human resource practices including
compensation, information sharing, employee
involvement in decision-making, and sched-
uling;
— Industrial relations practices involving the strate-
gies and institutional structures affecting the
labour-management relationship; and 
— New business practices and new management
techniques (Total Quality Management (TQM),
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) Systems,
Supply Chain Management (SCM) Systems,
Customer Relationship Management (CRM),
Lean Production33.
New business practices often affect the external co-
ordination of the firm, including changes in the
interaction with suppliers (Just-In-Time delivery and
Just-In-Time production, sub-contracting of produc-
tion and outsourcing) (Murphy, 2002; Greenan and
Mairesse, 2002).
Innovative human resource practices (also referred
to as high performance work practices (HPW))
include employee involvement in decision-making
(for example, self-managed teams, quality circles,
labour-management committees, works councils,
employee representation on the board of directors),
employee participation in the company’s financial
results (e.g., profit-sharing and employee stock
ownership), and supporting practices (such as infor-
mation sharing, training and internal labour
markets, job design, individual incentives, various
pension schemes – see Ichniowski et al., 2000). This
chapter addresses the most important elements of
organisational change, with emphasis on e-business
practices and innovative human resource practices.
2.2.2 Overview of e-business practices
A large number of innovative business management
concepts have emerged recently, e.g. Business
33 See also Annex 2.1 for a glossary of acronyms used throughout this chapter.
Process Reengineering, e-business, and Total Quality
Management34. However, of all these, e-business
and Business Process Reengineering (BPR; other
aliases: Business Process Redesign, Organisational
Redesign, Core Process Redesign, Value Reengi-
neering) have probably the greatest influence (Light
and Holland, 1998). BPR typically refers to the idea
of radical changes to the operations of a business,
often utilising new information technology or infor-
mation systems. 
Business Process Reengineering critically examines
the business process for redundant steps and
opportunities for entirely new ways of achieving the
desired output. It attempts to break down outdated
assumptions and rules, support teamwork, and
shorten cycle times (Grover et al., 1998), if success-
fully implemented, breakthrough performance
gains in productivity can be achieved. In addition to
ICTs, the success of process change also depends on
factors related to the organisational structure, the
management system and human resources (Grover
et al., 1998). Beginning in the late 1990s, compa-
nies invested heavily in e-business applications such
as ERP, CRM, supply-chain management, e-procure-
ment and data warehouse that influence directly
the reengineering process. 
2.2.2.1 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
systems
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems (also
called enterprise-wide systems or enterprise
systems) consist of a software package that uses
database technology to control and integrate all the
information related to a company’s business,
including customer, supplier, product, employee
and financial data. A single enterprise-wide data-
base is used in which all business transactions such
as inventory management, customer order manage-
ment, production planning and management,
distribution, accounting, human resource manage-
ment are entered, recorded, processed, monitored
and reported (Davenport, 1998; Ragowsky and
Somers, 2002; Umble and Umble, 2002). Thus, ERP
systems connect the organisation to its customers
and suppliers through the different stages of the
product or the process life cycle. 
It is well known that the implementation of an ERP
system is an enormously expensive and complex
European competitiveness report 2003
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Management have much in common with each other, they are significantly
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minor continuous improvements of business processes and it is not related to
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task. ERP package implementation costs include
consulting, process redesign, data conversion,
training, integration and testing (Mendelson,
1999). For most of the ERP projects, the software
portion only accounts for a small proportion of the
total implementation costs. The other areas such as
hardware, training and consulting tend to dominate
the true costs of implementing ERP Systems
(Mabert, Soni and Venkataramanan, 2001). Using
data on 5,000 U.S. manufacturing firms engaged in
ERP, Mabert, Soni and Venkataramanan (2001) find
that the cost of licensing the software itself is only
30 percent of the overall cost of implementing the
ERP system. Additional costs include expenditures
on new hardware (18 percent) and, most signifi-
cantly, fees paid to consultants and programmers
(24 percent), training (11 percent) and costs for the
implementation team (14 percent).
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Box 2.1: Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
systems and Knowledge Management Solutions
(KMS)
“ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning Systems) comprise
a commercial software package that promises the
seamless integration of all the information flowing
through the company - financial, accounting, human
resources, supply chain and customer information.”
(Davenport, 1998).
KMS refer to the system and managerial approach to
collecting, processing and organising enterprise-
specific knowledge assets for business functions and
decision making (Chen, 2001).
ICT enabled business practices such as ERP systems
have direct implications for the organisational structure
of the firm. The changes to the organisation can be
substantial, and can affect virtually every business
process or function within the organisation. ERP imple-
mentations induce changes to the organisation chart,
to job descriptions, to responsibilities, to internal power
structures, and to the organisation’s culture. According
to Davenport (1998), on the one hand, ERP systems
allow organisations to streamline their management
structures, creating flatter, more flexible and demo-
cratic organisations, by providing real-time access to
operating and financial data. On the other hand, they
also involve the centralisation of control over informa-
tion and the standardisation of processes, which are
qualities that are more consistent with hierarchical
organisations. Often the outcome of an ERP implemen-
tation is flatter hierarchies and the distribution of deci-
sion-making to the lower organisational levels. 
Most of the benefits of the ERP systems are expected
from the change in business processes, in which the
ERP software is just an enabler (Martin, 1998). Bene-
fits of ERP systems include (Davenport, 1998):
— Integration of customer order information:
• One order in one system;
• Easier coordination and information sharing
for departments;
• Better customer service;
— Standardization and acceleration of business
processes:
• Save time (direct and easy access to essential
data, improved information management,
integration of systems and information
within the enterprise);
• Increase productivity (reduced administrative
overhead for some business functions, simpli-
fied business processes, reduced paperwork);
• Multiple sites could be managed as a single
entity;
— Reduction in inventory;
— Integrated supply chain:
• Reduced inventory obsolescence;
• Integration with suppliers and increased visi-
bility;
• Standardization of HR information.
In summarising a number of studies, Ragoswky and
Somen (2002) suggest that the benefit an organisa-
tion derives from using information technology (IT) is
dependent on the characteristics of the organisation:
not all companies will gain the same benefit from
using the same ERP applications, and different ERP
software packages will better suit different organisa-
tions. Umble and Umble (2002) listed a number of
causes of ERP implementation failures including poor
leadership from top management, automating non-
value-adding processes in the new system, unrealistic
expectations, poor project management, inadequate
training, attempts to maintain the status quo and
inaccurate data. Dignum (2002) suggests that the
biggest mistake that companies have made is that
they expected huge benefits from just implementing
new IT components without changing the organisa-
tional structure.
2.2.2.2 Supply Chain Management (SCM) and
Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
An important role of ERP is to serve as a platform for
other applications, such as SCM and CRM (Ragoswky
and Somen, 2002). SCM covers every aspect of theEuropean competitiveness report 2003
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corporate supply chain process, starting from the
production of raw materials to establishing relation-
ships with the customers (Yen, Chou and Chang,
2002). It provides instant data access to information
about orders, forecasts, production plans, and key
performance indicators such as inventory levels and
filling rates, as well as the ability to increase service
quality and reduce investments in inventory. In the
last years, all major ERP suppliers have integrated
SCM strategy into their ERP systems. 
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) is also
linked to ERP. It provides companies with better
knowledge of and speedier and individualised rela-
tions with their customer basis. CRM and ERP have
been converging for some time. Web-based
product availability and delivery information are just
a few of the common business applications that
involve blending technologies from both disciplines. 
2.2.3 Productivity effects of ERP systems
There is a small but growing literature on the
impact of ERP systems on performance and produc-
tivity. However, the majority of these studies are
based on interviews, case studies or a collection of
case studies and industry surveys, mainly using US
data (see the literature reviews provided by Gattiker
and Goodhue, 2002; Hitt, Wu and Zhou, 2002).
None of these articles empirically tests the impact of
ERP systems using a representative dataset. McAfee
Box 2.3: Online procurement (e-procurement)
Online procurement (e-procurement) can be defined as
“a process which allows any designated user to requisi-
tion a product or service through a web interface and
generate a purchase order to send to a supplier”
(Boykin, 2000). E-procurement technologies include e-
procurement software, B2B (business-to-business)
auctions, B2B market exchanges, and purchasing
consortia. Online procurement is focussed on
automating workflows, consolidating and leveraging
organisational spending power, and identifying new
sourcing opportunities (Davila, Gupta and Palmer,
2002). 
e-marketplaces
“Also called e-Hubs, net marketplaces, and B2B
exchanges, e-marketplaces are purely digital meeting
places that provide to their participants two broad
categories of service: aggregation and facilitation.
Aggregation refers to making available large numbers
of potential partners – both buyers and suppliers –
along with, in many cases, listings of the goods they
want to buy or sell. In many cases, aggregation of
suppliers entails creating a comprehensive online cata-
logue of their wares. Aggregation provides the obvious
benefit of liquidity, an important consideration for all
traders. Facilitation refers to helping e-marketplace
participants interact with each other, before, during,
and after their decisions to do business together. Prior
to this decision, e-marketplaces facilitate by providing
information about potential partners, including certifi-
cation as to their demonstrated qualities (credit, fulfil-
ment reliability, etc.). e-marketplaces often assist
contracting and partnership decisions by conducting
auctions, reverse auctions, and other dynamic pricing
events. Finally, many e-marketplaces also offer post-
partnership facilitation services such as arranging credit
and logistics services, and in some cases taking respon-
sibility for order fulfilment” (McAfee, 2000).
Box 2.2: Customer Relationship Management
(CRM), Application Service Provider (ASP) and
Supply Chain Management (SCM)
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) enables
companies to identify, select, acquire, develop, and retain
profitable customers. CRM allows companies to build
lasting relationships with its customers (O’Brien, 2003).
Application Service Providers (ASP) manage and deliver
application capabilities to multiple entities from data
centres across a wide area network (Verwaal et al., 2002).
Supply Chain Management (SCM) is associated with
the process of optimising the delivery of goods, serv-
ices and information from supplier to customer. This set
of business processes encompasses a trading-partner
community engaged in the common goal of satisfying
the end customer (Gartner Group, 1999).
2.2.2.3 e-procurement and e-marketplaces
Online procurement (e-procurement) is another
commonly used e-business practice, affecting the
process of ordering goods and services. Company
personnel can access and browse a list of goods and
services directly from their desktops. Many e-
procurement systems are components of ERP
systems. One of the main benefits of e-procurement
is the reduction in transaction costs. According to
Dignum (2002), the cost reduction will be between
50 and 56 percent per order. However, the benefits
of cost reduction may only arise for large firms that
process hundreds of orders each week (Dignum,
2002). For small companies, the costs of the e-
procurement system may outweigh the benefits. Chapter 2 — ICT-Linked Firm Reorganisation and Productivity Gains
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(1999, 2002) studies the impact of ERP systems on
self-reported company performance and finds that
participating companies reported substantial
improvement in several areas as a result of their ERP
implementation, including their ability to provide
information to customers, cycle times, and on-time
completion rates. Hitt, Wu and Zhou (2002) empir-
ically test for the productivity and business perform-
ance effects of ERP on firms that adopted ERP versus
those that did not, and on firms before, during, and
after the implementation to assess performance
over time. They find that ERP adopters exhibit a
consistently higher performance than non-adopters
across a wide variety of measures. Most of the gains
occur during the implementation period, although
the authors do find some evidence of a decline in
business performance and productivity shortly after
the completion of the implementation. This result is
in contradiction to the theoretical expectation that
productivity should increase after the successful
completion of the ERP implementation.
Using data on 5,000 U.S manufacturing firms,
Mabert, Soni and Venkataramanan (2000) find that
the top three ERP performance outcomes include
quicker information response time, increased inter-
action across the entire enterprise and improved
order management/order cycle. 
2.2.4 Complementarity between ICT and
firm organisation and their productivity
effects
If complementarities between organisational invest-
ments and ICT investment exist, these factors are
likely to be correlated and firms that combine
complementary factors should have higher perform-
ance than firms that implement one measure but not
the other (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994 or Athey
and Stern, 1997). Even if there are clear complemen-
tarities between these measures, not all firms may
introduce both simultaneously, however, because
there are barriers to adoption, or the costs and bene-
fits of the investments differ between firms, or
managers do not fully understand all the comple-
mentarities (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Wolf and
Zwick, 2002b). These heterogeneities between firms
allow for a measurement of the complementarities
between ICT and firm organisation.
Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) argue that ICT are
general-purpose technologies that lower the cost of
intra- or interorganisational communication. In their
literature survey, they find that ICT investment is
greater in organisations that use increasing amounts
of delegated staff, invest more in training and
education and adopt corporate structures that
involve less vertical integration. A problem for the
measurement of complementarities is that positive
effects frequently affect intangible characteristics
such as speed in delivery or quality of the accompa-
nying services. In addition, the necessary invest-
ments in consulting or business organisation soft-
ware that usually accompany investments in ICT
and/or reorganisation are also difficult to measure. 
Furthermore, a number of authors argue that the
decreasing costs of co-ordination, communication
and information processing will lead to more free-
lancing (Malone and Laubacher, 1998), to a reduction
in firm size (Brynjolfsson et al., 1994), increased vari-
ability in the number and types of partnerships
explored by the average firm (Gurbaxani and Whang,
1991, Malone, 1997) and the rise of the “virtual
factory” (Upton and McAfee, 1996). Kang and Sakai
(2001) suggest that developments in ICT have given
rise to the establishment of a growing number of inter-
organisational relationships (e.g. alliances and joint
ventures, especially in service sectors like banking,
telecommunications, transport and trade). In other
words, ICT is seen as an enabler of the increasing inter-
organisational co-operation. This can be attributed to
the fact that developments in IT diminish the impor-
tance of location and time (Canoy et al., 2001).
The relationship between organisational change,
ICT and productivity is complex. Very few studies
empirically examine effectiveness of organisational
changes based on representative datasets. Using a
sample of 300 American firms drawn from Fortune
1000, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) find
a strong and significant interaction effect of decen-
tralisation and ICT capital on productivity (i.e.,
output controlling for labour and non-ICT capital).
These findings indicate that the impact of ICT
capital is higher when firms are more decentralised
and the authors conclude that information tech-
nologies and new work practices are complemen-
tary to each other. More recently, Brynjolfsson and
Hitt (2002) identified a specific set of these practices
that are important for productivity growth,
including open information access and communica-
tion, decision rights, performance-linked incentives
as well as heavy investment in training.
Using a sample of 400 British and 700 French firms
from the Workplace and Industrial Relations survey
(WIRS) and the “RÉPONSE” survey, Caroli and Van
Reenen (2001) find little evidence for the comple-
mentarity between organisational and technological
change measured as new equipment including new
microelectronic technology. Using the French
dataset RÉPONSE, Coutrot (1996) demonstrates thatthere is a strong correlation between technical
change and organisational change. A study of the
Danish Ministry of Business and Industry based on
515 Danish manufacturing companies find that
companies that made no investment in either new
equipment or new forms of work organisation
achieved an annual growth in labour productivity of
only 0.5 percent in the period 1990-1993. During the
same period, companies that invested only in phys-
ical equipment had a labour productivity growth of
1.5 percent per year while companies that invested in
both new equipment and new forms of work organi-
sation achieved an annual growth in labour of 2.7 %.
2.3 New Business practices
and productivity
performance35
2.3.1 Incidence of the use of e-business
practices
The present analysis of the incidence and conse-
quences of e-business practices draws heavily on
the e-business w@tch sector database. These data
provide the first cross-country and industry informa-
tion on this issue, covering up to 15 industries in
the manufacturing and service sector. The analysis is
based on data for the four larger EU Member States,
Germany, France, Italy and the UK, in 200236. The
e-business w@tch data indicate that in the EU-4, the
percentage of firms using ERP systems is much
higher than the percentage of firms using SCM (see
Graph 2.1). CRM is also important, particularly in
telecommunications and computer services as well
as in banking and insurance. Overall, CRM systems
are used by 22 % of firms in the ICT service sector
as compared to 7.5 % on average in the non-ICT
service sector (see Graph 2.1). In manufacturing,
ERP is the most frequently used e-business practice
followed by CRM and SCM. The chemical industry,
transport equipment as well as the electrical
industry have the highest share of enterprises using
ERP. Overall, only few firms use SCM with an EU-4
share of less than 5 %. The low share of ERP and
SCM in some service industries is due to the low
importance of intermediate materials such as raw
materials and energy. 
Graph 2.1: Incidence of e-business practices in the larger EU countries (EU-4)
Source: e-business w@tch sector database 2002.
0 5 10 15 20 25
Health and social services












Publishing, printing & audiovisual services
Food, beverages and tobacco
percentage of enterprises
Usage of an ERP system
CRM usage
SCM usage
European competitiveness report 2003
62
35 This section heavily draws on the e-business w@tch sector impact studies as
well as the e-business w@tch sector database 2002. Findings presented in the
report are based on data weighted by enterprises.
36 For Germany, France, Italy and the UK information for each of the 15 indus-
tries is available. For Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and Portugal
the E-business w@tch sector database covers three industries. For Finland, the
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden information is available for five industries.Chapter 2 — ICT-Linked Firm Reorganisation and Productivity Gains
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Graph 2.3: Use of SCM-systems in larger EU countries (EU-4) by industry and firm size 
Source: e-business w@tch sector database 2002.
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Graph 2.2: Use of ERP-systems in larger EU countries (EU-4) by industry and firm size
Source: e-business w@tch sector database 2002.
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When comparing survey results according to firm
size, it is possible to see that e-business practices are
used by a majority of large companies (see Graph
2.2 for ERP systems and Graph 2.3 for SCM). The
percentage of firms with ERP systems in large manu-
facturing companies (>250 employees) ranges from
30 percent in food and beverages to almost 80
percent in the electrical goods industry. This is
consistent with Hitt, Wu and Zhou (2002) who note
that ERP systems have been implemented in more
than 60 % of multinational firms. Turning to plans
to use an ERP system in the future, it is also evident
that larger firms are more likely to adopt ERP
systems. Among large firms, the percentage of firms
that will implement ERP systems in the next months
is highest in metal products, followed by insurance,
banking, computer services, and the food industry.
With regards to ERP diffusion in individual countries,
Italy is above average in all service industries, the UK
is below average and France and Germany are in the
middle range. In chemicals, French enterprises
reported the highest level of ERP (35 %). Enterprises
from Italy reported the highest level in machinery,
insurance and telecommunications sectors. UK firms
are again below average in all manufacturing indus-
tries. In the ICT sector, companies from the UK, in
particular, make extensive use of CRM systems (see e-
business sector reports).
Turning to the complementarity hypothesis, we find
that certain business practices are complementary
to each to other. In particular, the use of SCM and
ERP are highly correlated with a correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.87 (see Table 2.1).
The e-business w@tch data suggest that e-procure-
ment is one of the most widely used application. In
EU-4, the percentage of companies currently taking
advantage of e-procurement is approximately 37 %
(unweighted average across EU-4 industries).
Procuring online is more common in skill-intensive
service industries such as telecommunications and
computer services and business services (see Graph
2.4). Moreover, evidence suggests that online
procurement is more common in Germany and in
the UK (with unweighted means of 57 % and 44 %)
followed by Italy and France with 27 % (see e-busi-
ness w@tch sector impact studies). Furthermore,
the use of online procurement does not differ across
firm size. Small firms lag behind but the difference
is less pronounced than for other e-business appli-
cations such as ERP-systems (see e-business w@tch
sector impact studies).
Although the incidence of online-procurement is
relatively high, the volume shares are still low. In the
EU-4, the share of firms with less than 5 % of their
online purchasing volume is highest in manufac-
turing industries, such as metal products, machinery
and transport equipments (see Table 2.2).
Conversely, firms with a high share of online
purchasing (50 % or more of their purchasing
volume) can be found in business services, telecom-
munications and computer services and retail trade. 
In the EU-4, the percentage of firms participating in
e-marketplaces is still small with an unweighted
average of 4.5 % (see Graph 2.4). e-marketplaces are
more frequently used by large firms (see Graph 2.5). 
2.3.2 Relationship between e-business
practices, sectoral labour productivity
growth and performance
Table 2.3 shows the correlation coefficients
between various e-business practices in 2002 and
Table 2.1: Correlations between different types of e-business activities, EU-4





ERP 0.33 0.56 1
(0.03) (0.00)
Knowledge 0.58 0.68 0.32 1
Management Solution (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
SCM 0.46 0.60 0.87 0.42
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: p-value in parentheses. Number of observations 45 (15 sectors x 3 firm size classes).
Source: Calculations based on e-business w@tch sector database 2002.Chapter 2 — ICT-Linked Firm Reorganisation and Productivity Gains
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Graph 2.4: Participation in e-marketplaces and online procurement in the larger EU countries (EU-4)
Source: e-business w@tch data 2002.
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Table 2.2: Share of online procurement in total procurement, EU-4
Online share  Online share Online share  Online share Online share
of total  of total  of total  of total of total
procurement procurement:  procurement:  procurement: procurement:   
< 5 % 5-10 % 11 to 25 % 26 to 50 % > 50 %
Food, beverages  43.8 32.6 22.7 0.9 0.0
and tobacco
Publishing, printing  41.0 27.0 21.0 8.6 2.3
& audiovisual services
Chemical industries 43.3 41.6 10.3 3.1 1.8
Metal products 49.4 36.0 9.7 2.6 2.4
Machinery 52.0 31.8 12.5 1.8 1.9
Electrical machinery  39.0 29.3 14.1 8.5 9.0
and electronics
Transport equipment  57.1 22.5 12.5 6.6 1.3
manufacturing
Retail trade 33.7 19.0 19.6 13.9 13.8
Tourism 48.0 26.6 10.1 10.9 4.4
Banking 41.2 30.8 17.5 5.6 4.9
Insurance 41.4 28.7 18.9 5.1 5.9
Real estate 41.1 32.6 17.6 8.7 0.0
Business services 34.8 17.9 23.6 8.6 15.1
Telecommunications 16.1 19.2 23.2 21.5 20.0
and computer services
Health and social services 35.1 39.6 19.6 4.5 1.2
Source: e-business w@tch sector database 2002.the average annual change in labour productivity
between 1995-2000 based on EU-4 industry data.
The correlation is calculated on data for the indi-
vidual EU-4 countries. There is a significant correla-
tion between the change in labour productivity
during the period and ERP use37. This means that
industries with a higher productivity growth rate are
more likely to implement ERP systems. Graph 2.6
illustrates the relationship between the percentage
of firms with ERP use and labour productivity
growth. It shows that industries with a higher
proportion of ERP use have had a higher produc-
tivity growth in 1995-200038. However, the direc-
tion of causality may be ambiguous or open to
interpretation. Since the time period refers to past
rather than future productivity growth, the most
direct interpretation is that the causality runs from
labour productivity growth to ERP use. Neverthe-
less, the two phenomena (productivity growth and
ERP implementation) are to a large extent simulta-
neous, since ERP systems were developed in the
1990s and have grown rapidly since the mid-1990s.
In this case, it is plausible that a higher level of ERP
use might have influenced labour productivity
growth and higher labour productivity growth have
lead to a higher level of ERP use. 
The correlation coefficients between the other types
of e-business practices and change in labour
productivity are also positive in most of the cases
but are not significant at the five percent level. The
negative correlation between SCM and change in
labour productivity may be due to the fact that the
usage of SCM is more pronounced in specific
resource-intensive industries. 
Table 2.4 shows the correlation coefficients
between the percentage of firms using online
procurement and the change in labour productivity
between 1995-2000 based on EU-4 industry data.
In order to investigate whether the improvement in
labour productivity is mainly due to labour shed-
ding, correlations for value added growth are also
presented. 
A significant correlation is found between the change
in labour productivity over the period and the use of
online procurement. The results are robust with
respect to the measurement of online procurement
(percentage of firms, or alternatively the percentage
Graph 2.5: Participation in e-marketplaces by industry and firm size, larger EU countries (EU-4)
Source: e-business w@tch sector database 2002.
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37 The significance is even greater when the correlation is based on robust
standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity (p-value: 0.04).
38 The correlation is also significant when disaggregated EU-4 data are used (60
observations).Chapter 2 — ICT-Linked Firm Reorganisation and Productivity Gains
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Table 2.3: Correlation coefficients between various e-business practices 
and growth in labour productivity and in value added, EU-4
Use of an ASP CRM use Use of an  Use of a SCM use
ERP system Knowledge  
Management Solution
Change in value  +0.21 +0.19 +0.23 +0.18 -0.10
added in constant  (0.11) (0.15) (0.08) (0.17) (0.46)
prices per employee
Change in value  +0.32 +0.17 +0.07 +0.18 -0.20
added in constant  (0.01) (0.19) (0.59) (0.18) (0.12)
prices
Notes: p-value in parentheses. Number of observations is 60 (15 industries for each of the following countries: Germany, France, Italy and the UK).
Average annual change in value added refers to the period 1995 -2000 (UK, Italy and Germany) and 1995-1999 (France).
Source: Stan Database, e-business w@tch sector database 2002, own calculations, p-value in brackets.
Graph 2.6: ERP use and labour productivity growth, EU-4 (aggregated)
Notes: The graph contains data for EU-4. The number of observations is 15. 










0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16






























































































Table 2.4: Correlation coefficients between online procurement, 
e-marketplaces use and growth in labour productivity and in value added, EU-4
Percentage of companies  Percentage of companies Percentage of companies 
trading goods or services  purchasing goods  that procure at least 25%
through an e-marketplace or services online the goods or services online
Change in value  +0.16 +0.33 +0.30
added constant prices  (0.22) (0.01) (0.02)
per employee
Change in value  +0.26 +0.38 +0.38
added in constant prices (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes: Number of observations is 60, p-values in brackets.
Source: e-business w@tch sector database 2002, own calculations.European competitiveness report 2003
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of firms with an online procurement share of 25 % or
more). This means that industries with a higher
productivity growth rate are more likely to use online
procurement. The correlation coefficient between
participation in e-marketplaces and labour produc-
tivity growth is also positive but not significant at the
10 percent level (see also Graph 2.7). 
When surveyed in the framework of e-business
w@tch, the majority of firms expresses a highly or
fairly positive opinion of the impact of e-procure-
ment on procurement costs. This confirms the
results obtained from the correlation between
labour productivity and e-procurement. The sectors
where procurement has had the highest impact are
telecommunications and computer services, busi-
ness services, insurance and tourism.
2.3.3 Relationship between e-business
practices and organisational change
Table 2.5 shows the percentage of firms reporting that
e-business has significantly changed different aspects
of the organisation of the firm in EU-4 (only firms with
250 or more employees). Overall, the largest change
can be observed for internal work processes, followed
by changes in the organisational structure and rela-
tionships to suppliers. The largest impact e-business
had on the internal work process can be observed in
telecommunications and computer services, followed
by publishing and multimedia. 
In machinery, the electrical industry and transport,
between 6 % and 9 % of firms state that e-business
has significantly changed their organisation. The
impact of e-business on internal work processes is
more pronounced: between 8 % and 15 % of the
firms in these industries reported that e-business
significantly changed their internal work processes. 
Correlations between different types of organisa-
tional change indicate that changes in the organisa-
tional structure of a company and changes in
internal work processes go hand in hand (see Table
2.6 based in all enterprises). This confirms the theo-
retical predictions that e-business changes the
organisational structure, responsibilities and internal
power structures simultaneously.
2.3.4 Determinants and barriers 
to e-business practices
Rapid advances in computer and software technolo-
gies combined with the explosive growth of the
Graph 2.7: Participation in e-marketplaces and labour productivity growth, EU-4
Notes: The graph contains data for EU-4. The number of observations is 15.
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Internet have led many companies to rethink their
business practices, to put a greater emphasis on their
use of IT, and to invest more in enterprise organisa-
tion (Mendelson, 1999). It is well known that adop-
tion of new technologies involves significant costs in
terms of learning. Using U.S. data, Bartel and Licht-
enberg (1987) find evidence that educated workers
have a comparative advantage in implementing new
Table 2.5: Companies reporting a significant change in organisational structure 
and practices due to e-business, EU-4 (large firms)
Organisational structure  Internal work processes Relationship
of company to suppliers
Significant Somewhat Significant Somewhat Significant Somewhat
Food, beverages 
and tobacco 4.4 15.7 2.5 34.2 3.1 18.4
Publishing, printing  
& audiovisual services 11.7 30.9 17.8 40.1 2.4 46.3
Chemical industries 1.8 21.4 2.8 42.7 1.8 28.4
Metal products 1.6 14.8 0.0 21.3 0.0 8.4
Machinery 6.9 16.7 15.2 19.5 7.1 15.9
Electrical machinery 
and electronics 9.1 27.8 10.1 38.3 13.0 15.6
Transport equipment 
manufacturing 9.7 9.4 9.0 18.1 6.9 23.4
Retail trade 12.9 16.2 15.1 20.2 4.2 36.7
Tourism 13.4 29.5 23.8 33.2 15.7 13.8
Banking 5.9 33.2 9.8 37.1 4.8 18.8
Insurance 6.4 37.0 13.8 44.5 3.7 30.6
Real estate 2.3 11.9 0.0 24.7 4.5 19.4
Business services 6.7 22.5 12.6 32.3 6.2 25.4
Telecommunications 
and computer services 21.0 19.6 14.5 38.3 8.9 31.2
Health and social services 6.8 15.7 14.9 16.1 0.9 27.4
Source: e-business w@tch sector database 2002.
Table 2.6: Correlation coefficients for various e-business effects (firms reporting significant effects), EU-4
Organisational  Internal Customer  Relationship to  Offers of 
structure of  work relationship suppliers products / 
company processes services
Internal work processes 0.80 1
(0.00)
Customer relationship 0.69 0.61 1
(0.00) (0.00)
Relationship to suppliers 0.72 0.62 0.61 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Offers of 
products / services 0.67 0.62 0.62 0.73 1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Has e-business changed 
the way of conducting 
business? 0.67 0.61 0.66 0.73 0.77
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: Number of observations is 60 (number of sectors x number of countries). All enterprises. 
Source: e-business w@tch sector database 2002.European competitiveness report 2003
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technologies because they assimilate new ideas more
readily. Since better-educated workers enjoy a
comparative advantage in implementing new tech-
nologies, the diffusion of e-business practices should
be higher in skill-intensive industries such as
computer services and business services.
Furthermore, since various e-business practices are
enabled by information technologies, it is likely that
the diffusion of e-business practices is positively
related to the degree of information technology
intensity. Table 2.7 shows the correlation coeffi-
cients between various e-business practices and
skill/IT intensity. For two countries, Germany and
the UK, industry–level data based on the national
labour surveys are matched with the e-business
w@tch data. The data suggest that the use of
Knowledge Management Solution systems and
CRM systems are significantly and positively related
with the sectoral skill intensity39 (see Table 2.7). For
the UK, Graph 2.8 illustrates that industries with a
higher share of highly skilled workers have a higher-
Table 2.7: Correlation coefficients between various e-business practices and IT/skill intensity
# of observations CRM use Use of an ERP  Use of a  SCM use
system Knowledge  
Management Solution
Share of university graduares  30 +0.48 -0.14 0.65 +0.17
(based on LFS data) (0.01) (0.46) (0.02) (0.37)
Size of IT-department 60 +0.45 -0.05 +0.53 +0.09
(0.00) (0.72) (0.00) (0.51)
Share of IT personnel  30 +0.73 -0.03 +0.82 +0.20
(based on LFS data) (0.00) (0.88) (0.00) (0.28)
Note: p-value in parentheses. Number of observations is 30 (15 industries for each of the following countries: Germany and United Kingdom).
Source: UK Labour Force Survey 2000, Mikro Census, e-business w@tch sector database 2002, own calculations.
Graph 2.8: CRM use and skill intensity, UK
Notes: Skill intensity is defined as the number of university graduates in 2000.
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39 Skill intensity in the UK is measured as the share of workers with a higher
level of qualification such as National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) 5 (post-
graduate qualification) and NVQ 4 first degree. In Germany, skill intensity is
measured as the share of workers with a university degree.Chapter 2 — ICT-Linked Firm Reorganisation and Productivity Gains
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than-average share of firms using CRM. The data
also suggest that Knowledge Management Solution
systems and CRM systems are significantly and posi-
tively related to the sectoral IT intensity measured
as the share of IT workers (such as computer soft-
ware engineers, computer systems analysts,
programmers, network and computer systems
administrators, computer hardware engineers etc.).
However, no significant relationship between ERP
use and IT intensity is found. 
Table 2.8 shows the correlation coefficients
between IT/skill intensity and both participation in
e-marketplaces and use of online procurement. The
use of online procurement is significantly related to
the skill intensity of the firm, with a correlation coef-
Table 2.8: Correlation coefficients between participation in e-marketplaces 
and online procurement and IT/skill intensity
# of  Participation in Online procurement Online procurment 
observations electronic marketplaces in percent of total 
procurement between 
26 and 100 %b
Share of university graduares  30 +0.22 +0.51 +0.38
(based on LFS data) (0.25) (0.00) (0.04)
Size of IT-department 60 +0.62 +0.73 +0.66
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Share of IT personnel  30 +0.36 +0.62 +0.47
(based on LFS data) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01)
Notes: Size of IT-department is defined as the number of employees per thousand employees mainly occupied with maintenance of IT and networks. 
b The categories >50 % and 26-50 % are added together.
Source: UK Labour Force Survey 2000, Mikro Census, e-business w@tch sector database 2002, own calculations.
Table 2.9: Barriers to procuring online, EU-4 (firms that agreed “completely”)
Requires  Suppliers do  Concerns about  Technology is Suppliers’  Cost 
face-to-face  not sell online data protection,  expensive technical   advantage is
interaction security issues systems are insignificant
not compatible
Food, beverages  49.3 42.9 32.4 20.5 13.8 23.6
and tobacco
Publishing, printing  37.6 36.8 31.3 25.1 13.5 27.6
& audiovisual 
services
Chemical industries 39.4 44.5 27.9 23.5 13.9 20.3
Metal products 48.9 41.3 27.0 23.4 15.5 23.4
Machinery 49.0 45.7 32.9 24.7 14.3 21.4
Electrical machinery  36.2 36.8 32.5 21.0 12.1 23.0
and electronics
Transport equipment  39.7 44.8 35.0 36.3 18.7 30.5
manufacturing
Retail trade 41.4 34.5 33.5 24.4 17.6 23.2
Tourism 37.1 33.9 27.8 25.3 15.1 21.1
Banking 34.0 25.7 38.5 23.3 11.8 20.5
Insurance 33.4 33.7 45.0 22.9 14.8 20.9
Real estate 36.5 35.1 35.3 28.1 10.6 22.8
Business services 31.0 26.3 25.1 18.6 7.9 17.4
Telecommunications 20.9 14.8 25.0 12.7 9.7 17.4
and computer 
services
Health and social  40.8 27.2 34.6 27.9 10.6 25.8
services
Source: e-business w@tch sector database 2002, own calculations.European competitiveness report 2003
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ficient of 0.50. The results are robust when the
share of online procurement in percent of total
procurement is used. Again, there is a significant
relationship between IT intensity, measured as the
share of IT-personnel and use of online procure-
ment. The results are robust with respect to the
definition of IT-personnel (size of IT-department vs.
IT-personnel based on the Labour Force Survey).
Concerning factors that affect negatively the imple-
mentation of e-business practices, the principal
barrier to the use of online procurement is that
many products and services require face to face
interactions. This factor is particularly important in
some manufacturing industries such as food, metals
and machinery. The second most important factor is
that suppliers do not sell online. Other factors such
as concerns about data protection, security issues
and compatibility of the suppliers’ technical systems
are less important (see Table 2.9). 
2.3.5 Summary
The results from the empirical analysis at the
industry level can be summarised as follows: First,
the actual use of enterprise resource planning and
online procurement is positively related with labour
productivity. Second, certain e-business applica-
tions, such as Knowledge Management Solution
(KMS) systems and CRM systems are related to
either the skill intensity or the information tech-
nology intensity of the industry. Finally, evidence
confirms that the introduction of e-business applica-
tions change the organisational structure, responsi-




2.4.1 Incidence of organisational change
and new management techniques:
Evidence based on CIS III data
As already indicated in section 2.2.2, various new
organisational practices are complementary in the
sense that the implementation of one practice (say,
business or advanced management techniques) is
enhanced by the implementation of others (such as
changes in the organisational structure). The
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) allows an investi-
gation of the connections between changes in the
organisational structure and the introduction of new
management techniques. In the last CIS, enterprises
were asked whether they had made major changes to
their organisational structure or introduced important
new management techniques (alternatively referred
to as modern management practices or business prac-
tices) during the three-year period 1998-2000. 
Three areas of business/organisational practices
could be distinguished: implementation of
advanced management/business techniques within
the firm, implementation of new or significantly
changed organisational structures and implementa-
tion of new or significantly changed corporate
strategies. New business/management practices
may include total quality management, Business
Process Engineering (through ERP and SCM) and
lean manufacturing, although this was not clearly
defined. Changes in organisational structure may
include the introduction of new profit centres and a
flattening of the traditional hierarchical pyramid. At
preparing this report, data were available only for
Finland, Germany, Austria and Sweden.
Graph 2.9, Graph 2.11, Graph 2.12 and Graph 2.13
show the percentage of firms implementing either
new management techniques or changes in the
organisational structure for those countries. Both
types of organisational practices seem to be highly
correlated with correlations coefficients of 0.92 in
Finland, 0.68 in Germany, 0.79 in Austria and 0.84
in Sweden, all significant at the one percent level.
This is consistent with the prediction that manage-
ment techniques such as ERP lead to significant
organisational changes such as streamlining of
management structures, flatter, more flexible and
democratic organisations (Davenport, 1998).
In Germany, the percentage of firms implementing
new management techniques is on average 36 % in
manufacturing and 31 % in services. The percentage
of firms reporting major changes to their organisa-
tional structure in manufacturing and services is 49 %
and 44 %, respectively. Within the manufacturing
sector, machinery, metals and chemicals have higher-
than-average shares (see Graph 2.11). Moreover,
evidence suggests that large firms (> 499 employees)
are more likely to introduce a major organisational
change or new management practices (69 % for
firms with 500 and more employees vs. 44 % for
firms with less than 500 employees). 
The results for Finland show that telecommunication
and computer services have the highest share of firms
implementing either new management techniques
or changes in the organisational structure. A high
proportion of firms with organisational changes can
also be found in wholesale trade as well as in electrical
machinery (Nace 30-33) (see Graph 2.9). Chapter 2 — ICT-Linked Firm Reorganisation and Productivity Gains
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In Austria, the telecommunication and computer
services industry, and low-skill intensive industries
such as textiles, leather and wearing apparel as well
as the transport industry have the highest share of
firms with new organisational practices (see Graph
2.12). 
In Sweden, telecommunication and computer serv-
ices have the highest share of firms implementing
either new management techniques or changes in
the organisational structure (see Graph 2.13). A
high proportion of firms with organisational
changes can also be found in electrical machinery.
Engineering activities, testing, R&D, machinery and
electrical machinery have higher-than-average
shares of firms implementing new management
techniques. 
Overall, the results suggest that ICT intensive indus-
tries, such as telecommunications and computer
services, and R&D intensive industries, such as
machinery or electrical machinery, are more likely to
introduce organisational changes.
Graph 2.10 plots labour productivity growth and
the percentage of enterprises with new or signifi-
cantly changed organisational structures based on
industry data for Finland. Industries such as
telecommunication services, electrical machinery
(including computer hardware, telecommunications
equipment) can be identified as the industries with
an above-average growth rate of labour produc-
tivity. It is surprising that computer services experi-
enced negative productivity growth between 1995
and 2001. This may be partly due to measurement
problems in the ‘unmeasurable sector’ (financial
sector, market services such as computer services)
(Griliches, 1992). For instance, in many service
industries information on inputs (such as labour
income) is used as a proxy of output. Furthermore,
it is difficult to disaggregate the change in output
value into a quantity and a price component. This
problem may be even more severe in industries that
are affected by changes in the quality of services.
Van Ark (2001) pointed out that the difference in
the labour productivity change between the meas-
urable sector and unmeasurable sector is highest in
Graph 2.9: Introduction of new organisational practices and advanced management techniques,
Finland 1998-2000
Notes: Energy supply and financial intermediation services are not covered by the survey.
Source: CIS 2000 Finland, own calculations. 
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Graph 2.10: Organisational change and labour productivity growth, Finland
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Graph 2.11: Introduction of new organisational practices and advanced management techniques,
Germany, 1998-2000
Notes: Energy supply is not covered by the survey.
Source: CIS 2000 (Germany). We would like to thank Christian Rammer (ZEW) for providing us with the cross-tables.
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Finland. This suggests that measurement problems
may be more acute in Finland than in other Euro-
pean countries. 
Excluding the outlier computer services, the correla-
tion between organisational change and labour
productivity depicted in Graph 2.10 is highly signifi-
cant (p-value = 0.02). Positive and significant correla-
tions between the share of firms with organisational
changes on one hand and employment and value
added growth (in constant prices) on the other, indi-
cate that organisational change is accompanied by a
higher labour productivity growth achieved mostly
through output growth rather than labour-shedding.
There is also a positive relationship between the
proportion of firms with organisational changes and
labour productivity in Germany, but the correlation
is not significant at the 10 percent level.
2.4.2 The productivity effect of
reorganisation: Evidence based on
establishment level data
Cross-country comparisons of the diffusion of new
forms of work organisation are very limited. They
are typically drawn from small samples and are
therefore not representative. The most reliable
evidence concerning changes in work organisation
in Europe is provided by the 1996 survey titled
“European Direct Participation in Organisational
Change (EPOC)“ in ten European countries, which
was initiated by the European Foundation. The
results of the EPOC survey have been well docu-
mented in the literature (OECD 1999; Sisson 2000). 
Concerning the relationship between organisational
change and productivity the EPOC survey is of no
help. More generally, neither the theoretical nor the
empirical literature concur on the productivity effect
of reorganisation. Therefore, clearly more research is
warranted. Unfortunately, no internationally compa-
rable data sets are available for an empirical assess-
ment of this issue.
To investigate this further, the present section is
based on the German IAB establishment data40. This
data set, deriving from the largest survey of this kind
in Europe, is a representative sample of German
establishments employing at least one employee
belonging to the compulsory social security scheme. 
Graph 2.12: Introduction of new organisational practices and advanced management techniques,
Austria 1998-2000
Source: CIS 2000 (Austria), Statistic Austria, Wifo calculations. 
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The section concentrates on an important aspect of
reorganisation, the increase in employee participa-
tion, i.e. the reduction of hierarchies, teamwork and
autonomous work groups. These forms of reorgani-
sation are frequently associated with stepped up
ICT investments while other forms of reorganisa-
tion, such as new incentive schemes (profit sharing,
employee share owning) do not share this associa-
tion and are not considered here. Our hypothesis is
that the introduction of measures that increase the
participation of employees increases the produc-
tivity of the establishment.
The main diagonals of Table 2.10 provide an
overview of the incidence of the selected reorgani-
sations in a representative sample for German
establishments in 1997. The most common reor-
ganisation measure in 1997, with 11.4 %, is the
delegation of responsibility and decisions to lower
levels of hierarchy. Teamwork has been introduced
by 5.5 % and work groups with independent
budget have been introduced by more than 4 % of
the establishments. Continuous training is offered
by about 37 % of the establishments in the first half
of 1997, while ICT investments have been under-
taken by 28.4 % of the establishments in 1997.
The figures in the lower triangle of Table 2.10
describe the incidence of different combinations of
the measures. That is, for example 3.3 % of the
establishments in our sample aimed at improving
the participation of their employees by shifting
responsibility to lower levels of hierarchy and by
implementing teamwork and self-responsible teams.
If we only consider the group of establishments that
introduce work groups with independent budgets
(i.e. set as 100 %), almost 60 % of these establish-
ments introduce both measures. Teamwork and
self-responsible teams have been introduced by
almost 30 % of those establishments that have work
groups with independent budgets. Among the
firms that implemented teamwork and self-respon-
sible teams, a shift of responsibility to a lower level
of hierarchy is also very widespread. 
Graph 2.13: Introduction of new organisational practices and advanced management techniques,
Sweden 1998-2000
Notes: Transport and courier services include telecommunication. Data for computer services should be interpreted with caution due to small sample
size. This also holds for the category “organisational change” in other manufacturing, energy supply and minerals. We thank Maria Säfström for her
advice on the data interpretation. 
Source: CIS 2000 (Sweden), Statistics Sweden, Wifo calculations. 
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Nevertheless, the joint incidence of combinations
between investments in ICT, training and the three
organisational changes is clearly lower. The
percentage of establishments which offer all five
measures is infinitesimal. These findings indicate
that most German establishments selected only a
small number of those measures analysed here.
Similar results are obtained from waves 1999 and
2000 of the IAB panel. While the incidence of reor-
ganisation measures decreased in 1998 and 1999,
training and ICT investments increased. 
It is not easy to detect empirically if organisational
changes increase firm productivity because changes
are perhaps introduced for reasons that also affect
productivity. The OECD points to this problem as
follows: “If firms only began to experiment with new
forms of working practices when they faced dire
trouble, the existence of practices might be associated
with poorer performance, at least over the short-term.
On the other hand, if flexible practices were intro-
duced mainly into firms with more highly skilled work-
forces, there is the danger that higher performance
may be attributed to the working practices rather than
the higher skills” (OECD, 1999, p. 182). Empirical
analysis41 shows that indeed both factors, selectivity
caused by temporary shocks (endogeneity) and unob-
served structural differences (unobserved hetero-
geneity) have an impact on the estimated productivity
effects of reorganisation. Productivity effects are
assessed with lags up to 3 years.
The regressions indicate that if establishments intro-
duced all three measures to increase employee
participation in 1996 or 1997, average establish-
ment productivity can be significantly increased by
8 % on average for the time period 1997-2000.
Those establishments that introduce more than one
measure to increase employee participation have a
productivity advantage with respect to those that
introduce only one. Therefore there are positive
complementarities between the reorganisations
studied. The interaction effect between organisa-
tional changes and investments in ICT and training
stays insignificant, however, when both, endo-
geneity of HPW measures and unobserved hetero-
geneity are controlled. 
Additional regressions show that not taking endo-
geneity of these measures and unobserved hetero-
geneity into account underestimates the produc-
tivity effect. With selection control, the effect of
reorganisation is larger than without selection
control for most regressions (see Table 2.11). This
may mean that establishments introduce reorgani-
sations when they have a temporary productivity
problem. In addition, the regression on the average
productivity effect for the period 1997-2000
exhibits higher productivity effects of reorganisation
than the separate cross-section regressions for
1998, 1999, and 2000. As the regression on the
averages controls for unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity, it can be deduced that these unob-
served factors have a negative impact on the estab-
lishments or, in other words, that establishments
with structural productivity problems introduce
reorganisations. These last two findings would tend
to confirm that reorganisation is often a response
by enterprises falling behind. Alternatively, it
confirms the importance of competitive pressure as
a factor for introducing innovative practices. 41 See Appendix 2.1.
Table 2.10: Incidence of Reorganisations, ICT Investments, and Training in 1997 (in %)
12 3 45
1 Shift responsibility to lower level of hierarchy 11.4
(100)
2 Teamwork and self-responsible teams 3.3 5.5
(59.3) (100)
3 Work groups with independent budget  1.9 1.2 4.1
(46.5) (28.4) (100)
4 Continuous training 7.2 3.9 2.9 37.1
(19.4) (10.5) (7.9) (100)
5 ICT investments 6.2 3.3 2.6 15.5 28.4
(21.8) (11.7) (9.0) (54.6) (100)
Notes: The figures present the percentage of establishments applying a certain measure or combination of measures (based on the whole population).
The figures in parentheses describe the percentage of establishments that use a given combination of measures (based on the number of establish-
ments in the corresponding category). 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1997 and 1998, own calculations.European competitiveness report 2003
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The bulk of the evidence on the productivity effects
of human resource management methods can be
found for the USA. For most European countries,
studies on this topic are limited by the scarcity of
data sets with the relevant information drawn from
a representative sample of firms. Outside Germany,
Fernie and Metcalf (1995) and Addison et al. (2000)
show on the basis of the Workplace Industrial Rela-
tions Survey (WIRS) that efforts of the management
to increase employee involvement in the three prior
years have a significantly positive impact on firm or
labour productivity in Britain (at least for non-union
firms). They survey several British studies, however,
that do not find significant productivity effects of
employee participation. Ramsey, Scholarios and
Harley (2000) include 24 human resource practices
and identify some of them as High Performance
Workplaces (HPW) on the basis of the Workplace
Employment Relation Survey (WERS). British firms
that adopted these measures had a relatively high
labour productivity, however neither selection bias
nor unobserved heterogeneity are controlled here.
Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) find on the basis of
the RÉPONSE survey that French firms increased
their productivity by a reduction in managerial
levels and that the effect is strongest in firms with a
high share of qualified employees. NUTEK (1999)
derives positive but frequently only marginally
significant productivity effects of new work prac-
tices for Danish, Swedish and Finnish firms.
2.5 Summary and conclusions
Most large firms in the EU use e-business applica-
tions, such as enterprise resource planning and
online procurement. The implementation of e-busi-
ness applications is often accompanied by addi-
tional investments in hardware, software and
training. The changes to the organisation can be
substantial, and may have an impact on virtually
every business process or function within the organ-
isation. E-business applications such as ERP (Enter-
prise Resource Planning) require changes to the
organisation chart, job descriptions, responsibilities,
internal power structures, and to the organisation’s
culture. 
Attached to ERP projects is not only the promise of
productivity improvement but also the risk of failure
if badly managed. Many projects fail because of the
lack of organisational change, poor project manage-
ment, inadequate training and the underestimation
of the amount of time needed. Case studies and
academic research indicate that ERP implementa-
tion leads to improvements in short-term produc-
tivity. However, it is still unclear whether ERP
contributes to a long-term competitive advantage
for the firm (Cotteleer, 2002). 
Positive correlation between e-business
practices and productivity growth
On the basis of e-business w@tch data for Germany,
France, Italy and the UK, the actual use of ERP and
online procurement is positively correlated with
past or simultaneous labour productivity growth.
However, there is no significant relationship
between other e-business applications (i.e Supply
Chain Management (SCM), Customer Relationship
Management (CRM)) and labour productivity.
Finally, certain e-business applications, such as
Knowledge Management Solution (KMS) systems
and CRM systems are correlated to either sectoral
skill intensity or information technology intensity.
Positive correlation between organisational
change and and productivity growth
The results from the empirical analysis based on CIS
data confirm the hypothesis that the introduction of
new business practices and new organisational
practices are highly correlated. Furthermore, on the
basis of industry data in Finland, there is a statisti-
cally significant relationship between labour
productivity growth and the percentage of enter-
prises with new or significantly changed organisa-
Table 2.11: Productivity Effects of Reorganisation
without  with without with   without with   without with  
selection selection selection control selection selection selection selection
control control control selection control control control control
1998 1999 2000 average 1997-2000
Reorganisation
in 1997 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.08* 0.00 0.03 0.02** 0.08*
Notes: Significance levels are: **<5 %, *<1 %.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1999 and 2000, own calculations.Chapter 2 — ICT-Linked Firm Reorganisation and Productivity Gains
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tional structures. This indicates that industries with
an above-average growth rate of labour produc-
tivity such as telecommunication services and elec-
trical machinery have a higher share of firms with
new or significantly changed organisational struc-
tures. However, this relationship is less clear in other
countries such as Germany. 
Simultaneous introduction of reorganisation
measures increases productivity
The last part of this chapter shows that changes in the
work organisation introduced in order to increase
employee participation raises the productivity of
establishments. The results indicate that the simulta-
neous introduction of teamwork, autonomous work
groups and the reduction of hierarchies in the years
1996 or 1997 increases the average productivity of a
representative sample of German establishments by
8 % in the period 1997-2000. It is also found that the
three measures complement each other and the
establishments that introduce all of these measures
have an additional productivity advantage. The inter-
action effects between reorganisations and invest-
ments in ICT and training were not significant,
however. The analysis suggested that the decision to
engage in reorganisation is often the result of
competitive pressure. 
Policy implications
Given the positive relationship between e-business
applications such as ERP systems and labour
productivity growth, policies should aim at
increasing the firms’ incentives for productivity
enhancing investments in e-business solutions.
Many e-business applications are widely available
but utilisation is not widespread especially within
SMEs. The European Commission (2003) suggests
several issues that should be considered, in partic-
ular: (i) improve the managerial understanding and
skills for e-business in SMEs, (ii) promote the avail-
ability of SME friendly e-business solutions, and to
facilitate effective participation of SMEs in electronic
marketplaces and business networks. The manage-
rial understanding and skills for e-business in SMEs
should be enhanced by an increased knowledge
transfer. Furthermore, managers and system users
must be able to understand the integration of e-
business applications into the overall company
operation. Thus, firms should increase their invest-
ment in training and retraining programmes that
give attention to the organisational culture and
work organisation (EITO, 2003). E-business support
networks may provide a way to develop and share
knowledge. Some member states such as the UK
already established SME business support networks.
These typically aim at providing targeted knowl-
edge and practical assistance to SMEs in the various
stages of their effort to adopt concepts such as e-
business. 
Government policy, in general, can take responsi-
bility for the following areas. Given the key role of
ICT in the process of organisational change, govern-
ments must ensure the provision of a high quality
ICT infrastructure. Given the positive externalities
associated with human capital investment, govern-
ments have a major role in developing human
capital. Government support is required in various
areas, particularly tertiary education, worker
training and lifelong learning (OECD, 2001). 
EU member implemented measures under the 
e-Europe 2002 Action Plan, which focused on the
key objectives of achieving a cheaper, faster, and
secure Internet, investing in people and skills and
stimulating the use of the Internet. It is important
that this momentum is sustained and intensified in
the e-Europe 2005 Action Plan, focused on only
three priorities, of which two are e-business and e-
learning. Furthermore, governments can dissemi-
nate information on the benefits and costs of ICT
enabled organisational change. This is particularly
important for small and medium sized firms, as well
as for firms in low skill intensive industries such as
food & beverages and textiles, leather and clothing
that seem to be late adopters of e-business prac-
tices. Encouraging the further growth of e-business
solutions in these industries should be a key issue
for sector-specific policy actions. 81
9,000 German establishments in 1997 to almost
14,000 German establishments in the year 2000.
For the purpose of this analysis, we only include
profit-oriented establishments and establishments
that have not bought other establishments or been
bought by other establishments.43 The variables
describing the reorganisations to increase the partic-
ipation of employees, ICT investments and training
refer to the year 1997. The impact of these measures
on productivity are estimated for cross-section
production functions from 1998 until 2000. In addi-
tion, a panel estimation includes the average produc-
tivity of the establishments in the years 1997 – 2000.
In 1998, there are 2,287 establishments in our gross
sample, in 1999 2,506 establishments and in 2000
4,314 establishments while during the years 1997 –
2000, 11,322 enterprises are covered in total.44
Productivity estimations in a cross-section
analysis
The productivity effects of reorganisations that
increase the participation of employees are deter-
mined by estimating Cobb-Douglas production func-
tions (see also Black and Lynch, 2001). The
dependent variable denotes the economic value
added (turn over minus input costs) and the explana-
tory variables include capital, the number of
employees, reorganisation, ICT investments and
continuous training as well as other control variables. 
The first estimation model describes a cross-section
regression of a simple production function, where






In order to assess the productivity impact of organ-
isational changes for the average establishment in
an economy and give an overview of the incidence
of reorganisation, we need representative establish-
ment panel data covering at least several sectors
(Black and Lynch, 2001). Internationally compa-
rable data sets suitable for such analysis do not exist
and even national data sets are scarce. Therefore,
for the present study the effects are measured
exemplary for Germany, using the IAB establish-
ment panel survey. 
The establishments covered by the survey are asked
every year about their turnover, number of
employees, personnel problems, apprenticeship
training, investments, ICT usage, innovations, and
public subsidies since 1993 (in East Germany since
1996). From time to time, additional topics such as
training and establishment reorganisation are
added to the questionnaire. The establishments
participating in the IAB Establishment panel are
selected from the parent sample of all German
establishments that employ at least one employee
covered by social security.42 Thus, self-employed
and establishments that employ only people not
covered by social security (mineworkers, farmers,
artists, journalists, etc.) as well as public employers
with solely federal employees do not belong to the
original sample. The random draw on this sample
covers information that increased from almost
APPENDIX 2
43 We sort the establishments into the following sectors: Agriculture and
forestry, mining and basic materials, food, consumer goods, production
goods, investment goods, construction, trade, traffic and communication,
credit and insurance, hotels and restaurants, education, health and social
affairs, electronic data processing and research and development as well as
business consulting, other business services, and other personal services.
44 The number of observations in the net sample is shown in the tables with the
estimation results. 42 A detailed description of this dataset can be found in Kölling (2000).European competitiveness report 2003
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introduction of reorganisation and selected control
variables are regressed on value added. Here, the
introduction of three reorganisations that increase
the participation of the employees are central: shift
in responsibility to lower levels of hierarchy, team-
work and self-responsible teams, and work groups
with independent budgets. The dummy variables
indicating if an establishment introduced reorgani-
sations in the years 1996 or 1997 (see Table 2.10 in
main text) have a strong coherence and it seems
difficult to disentangle the effect of one individual
measure on productivity. Therefore the three
observed measures are aggregated to one inde-
pendent “reorganisation” factor by a factor
analysis.45 This approach captures the complemen-
tary nature of the three reorganisations better than
using dummy variables for individual measures
because it does not reduce the index value to zero
if a single practice is absent in an establishment.
Instead, the absence of one practice only reduces
the value of the factor (Osterman, 1994; Youndt et
al., 1996, Wolf and Zwick, 2002b).
First, the productivity effects of the factor “reorgan-
isation” is estimated in a Cobb-Douglas production
function for the cross-section equations: 
(1) lnYt=α lnKt+β lnLt+γ Rt-l+φ ICTt+ϕ Tt+δ Xt+ε t
with t=1998–2000,
where  Y is value added, K is capital which is
constructed from replacement investments by the
perpetual inventory method (see also Black and
Lynch, 2001 or Hempell, 2002), L is the number of
employees, R is the factor “reorganisation”, ICT is a
dummy for ICT investments, T a dummy for contin-
uous training investments and X represents the
vector of control variables including the share of
qualified employees, the legal form of the establish-
ment, dummies for exporters, establishments with
work councils and collective bargaining, and the
state of the technical equipment. The productivity is
measured in the respective values of the year
observed. It can not be expected that reorganisa-
tions have an instantaneous effect on establishment
productivity and therefore their productivity impact
is lagged (Wolf and Zwick, 2002b; Zwick, 2002b;
Kato and Morishima, 2002). In addition, by lagging
the reorganisation variable, the endogeneity of this
variable in the productivity regression can be miti-
gated (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001). The symbol l
indicates the lags that are between one for the
1998 and three for the 2000 cross section estima-
tion. The parameters α ,  β ,  γ ,  ϕ ,  φ , and ä are the
regression coefficients to be estimated and å is the
normally distributed error term with expected value
zero and variance σ 2 .
In addition to the inputs capital and labour, further
establishment characteristics are added as explana-
tory variables. It can be expected that a high share
of qualified employees and modern technical equip-
ment increase the productivity of the establishment
(Addison et al., 2000; Black and Lynch, 2001; Wolf
and Zwick, 2002b). Also exporters and establish-
ments with work councils and collective bargaining
usually exhibit a significantly higher productivity
(Hübler and Jirjahn, 2002; Addison et al., 2000;
Zwick, 2002b; Zwick, 2003c). East German estab-
lishments may still have lower productivity, differ-
ences between the business sectors are captured by
16 dummy variables and four dummies for legal
establishment forms are added. A definition of all
variables as well as their average values can be
found in table A.2.2. 
Column 2 and 3 of table A.2.5 show the effects of
reorganisation introduced in 1996 and 1997 on
value added in 1998 (model 1).46 The establish-
ments in our sample produce with a capital inten-
sity of around 0.16.47 The low and insignificant
coefficient of the factor reorganisation surprises in
the light of the theoretical considerations in Section
2. The control variables all have the expected effects
on the productivity of the enterprises, however. The
productivity gap between East and West Germany is
still persistent and the productivity differentials
between sectors are jointly significant. 
The complementarities between different measures
are widely ignored in the empirical literature
(Cappelli and Neumark, 1999). Frequently
mentioned complements to reorganisations that
decentralise decision-making and increase the partic-
ipation of employees are investments in information
and communication technologies (ICT) and training
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson
and Hitt, 2002). Therefore, in model 1 in addition to
the factor reorganisation, also interaction terms
between organisational changes, ICT investments
and training investments as well as an interaction
term between all three measures are added. In
contrast to our theoretical considerations in section 2
– though in accordance with comparable estimations
(McNabb and Whitfield, 1999, Wolf and Zwick,
2002b) – the interaction terms are insignificant for all
45 A main component factor analysis is applied to reduce the three reorganisa-
tion measures to one independent factor with an eigen value of 1.82 (see
Osterman, 1994; Ramsay, Scholarios and Harley, 2000). The resulting factor
“reorganisation” explains 61 % of the total variance. The factor loadings are
shown in table A.2.3.
46 The results for 1999 and 2000 are qualitatively the same and, therefore, they
are not shown here.
47 The low capital coefficient may be a consequence of the approximation of
capital by replacement investments. The measurement errors incurred by this
method lead to the well-known bias of the capital coefficients toward zero
(Griliches and Mairesse, 1998).APPENDIX 2
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cross section regressions.48 This means that establish-
ments that increase the participation of their
employees can not further increase productivity by
additionally offering continuous training or investing
in ICT at the same period of time. 
We do not know, however, if ICT investments and
training efforts in the establishments are intended
to support the introduction of the reorganisation.
We only observe the joint incidence of these meas-
ures in some establishments. Therefore, it can not
be excluded that ICT and training investments
specifically designed to improve the adoption of
reorganisation have a positive impact on produc-
tivity as it was shown by Ichniowski, Shaw and
Prennushi (1997) for the American steel industry.
Another reason for the insignificant interaction
terms might be that the experiences in one firm or
sector might not be easily transferred to other
firms with a different business environment and
industrial relations (Ichniowski, Shaw and Pren-
nushi, 1997). We take the universal view that looks
at productivity effects irrespective of sector or
specific business strategy of the establishment
(Huselid, 1995). Probably the complementarity
between ICT, training and reorganisation is
strongly dependent on firm-specific conditions,
however. Finally, formal training might not be the
most efficient reaction of the establishment on the
introduction of reorganisation. Borghans et al.
(2000) show that most employees in a Dutch
insurance company received the necessary infor-
mation from colleagues or superiors when organi-
sational changes are introduced. When new ICT
measures are introduced, mainly training and
instruction is used, however, see table A.2.1.
48 The results do not differ from those in model 1 and are therefore not shown
here.
Endogeneity of Reorganisation
The cross section regressions in the last section can
give only first indications on possible productivity
effects of measures that increase the participation of
employees, because possibly important unobserved
establishment characteristics and endogeneity of the
personnel measures are not taken into account. In a
next step, it is explored on the basis of instrumental
variable regressions if the results presented in the
previous estimations are biased because the intro-
duction of reorganisation is endogenous (Model 2). 
Most data sets do not provide suitable additional
variables that meet the requirements for qualifying
them as identifying variables in an instrument
regression. In the case of panel data, lagged values
or differences of the explaining variable in question
are often used as instruments. This strategy is prob-
lematic, however, because the instruments are often
only weakly correlated with the endogenous vari-
ables, and explanatory variables, such as capital, are
only weakly correlated over time. Therefore, it is
preferable to use external instruments that intu-
itively explain the selection process in the establish-
ment and exhibit the necessary statistical properties
(Griliches and Mairesse, 1998).49 The wave 1997 of
the IAB establishment panel contains information
on expected training activities and on expected
personnel problems, which may serve as identifying
regressors. Seven suitable external instruments can
be found: three variables on expected personnel
problems concerning skill gaps and organisational
changes50 and four training forms whose incidence
is expected to increase in the next two years.51 Each
of these variables is correlated with the introduction
of reorganisation because we can expect that the
introduction of these measures increases the qualifi-
cation demand of the work force. In addition, the
identifying variables are uncorrelated with establish-
ment productivity and therefore satisfy the statis-
tical requirements.
The instrument equation for the factors organisa-
tional change R can be described as follows:
(2) R=α 1I1+...+α 7I7+δ X+ε ,
Table A.2.1: What kind of support did the
workers get?







Source: Borghans et al. (2000).
49 Nevertheless the list of identifying variables used has an impact on the esti-
mated coefficient of the instrumented variable. Therefore several different
identifying variables are used here.
50 The dummy variable has the value one if the establishment expects problems
to find suitable skilled employees on the labour market, organisational prob-
lems due to maternal leave and a large demand for training and qualifica-
tion. It is based on the question, “Which personnel problems do you expect
in the following two years?”.
51 The four training forms are formal external courses, job rotation, self-induced
training and quality circles. The dummy variable has the value one if the
establishment expects that the incidence of these training forms increases
during the next two years. European competitiveness report 2003
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where I1 – I7 are the identifying variables and X is
the vector of control variables from equation (1). In
Model 2, equation (2) is estimated simultaneously
with the production function (1) using a two stage
least squares procedure. This implies that the
endogenous factor R that is correlated with the
error term in equation (1) is replaced by the instru-
mented factor estimated in equation (2), Rhat. This
factor is correlated with the original factor but inde-
pendent from å in equation (1) and therefore
exogenous. The results of the instrumental equation
(2) can be found in table A.2.752. 
Columns 4 and 5 of table A.2.5 show the estimation
results of the production function of Model 2 with
the instrumented reorganisation for 1998. The coef-
ficients of the input factors capital and labour and
the additional control variables are almost
unchanged in comparison to the estimation results
of model 1. Also the estimated impacts of reorgani-
sation are relatively unchanged and still do not
significantly differ from zero. Finally, the interaction
terms between reorganisation, ICT and training
investments are not significantly different from zero
again (not shown here). These results apply also for
the cross sections of the year 1999 and 2000.
Therefore endogeneity of reorganisation does not
have an impact on the results in the cross-section
regressions.
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Even if we control the endogeneity of the establish-
ment´s decision to introduce reorganisation, the
cross-section production function estimation may
be biased because other explanatory variables,
especially capital and labour, are endogenous
(Griliches and Mairesse, 1998). Important reasons
for the endogeneity of labour, capital, and other
variables in the production function may be that
unobserved time-invariant factors, such as manage-
ment quality, industrial relations, or technological
change, have an impact on the explanatory vari-
ables and on the value added. Therefore the impact
of time invariant unobserved heterogeneity on the
estimation results is estimated in model 3. If unob-
served characteristics of the establishment, such as
management quality or industrial relations, are
correlated with both, the introduction of reorgani-
sation and productivity, cross-section estimates are
inconsistent. A possibility to correct the estimation
bias is to use panel estimation methods that elimi-
nate the establishment fixed effects. When, for
example, deviations from an establishment’s mean
or first differences in equation (1) are taken, all
time-invariant variables such as the introduction of
certain measures during a period of time, industry
sector, the existence of work councils as well as
other variables in the production function, can not
be identified, because they drop out (Ichniowski,
Shaw and Prennushi, 1997; Black and Lynch, 2001).
This feature proves to be a crucial hindrance in our
case, because we only know if an establishment has
ever introduced the reorganisation in 1996 or 1997.
Therefore we do not know the exact implementa-
tion date and we do not have yearly data on the
incidence of these measures. 
Therefore, the two step estimation procedure
suggested by Black and Lynch (2001) is used. In this
model, the parameters of the time-variant input
factors are determined by a simple Cobb-Douglas
production function on the basis of panel data from
1997 to 2000, while the effects of the (almost) time
invariant determinants are regressed on the fixed
effects from the panel analysis in the second step.
Therefore, the fixed effects estimation in the first
step can be written as:53
(3) lnYt=α lnKt+β lnLt+υ +ε t with t=1997–2000,
where õ is the unobserved time invariant establish-
ment specific fixed effect and åt the idiosyncratic
component of the error term. The estimation results
of equation (3) can be found in table A.2.4. Striking is
again the low coefficient of the input capital that has
a similar size to that in the comparable estimation in
Black and Lynch (2001), however. If input and output
are chosen simultaneously or if there are measure-
ment errors for the input factors (especially for
capital), the within estimator will be inconsistent and
we may observe too low capital intensities in the
production function (Griliches and Mairesse, 1998).54
On the basis of these first step regression results,
the average fixed effect  for every establishment in
the period 1997-2000 is calculated. The average
fixed effect can be interpreted as the average estab-
lishment specific difference from productivity
predicted on the basis of the inputs. This time
invariant variable therefore indicates whether total
factor productivity was below or above the average
of the other establishments during the observation
53 The necessary assumptions for a random effects regression were rejected by
a Hausman test.
54 Some papers demonstrate that these problems can be avoided by using esti-
mators based on differences or lags such as (system) GMM or the two-stage
least-squares first-differenced estimator (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981), see
Black and Lynch (2001) or Hempell (2002). This approach is not possible
with the data because the number of observations would decline dramati-
cally.
52 The instrumental regressions only differ slightly for the different years in the
cross section regressions and the fixed effects regressions. Therefore just the
instrumental regression for the fixed effects regressions (see below) is
displayed in table A7.APPENDIX 2
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period. It serves as dependent variable for the
second estimation step. The vector of explanatory
variables in the second step contains all (almost)
time invariant establishment characteristics from
model 1, that is the reorganisation factor, ICT
investments, the continuous training dummy and
all variables in X.  All explanatory variables are
included with their values for the year 1997:
(4) υ–=γ R+φ ICT+ϕ T+δ X+ε .
The estimation results are shown in table A6. Reor-
ganisation introduced in 1996 or 1997 have a
significant positive impact on the establishment
specific fixed effects (model 3). In comparison to
the results of the first model, taking into account
unobserved heterogeneity increases the positive
impact of organisational changes on establishment
productivity. This suggests that establishments
which introduce organisational changes have unob-
served time invariant characteristics that decrease
their productivity. In other words: establishments
with structural productivity problems try to improve
their situation by changing their organisational
structure. This is also found by comparable contri-
butions, see Nickell, Nicolitsas and Patterson (2001)
and Wolf and Zwick (2002b). If one ignores the
impact of these unobserved fixed effects, the meas-
ured productivity effect of organisational changes is
too low. The relative impact of the other variables
on productivity is roughly the same in models 1 and
3 while the significance of the explanatory variables
is somewhat larger in model 3.
Final statements on the effects of reorganisation can
only be made, however, if we control for both,
unobserved fixed effects and endogeneity. There-
fore, in a next step, the reorganisation factor R in
estimation equation (4) is instrumented using equa-
tion (2), see the regression results of model 4 in
table A.2.6. Controlling endogeneity clearly
increases the measured productivity impact of reor-
ganisation on the average fixed effect. The coeffi-
cients of the other explaining variables are more or
less the same. This result shows that taking account
of selection effects can be decisive for the evalua-
tion of the productivity effects of reorganisation
even after controlling unobserved heterogeneity.
When we take into account the decision of the firm
to restructure their internal organisation, the assess-
ment of these organisational measures is clearly
more positive. The regression indicates that if estab-
lishments introduced all three measures to increase
employee participation – flatter hierarchies, team
work and autonomous work groups – in 1996 or
1997, average establishment productivity could be
significantly increased by 8 % on average for the
time period 1997-2000. The construction of the
reorganisation factor makes it clear that those
establishments that introduce more than one
measure to increase employee participation have a
productivity advantage with respect to those that
introduce only one. Therefore there are positive
complementarities between the reorganisations
studied. The interaction effect between organisa-
tional changes and investments in ICT and training
stays insignificant, however, when both, endo-
geneity of HPW measures and unobserved hetero-
geneity is controlled.55
55 Estimation results are not shown here, but they are available upon request.European competitiveness report 2003
86
Table A.2.2: Descriptive statistics of variables used
Variables 1997 1998 1999 2000 Comments
Value Added 12.90 12.85 12.99 13.07 Turnover minus inputs, in DM, logs
Capital 12.44 12.45 12.38 12.44 Constructed from expansion
investments by perpetual inventory
method, in DM, in logs
Labour 1.95 1.95 1.97 1.96 Number of employees, in logs
Share qualified employees 0.51 0.48 0.53 0.53 Share of employees with
professional degree on all
employees
Exporter 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.25 Establishment exports, yes=1, no=0
State of the art technical equipment 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.76 Technical state of equipment is
modern or state of the art, yes=1,
no=0
Work council n.a. 0.20 0.22 0.26 Establishment has work council,
yes=1, no=0
Collective bargaining 0.54 0.67 0.67 0.70 Establishment is subject to or
orients itself on sector or
establishment specific collective
wages, yes=1, no=0
Individual establishment 0.58 0.60 0.59 0.56 Establishment is an individual firm,
yes=1, no=0
Partnership 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 Establishment is a partnership,
yes=1, no=0
Publicly listed establishment 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 Establishment is publicly listed,
yes=1, no=0
Limited (reference) 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.31 Establishment is a public limited
company, yes=1, no=0
Expected skill shortage 0.19 Establishment expects skill
shortages in next 2 years, yes=1,
no=0
Expected organisational problems  0.04 Establishment expects 
due to maternal leave organisational problems due to
maternal leave in next 2 years,
yes=1, no=0
Expected large demand for training  0.07 Establishment expects large 
and qualification demand for training and
qualification in next 2 years, yes=1,
no=0
Expected increase in internal  0.11 Establishment expects increase in 
formal courses internal formal courses in next 2
years, yes=1, no=0
Expected increase in job rotation 0.02 Establishment expects increase in
job rotation in next 2 years, yes=1,
no=0
Expected increase in  0.06 Establishment expects increase in 
self-induced training self-induced training in next 2
years, yes=1, no=0
Expected increase in quality circles 0.03 Establishment expects increase in
quality circles in next 2 years,
yes=1, no=0
East German establishment 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.24 Establishment has head quarter in
East Germany, yes=1, no=0
Notes: Averages are derived from cross section samples and weighted according to establishment weights. 
Source: IAB establishment panel, waves 1997-2001, own calculations.APPENDIX 2
87
Table A.2.3: Rotateda component matrix of
factor analysis







Notes: a The factors have been rotated by promax. 
Source: IAB establishment panel, wave 1999, own calculations.
Table A.2.4: Fixed effect production function
1997-2000, endogenous variable: Value Added
Variables Coefficient z-Value
Capital 0.02** 2.54 
Labour 0.44*** 12.38 
Year 1998 -0.00 -0.04
Year 1999 0.02 1.55
Year 2000 0.07*** 4.55
Constant 12.82*** 85.58 
Number of 
observations = 11322
Number of groups = 6293 R2 = 0.83
F(5,5024) = 37.91
Prob > F = 0.0000
Notes: Significance levels: ***<1 %, **<5 %. 
Source: IAB establishment panel, wave 1999, own calculations.
Table A.2.5: Productivity effects of reorganisation in 1997 on productivity 1998, endogenous
variable:Value Added 1998
Model 1 (OLS regression) Model 2 (2 stage least squares 
instrumental variables regression)
Coefficients z-values Coefficients z-values
Reorganisation 1997 0.01 0.53 -0.01 -0.27
Capital 0.16*** 11.42 0.15*** 9.61
Labour 0.82*** 35.91 0.82*** 28.17
ICT investment  0.07* 1.92 0.05 1.04
Training 1997 0.07** 2.03 0.06 1.46
Share qualified employees 0.42*** 6.03 0.47*** 5.92
Exporter 0.18*** 3.64 0.19*** 3.32
State of the art technical equipment 0.07* 1.80 0.09** 2.07
Work council 0.14*** 2.64 0.16** 2.56
Collective bargaining 0.05 1.40 0.09** 1.99
Individual establishment -0.26*** -5.47 -0.30*** -5.72
Partnership -0.01 -0.18 -0.01 -0.13
Publicly listed establishment 0.16* 1.87 0.21** 2.16
East German establishment -0.35*** -9.60 -0.32*** -7.85
Constant 9.23*** 47.16 9.29*** 41.49
N=2287 N=1835
R2=0.88 R2=0.89
Notes: Significance Levels: ***<1 %, **<5 %, all values are for 1998, except indicated otherwise (training investment is only available for 1997). 16
sector dummies are included, standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1999 and 2000, own calculations. All standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust.European competitiveness report 2003
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Table A.2.6: Productivity effects of reorganisation on average productivity 1997-2000
Model 3 (OLS regression) Model 4 (2 stage least squares 
instrumental variables regression)
Coefficients z-values Coefficients z-values
Reorganisation 0.02** 1.98 0.08* 1.65
ICT investment 0.14*** 4.40  0.11*** 2.74 
Training 0.19*** 5.31  0.17*** 4.38 
Share qualified employees 0.58*** 9.58 0.58*** 9.53
Exporter 0.26*** 5.67 0.25*** 5.35
State of the art technical equipment 0.18*** 6.64 0.17*** 5.23
Work council 0.48*** 10.14 0.48*** 10.09
Collective bargaining 0.15*** 4.32 0.15*** 4.22
Individual establishment -0.52*** -11.99 -0.51*** -11.69
Partnership -0.13*** -2.59 -0.12*** -2.30
Publicly listed establishment 0.15** 2.00 0.14** 1.79
Establishment size 20-199 0.79*** 18.12 0.77*** 16.67
Establishment size 200-499 1.50*** 22.11 1.50*** 20.24
Establishment size 500-999 1.81*** 20.21 1.75*** 16.85
Establishment size 1000+ 2.43*** 25.59 2.30*** 15.56
East German establishment -0.36*** -11.10 -0.36*** -11.09
Constant -1.19*** -11.57 -1.17*** -11.26
N=3168 N=3168
R2=0.73 R2=0.72
Notes: Significance Levels: ***<1 %, **<5 %, all values are for 1997, except work council which is only available for 1998. Also 16 sector dummy vari-
ables added, standard errors are heterosedasticity robust.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, Waves 1999 and 2000, own calculations. All standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust.APPENDIX 2
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Table A.2.7: Instrumental variable regression, endogenous variable: Reorganisation
Variables Coefficient z-Value
ICT investment 0.45*** 8.35 
Training 0.14*** 2.32 
Share qualified employees 0.02 0.25
Exporter 0.07 0.98
State of the art technical equipment 0.15*** 2.69
Work council -0.10 -1.25
Collective bargaining 0.03 0.49
Individual establishment -0.11 -1.52
Partnership -0.19*** -2.19
Publicly listed establishment 0.19 1.46
Establishment size 20-199 0.26*** 3.66
Establishment size 200-499 0.34*** 2.72
Establishment size 500-999 0.79*** 4.97
Establishment size 1000+ 1.83*** 11.38
East German establishment 0.13*** 2.36
Expected skill shortage 0.20*** 3.39
Expected organisational problems due to maternal leave 0.16** 1.87
Expected large demand for training and qualification 0.19*** 2.33
Expected increase in internal formal courses 0.22*** 3.04
Expected increase in job rotation 0.36*** 3.21
Expected increase in self-induced training 0.35*** 3.79
Expected increase in quality circles 0.32*** 3.09
Constant 12.82*** 85.58 
Number of observations = 11322
Number of groups = 6293 R2 = 0.83
F(5,5024) = 37.91
Probe > F = 0.0000
Notes: Significance levels: ***<1 %, **<5 %. All variables take the values of year 1997 (except work councils that are only available for 1998), also 16
sector dummy variables added, standard errors are heteroscedasticity robust.
Source: IAB establishment panel, wave 1999, own calculations.European competitiveness report 2003
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Appendix 2.2 Glossary - list
of abbreviations
ASP: Application Service Provider
B2B: Business-to-business
BPR: Business Process Reengineering
CRM: Customer Relationship Management 
EDI: Electronic Data Interchange 
ERP: Enterprise Resource Planning 
HR: Human Resources 
ICT: Information and Communication Technologies 
IS: Information Systems 
IT: Information Technologies 
KMS: Knowledge Management Solutions
SCM: Supply Chain Management 
VO: Virtual Organisation3.1 Introduction
Regional diversity in the EU will increase sharply
with the forthcoming enlargement as will the
competitiveness challenge. The present EU–15 is
already characterised by substantial income,
employment and productivity disparities reflecting
differing resource endowments and innovation
performance. Certain EU regions perform very well
and constitute clusters of innovation and produc-
tivity growth, associated with high real wages and
standards of living and providing substantial
external economies that attract new firms and foster
the process of innovation. Other regions perform
poorly (see European Commission (2003)). A key
competitiveness challenge for the EU on the eve of
enlargement is to ensure that the conditions that
are necessary for regional productivity growth are
developed across all regions including those of the
acceding nations. Such conditions will ultimately
determine whether regional disparities are eased
and cohesion is advanced or whether disparities
continue to be present or to widen over time. 
This chapter has two main purposes. In order to
understand better the problem of regional dispari-
ties in the EU, it is, firstly, necessary to explain
success at the regional level – where success is
understood to mean high levels of competitiveness;
secondly, it is necessary to determine whether the
factors underlying success can be applied else-
where, in particular in less successful regions.
It is essential, to begin with, to define more
precisely what is understood by success choosing
from a number of possible measures of competitive-
ness suggested in the literature. Once this is accom-
plished, a review of the theoretical aspects of
(regional) competitiveness should help determine
the causes of success. A review of available data and
analytical approaches should make it possible to
Titolo capitolo
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consider how to measure success in practical terms,
and to determine which factors affecting success
are the most important or relevant. Finally, by
looking more broadly at a selection of regions
which have performed well in recent history it will
be possible to assess the transferability of the factors
behind success.
The present chapter begins with a literature review,
in section 3.2, to help determine the structure
behind regional competitiveness and what makes
this different from the concept of national competi-
tiveness. An overview of the theories explaining
regional competitiveness is followed by a specific
focus on how knowledge-based factors influence
the outcome. The role of knowledge-based factors
is of particular importance to the study in view of
their presence in many of the growth areas in the
economy. The section concludes by proposing a set
of variables and concepts which give structure to
the subsequent empirical analysis.
An assessment of the availability of European56
regional data is presented in section 3.3. In partic-
ular, the section looks at what indicators are avail-
able to approximate the factors determining
regional competitiveness. Ultimately, a European
regional databank is established from which empir-
ical analysis is undertaken.
In sections 3.4 to 3.6 three methodologies are used
to help determine how success, i.e. regional
competitiveness, can be explained: associations and
correlations of competitiveness with key indicators,
econometric analysis, and case studies.
The methodologies enable a picture of competitive-
ness to be constructed, which gradually moves
towards more robust conclusions of the causes.
Chapter 3:
Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
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Section 3.7 summarises the main conclusions and,
finally, section 3.8 reviews some policy conclusions
regarding the potential of transferring those factors
found to be important in regional competitiveness
to regions that have been lagging behind.
3.2 Regional Competitiveness:
A Brief Literature Review
Competitiveness can be defined in many ways. A
common indicator is GDP per capita, which can be
broken down into various component factors, each











(Productivity) • (Work-Leisure choice) • (Employment
Rate) • (Dependency Rate)
Although some interrelation is likely between the
indicators (highly productive regions, for example,
using skilled labour may well display high rates of
employment), for the purpose of this chapter the
focus will be on productivity, defined in terms of
output per hour worked.
The relative merits of GDP per employee and GDP
per hour worked as a measure of productivity have
been discussed in Chapter 1. The regional implica-
tions of choosing an hours worked measure are
perhaps more profound than at the national level.
Regions are more likely to be specialised in partic-
ular sectoral activities, and this means that adjusting
for different hours worked profiles will more accu-
rately represent the true labour effort involved in
producing the output against which it is measured.
By analysing success at the sub-national level one
assumes that despite the presence of both compet-
itive and less competitive firms in every region there
will be common features within a region, which
affect the competitiveness of all firms located there.
Clearly, there are many parallels with the study of
national competitiveness and certain indicators are
likely to be common to both country-level and











from countries in some key respects. Sub-national
regions are part of the national monetary union and
subject to common rules governing their interna-
tional trade, and the degree of price and wage flex-
ibility is generally less than across nations, whereas
generally there is full and unrestricted capital and
labour mobility. Regions do not have the same set
of adjustment mechanisms as countries, and there-
fore the concept of macro-economic competitive-
ness cannot be fully applied to the regional level; on
the other hand, as part of a national fiscal system,
regions enjoy substantial benefits related to fiscal
transfers that constitute an important adjustment
mechanism.
As regional competitiveness shares many features
with its national counterpart, most theoretical
approaches are usually present in both areas of
work. Graph 3.1 provides a broad overview of the
theoretical foundations and of the array of factors
that can be considered to play a role in determining
regional competitiveness. The concepts from neo-
classical, new growth theory and cost competitive-
ness apply equally well to regions as to nations. On
the other hand, knowledge and innovation, and
localisation/specialisation effects are critical factors
in regional competitiveness. The rest of this section
reviews these more closely. 
3.2.1 Theories concerning localisation
and specialisation
3.2.1.1 New economic geography
The attempt to find more convincing and robust
explanations for the tendency of economic activities
to cluster in a limited number of places and within
clearly defined boundaries, and to link this with the
concept of regional competitiveness, has stimulated
a resurgence of interest for space-related issues in
economic theory, after concepts such as distance
and transportation costs had long been margin-
alised by mainstream (neo-classical) economists.
The most compelling testament to this has been the
birth of what is often referred to as ‘new economic
geography’ recently reviewed by Schmutzler (1999)
and inspired by the influential core-to-periphery
model proposed by Krugman (1991a). In its
essence, the new paradigm maintains that
geographical concentration is the equilibrium
outcome of countervailing forces (centripetal and
centrifugal) which, while they attract consumers
and firms to the same location, they prevent the
production of one good from being entirely located
in a single massive centre.acterised by strong internal scale economies like
manufacturing and chemicals and centrality indices.
In other words, these industries tend to be localised
at the EU core. 
Haaland et al. (1998) empirically address the ques-
tion of what determines the economic geography
of Europe. Using cross-section data on thirteen
Western European countries disaggregated by
sector at the 4-digit level, they test the relative
importance of a wide range of factors on the rela-
tive and absolute indices of geographical concentra-
tion proposed by Amiti (1998). Among the explana-
tory variables the authors include market size effects
(concentration of expenditure), between-country
differences in labour (number of employees to value
added) and human capital (average labour
compensation) intensities, differences in technology
(labour productivity), input-output linkages
(proportion of own industry inputs on output),
economies of scale (percentage reduction in
average costs for each percent increase in output),
and trade costs (non-tariff barriers). 
The results indicate that the most important deter-
minant of industrial concentration in Europe is the
demand bias generated by the localisation of
expenditure. This factor alone accounts for nearly
half of the total variation in industry concentration
across countries. This result is taken as evidence in
Chapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
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New economic geography theories have stimulated
a wealth of empirical work. However, few studies
have attempted to test directly the market-size
effects on agglomeration posited by the core-to-
periphery framework. Davis and Weinstein (1999)
confirmed the existence of the “home market
effect” described by Krugman (1991b), which
postulates that differences between two regions in
demand for a good can induce amplified differ-
ences in the production of the good, leading the
high-demand region to become a net exporter. 
These findings contrast with evidence previously
found by the same authors using OECD data at the
country level (Davis and Weinstein, 1999). Higher
trade costs (transport costs and trade barriers)
between countries and greater mobility of factors
across regions are two factors put forward in Davis
and Weinstein (2001) to explain the different
predictions obtained from their regional and inter-
national analyses, respectively. 
Amiti (1998), using data on 5 EU countries and 65
manufacturing industries, finds that a 1 percent
increase in scale economies - measured as the ratio
between total employment in each industry and the
number of enterprises - leads to 0.5 percentage
points increase in industrial concentration. Brülhart
(1998) using employment data on EU industries
finds a positive relationship between industries char-
Graph 3.1: Aspects of Regional Competitiveness
Neoclassical View New Growth Theory
Investment Technology endogenous
Initial conditions (technological externalities)
Technology exogenous
Human Capital
Regional Competitiveness Cost Competitiveness
(HighGDP per employee,    Unit Labour cost
or GDP per hour worked)    Price of public inputs
  Ratio of prices tradeable/nontradeable
Economic Geography  /Trade Theory Knowledge-based factors
    Agglomeration effects play a role in each theory (at least implicitly)
               Urbanisation - input measures (human capital, researcher, R&D infrastructure,
                             Investment in R&D)
  Transport costs - output measures (patents, process and product innovation)
 Economies of Scale
Sectoral Specialisation
Output =f (Human Capital, No. of Researcher, R&D Infrastructure, Spillovereffects, etc.)European competitiveness report 2003
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favour of the home market effect postulated by the
new economic geography theories. Ceteris paribus,
differences in factor intensities are also found to be
significant forces behind concentration, suggesting
that the Hecksher-Ohlin and Ricardo theory of
comparative advantage also contributes, albeit to a
lesser extent, to explaining economic geography in
Western Europe.
3.2.1.2 Spillover effects
The observation that knowledge tends to flow freely
between proximate firms operating within the same
or related industries lies at the heart of the empirical
literature investigating the link between innovation
and location. A sizeable body of empirical studies
have shown that knowledge spillovers not only
increase productivity, but their effect also decays
with geographic distance (Jaffe et al., 1993;
Almeida and Kogut, 1997; Acs et al., 1994). 
Von Hipple (1994) argues that non-codified knowl-
edge is “sticky” and consequently it is best trans-
mitted via face-to-face interaction. Geographical
proximity matters because tacit knowledge - if non-
rival, in the sense that the use of a piece of infor-
mation by a firm does not reduces its content for
other firms (Arrow, 1962) - can more easily spill
over from a firm to a closely located firm through
employees or researchers interaction. Along similar
lines Glaeser et al. (1992) observe that the diffusion
of technical knowledge may be highly localised and
transfer is more likely to occur in places densely
packed with organisations that share similar inter-
ests (local milieu). The attention devoted to the
measurement and the effect of knowledge spillovers
is also linked to the new growth theory (Romer,
1986; Lucas, 1988; Grossman and Helpman, 1991).
Unlike neo-classical growth theory (Solow, 1956),
endogenous growth models identify externalities,
rather than scale economies, as the main engine of
growth. Given that knowledge spillovers are an
important source of externalities, regional differ-
ences in growth rates may result from increasing
returns to knowledge.
Agglomeration economies
A related theoretical debate that has attracted a
considerable amount of empirical work concerns
the disaggregation of agglomeration economies –
as conceived by Marshall (1890), Weber (1909) and
Lösch (1940) – into localisation economies and
urbanisation economies, or alternatively, distin-
guishing between specialisation and diversity
economies. 
Localisation economies, attributed by Glaeser et al.
(1992) to the Marshall-Arrow-Romer externality
(MAR)57, are defined as knowledge spillovers
external to firms but internal to an industry within a
geographic region. On the other hand, urbanisation
economies reflect Jacob’s (1969) view of a cross-
fertilisation of ideas across firms from different
industries within a city. According to this view, the
most important sources of knowledge spillovers are
external to industries and are realised through the
exchange of complementary knowledge across
firms sharing a common science base within a
geographic region. 
Empirical results tend to support the second
hypothesis, that knowledge spillovers are associated
to diversity rather than industry specialisation.
Glaeser et al. (1992) using a dataset on the growth
of the top five industries in 170 different cities test
the relative importance of specialisation and diver-
sity and find that diversity is relatively more
conducive to higher growth than specialisation. Acs
et al. (1999) find that specialisation has a negative
effect on local employment growth and Audretsch
and Feldman (1998) find that diversity is more
conducive to innovation than specialisation58.
Local competition, knowledge externalities and
innovation
Contextual to the debate on whether regional
specialisation (rather than regional diversity) is more
conducive to innovation and growth, a second
controversy has involved the link between the
degree of local competition, knowledge externali-
ties and innovation. 
The MAR model predicts that local monopoly domi-
nates local competition as the means to economic
growth, because it allows firms to maximise their
ability to appropriate the economic value generated
by their investment in innovative activities.
Conversely, Jacobs (1969) and, more recently,
Porter (1990) claim that local competition is supe-
rior to local monopoly, because it creates incentive
to emulate best practice and boosts pressure to
innovate. This debate has also stimulated a number
of empirical studies. Armington and Acs (2002) look
at the effect of new firm entry rates on local
57 Marshall (1890) suggested that knowledge transfers were important for the
growth of cities. Arrow (1962) framed this concept into a general equilibrium
formulation, which was later expanded by Romer’s model of endogenous
growth (1986).
58 Some successful examples of diversified innovative (biotech and IT) clusters
in Europe (with NUTS codes) are: East Anglia (Cambridge) UK40; Stockholm-
Uppsala SE0(1-2); Central Scotland (Edinburgh, Glasgow, Dundee) UKA(1-2);
Uusimaa (Helsinki) FI11; Karlsruhe (Heidelberg) DE12 (winner of the Bio-
Regio Contest, this clusters hosts the European Molecular Biology Labora-
tory); Dublin IE002. Chapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
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employment growth. They find that high rates of
entry have a positive impact on the growth of local
economies. Fosfuri and Ronde (2002) study firms’
incentive to cluster in order to benefit from recip-
rocal technological spillovers and find support to
the hypothesis that weak market competition leads
to more clustering. Firms might try to locate in
distant areas in order to minimise technology
spillovers and preserve their competitive advantage,
especially when trade secret protection is low.
Saxenian (1994) shows that this is not the case for
Silicon Valley where the annual labour turnover
among highly skilled personnel is very high (25-
30 %) but this does not prevent firms from
competing vigorously in the product market.
3.2.2 Regional characteristics 
of innovation
Within the various approaches presented in Graph
3.1 there are also regional aspects other than the
specific localisation and specialisation theories
discussed in the previous section.
Higher education institutions are easily identified as
sources of human capital within a region. The deci-
sion to stay and work in the region after graduation
is, however, highly dependent on locational factors
such as the quality of the living environment and
employment opportunities (Simmie et al., 2002). In
empirical studies, the attraction and retention rates
of trained and educated workers, which might act
as a measure of the return on investment in educa-
tion, are often ignored (De Gaudemar, 1996). There
is as of yet little knowledge on how students flow
into the labour market and how this affects
60 See as an example the recommendations for public initiatives supporting the
development of biotech regions in the UK invoked by Lord Sainsbury’s
‘Biotechnology Clusters’ report (Department of Trade and Industry, 1999).
61 27.7 % of US dedicated biotech firms (DBFs) are located in California while
Germany, the leading country in terms of number of DBFs, accounts only for
24 % of European companies. Even moving from a nation/state level to
regions the picture does not change: 28.5 % of US dedicated biotechnology
enterprises concentrate in only three regions: San Diego, the Bay Area, and
Boston while to reach a comparable level of concentration in Europe, we
must consider seven regions: Ile de France, Cambridgeshire, Greater London,
Oxfordshire, Bayern, Stockholm-Uppsala and Medicon Valley.
59 A recent report by the French Ministry of Education (reference?) comes
essentially to the same conclusion.
Box 3.1: Example - European biotechnology
clusters
The recent evolution of the high tech industries such as
biotechnology and ICT has revealed a marked
tendency toward clustering of dedicated start-up firms
and R&D activities in selected regions. Concurrently,
the development of a dense network of collaborative
relationships among a variety of different actors have
been pinpointed as a distinctive feature of the evolu-
tion of the biotechnology sector and several studies
have provided sound analyses of the basic structural
features of an ever-widening network of collaborations
(Barley et al., 1992; Kogut et al., 1992; Arora and
Gambardella, 1994; Gambardella, 1995; Zucker and
Darby, 1997; Powell et al., 1996; Orsenigo, Pammolli,
Riccaboni, 2001).
Furthermore, recent empirical work has revealed that
radical technological shifts act as a powerful mecha-
nism of de-hierarchisation and de-localisation of
biotechnology activities worldwide. Orsenigo et al.
(2001) show that, starting from 1992, the emergence
of baseline technologies has significantly reduced the
degree of hierarchisation of the overall network of R&D
collaborations. Owen-Smith et al. (2002) reveal that
the growing interdependence and reaching out of
traditional biotechnological clusters toward new
emerging areas in the US is driven, at least partially, by
new general purpose techniques. Finally, Allansdottir et
al. (2002) document that the recent growth of new
European biotechnology firms and regions is largely
based on the emergence and proliferation of new
research tools59.
Presently, the ability of firms to benefit from agglomer-
ation economies and simultaneously to access and
make efficient use of networks of collaborative relations
has become a crucial source of competitiveness in new
markets for technology (Arora, Fosfuri, Gambardella,
2001; Owen-Smith et al., 2002). Arguably, the growth
of an international network of R&D collaborations
represents a crucial factor that ought to be taken into
account in order to understand the leading forces
toward clustering in this sector.
Many economists, analysts and policy-makers focused
their attention on spatial concentration of innovative
and industrial activities as a fundamental pre-requisite
for the successful development of biotechnology activi-
ties. Innovative policies have been devised (e.g. the
German BioRegio Contest) with the explicit aim to
support clustering of biotechnology activities60.
Nonetheless, most of them focus on interaction within
clusters and pay little attention to the interplay
between co-localization and reaching out. As a result,
Allansdottir et al. (2002) show that EU biotechnology
clusters appear to be highly fragmented as compared
to US ones and tend to stay at the periphery of the
international network of division of innovative labour61.European competitiveness report 2003
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economic performance (Goddard, 1997a, 1997b;
Besson and Montgomery, 1993). 
Apart from contributing to the quality of the labour
force, higher education institutions can also play a
valuable role in the regional knowledge infrastructure,
for example through business–university linkages to
promote the transfer of knowledge and of human
capital. The development of effective linkages –
especially involving technology–based industries
and businesses – has proved to be successful in
promoting regional economic development, for
instance in the case of the university of Limerick
(Dineen, 1995) and the science parks in various
locations in Sweden and Finland (Cooke, 2002).
Research grants by the government can further
strengthen the regional knowledge infrastructure,
which can prove to be influential in the location
decisions of multinational enterprises. The attrac-
tions of the scientific knowledge infrastructure in
Scotland and East Anglia may help to explain how
the technological efforts of non-UK businesses tend
to be drawn relatively strongly to these regions
(Cantwell and Iammarino, 2000). Regional govern-
ments can also improve the knowledge infrastruc-
ture by formalising co-operation between firms in
manufacturing technology centres, as is the case in
the United States (Feller, 1997). These centres aim
to strengthen the competitiveness of existing SME’s
through improvements in production, managerial
and marketing processes. 
The  regional business climate can spur firms to be
more innovative. The prospect of profitable
exploitation is an incentive for the entrepreneur to
innovate. This perspective becomes all the more
attractive if product demand expectations are high,
for instance because of high disposable income in a
region. An empirical study by Stadler (1999)
confirms that prospects for significant market
power, favourable technological opportunities, the
availability of qualified labour and high product
demand expectations all have an unambiguous
positive influence on innovation.
The sum of all factors mentioned above is described
by Storper (1995) as the untraded interdependencies
(traded interdependencies concerns information
exchange by user-producer relations as described in
the previous subsection). These interdependencies
cover not only labour market, regional knowledge
infrastructure, business climate, but also regional
conventions, norms and values and public or semi-
public institutions. When these untraded interde-
pendencies are concentrated, Storper considers the
region to be of pivotal importance in the supply
architecture of learning and innovation. This notion
may seem provocative in the light of on-going
globalisation, which is supposed to make spatial
considerations less and less important. But globali-
sation and localisation need not be mutually exclu-
sive processes and are actually much more inter-
woven than is generally acknowledged. This can be
seen in practice, where foreign direct investment is
often attracted to, and has a reinforcing effect
upon,  innovation clusters in the targeted country
(Storper, 1992; De Vet, 1993; Cantwell and
Iammarino, 2000; Wolfe and Gertler, 2001).
Economically significant innovation and learning
takes place mostly at the firm level. But the innova-
tive and knowledge-adapting capacities of a firm
are determined by its surroundings: its partners,
competitors, customers, the available human
capital, the regional knowledge infrastructure, insti-
tutions, regulation and legislation, untraded inter-
dependencies and a host of other factors that influ-
ence innovation directly or indirectly. All these
factors combined can be defined as the regional
innovation system.
Following Braczyk et al. (1998), several typologies of
regional innovation systems (RISs) can be distin-
guished. These typologies can prove instrumental in
determining the success factors of regional innova-
tion and economic development further on. From a
governance point of view, three modes of technology
transfer can be identified: grassroots,  network and
dirigiste.  Grassroots RISs are characterised by local
initiatives, diffuse funding (banks, local governments,
chambers of commerce), applied, near-market
research, low level of technological specialisation and
low supra-local co-ordination. Network RISs can be
initiated at several levels: local, regional, federal or
governmental. Consequently, funding is more likely
to be agreed by banks, firms and government agen-
cies. The research is mixed, aimed at both applied
and ‘pure’ technology with flexible specialisation
given the wide range of participants. Dirigiste RISs are
more animated from outside and above the region
itself, initiated and funded typically by central
governments. The research is rather basic or funda-
mental, to be used in large firms or beyond the
region in question. As it is state-run, the level of co-
ordination is high and the level of specialisation is also
likely to be high.
Complementing the governance dimension is the
business innovation dimension, distinguishing
between  localist,  interactive and  globalised RISs.
Localist RISs have few large firms, either indigenous or
multinational. The research reach of individual firms is
not great, but there is a reasonably high degree of
association among entrepreneurs and between themChapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
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and local or regional policy makers. In interactive RISs
there is a balance between large and small firms.
There will be a mix of public and private research,
reflecting the presence of large firms and of a local
authority that is keen to promote the innovation base
of the economy. Such regions will be characterised by
a higher than average degree of association,
expressed in research networks, forums and clubs.
Globalised RISs are dominated by global enterprises,
often supported by clustered supply chains. The
research will be mainly internal and highly private,
rather than public. Association is hardly present and is
conducted only on the terms of the large companies.
Both dimensions are combined in Table 3.1,
creating a total of nine different types of regional
innovation systems. 
3.2.3 Summary
A variety of general factors affecting competitive-
ness are suggested by the literature. Neo-classical
theory points to physical and human capital as key
influences, while technology remained largely
exogenous, whereas new growth theory brought
technology within the system, suggesting that the
accumulation of knowledge could generate
increasing returns. Knowledge could be measured
as the skills of the workforce, such as education
levels or spending on education, or through meas-
ures such as R&D expenditure.
Theories more in tune with regional economics,
such as new economic geography, look at the
effects of localisation on productivity. A number of
studies link spillover effects, in particular knowledge
spillovers, with productivity gains. This links ideas
from new growth theory with the concept of knowl-
edge spillovers as important sources of externalities.
Work on knowledge and innovation has suggested
a variety of relevant indicators. While it is recog-
nised that many of the indicators will be
related/correlated with each other, it is necessary to
respect a basic idea of causality, i.e. not to explain
one output indicator with another. A variety of indi-
cators can be linked to productivity to assess bi-
variate relationships over time and across regions.
Econometric approaches such as the Barro regres-
sions (discussed later) rely on explaining produc-
tivity growth by a list of factors, including the
concept of catch-up suggested originally by neo-
classical theory. The list of other factors has gradu-
ally been added to by more recent theoretical
advances. In addition, new growth theory suggests
it is important to test for, and take account of,
spillover effects across regions.
Clearly, there are factors suggested by theory as
having an effect on competitiveness for which there
is no quantifiable approximation. Much of govern-
ment policy falls into this category, as do indicators
measuring the extent of venture capital activity,
business registration rates, and the presence of
high-tech clusters. Such features can be examined
to see whether they are present in the characteris-
tics of those regions which display productivity
growth in excess of what would be expected when
taking account of the more measurable influences.
3.3 Regional Data Audit –
Definitions and Data Sources
This section deals with how to measure regional
competitiveness and its determinants as identified
in the review of literature.
Regions are defined at the NUTS-2 level. Table 3.2
provides a brief summary of the number of regions,
and their conventional (i.e. native) names. A full list
of regional codes that are used in subsequent data
analyses are readily available from Eurostat.
Table 3.1: Typology of Regional Innovation Systems
Grassroots Network Dirigiste
Localist Tuscany (I) Tampere (FIN) Tohoku (Japan)
Denmark (DK)
Interactive Catalonia (E) Baden-Württemberg (D) Québec (Canada)
Globalised California (Silicon Valley) North Rhine-Westphalia (D) Midi-Pyrénées (F)
Nord-Brabant (NL) Singapore
Source: Braczyk et al., 1998.European competitiveness report 2003
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There is an issue of regional homogeneity when
dealing with NUTS-2 level regions due to the wide
spread of regional types and sizes of population,
which could affect the results. However, although
this must be borne in mind when interpreting the
findings, the classification is well known and cannot
be replaced by some more economically mean-
ingful area grouping.
There are various sources62 of regional data.
Table 3.3 provides a description of the information
available to undertake subsequent data analysis and
empirical work.
3.3.1 Measures of competitiveness and
knowledge-based indicators
The focus of the study is on analysing productivity,
which can be defined as GDP, or Gross Value
Added, per employee or per hour worked.
The main available indicator to represent innovation
is R&D expenditure. This indicator can in principle
be computed for three sectors (Government, Busi-
ness, and Higher Education Establishments),
although in practice the very sparse nature of the
data means that total R&D expenditure is the better
choice to ensure reasonable coverage across space
and time.
The stock of human capital can be proxied by the
working population (by age structure if necessary),
personnel employed in R&D, employment in high-
tech sectors, total number of students and those
involved in tertiary education.
Aside from the knowledge-based factors, the litera-
ture suggests a number of other influences on
competitiveness which will need to be borne in
mind when undertaking empirical analysis, as it is
important to account for all the important factors
not just those with a link to innovative activity:
— Sectoral structure - The most prosperous regions
(i.e. those with the highest GDP per capita) are
seen to be those with a high (70 %+) share in
market services, but success depends on the
type(s) of market service(s)which dominate,
e.g. tourism services are not associated with
particularly high productivity levels.
— Investment -The size of a region’s capital stock
and the amount it invests in maintaining this
capital stock are fundamental influences on the
ability to produce more output per unit of
labour. 
— Spillover effects - Spillover effects are seen as an
important factor when explaining regional
62 The two sources used here are the REGIO database of Eurostat and the
Cambridge Econometrics‘ European regional database.
Table 3.2: NUTS-2 Regional Definitions by Country
Country Number of Regions Administrative Definition
Belgium 10 Provinces
Denmark 1 Whole country
Germany 45 Regierungsbezirke
Greece 13 Development regions




Luxembourg 1 Whole country
Netherlands 12 Provinciën
Austria 9 Bundesländer
Portugal 7 Comissoes de coordenaçao regional + Regioes autónomas
Finland 6 Groups of lääni
Sweden 8 Groups of län
United Kingdom 36 Groups of counties1
EU 210
1 Grouping for Community purposes.Chapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
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productivity, as discussed previously. They
reflect the importance for the performance of a
given region of proximity to other, well
performing regions.
— Unquantifiable factors - There are some factors
which affect competitiveness for which no
available data exist, for example cultural
aspects and government intervention. This is an
inevitable feature of empirical work and this will
be examined further in the case study section.
Obviously, some of these factors will be related to
each other. For instance, a favourable sectoral struc-
ture will be accompanied by high levels of invest-
ment, R&D and the presence of a skilled work force.
3.4 Regional Productivity
Analysis
This section investigates how success, understood
to mean high regional productivity, has been
achieved. This is done by studying associations
between productivity and the set of available indi-
cators expected to be part of the causal framework.
3.4.1 Associative and correlation analysis
This section looks at the evidence for relationships
suggested by economic theory through a series of
cross-plots of productivity and various input indica-
tors. There is a danger when analysing a single year
of cross-sectional data that the association may
reflect the time period chosen rather than any
fundamental relationship. To circumvent this
problem ratios are chosen which are more likely to
be stable over time - for example when reviewing
R&D expenditure, R&D intensity (relative to GDP) is
used. In addition, and where possible, different
years have been investigated to verify the same
associations, although the results are not reported
in this chapter. 
3.4.1.1 Productivity and initial wealth / 
catch-up
Differences in growth rates of productivity across
regions can be explained by differences in initial
endowments of key factors of production and the
subsequent ‘catch-up’ effect through diffusion of
knowledge facilitated by trade or foreign direct
investment. Graph 3.2 illustrates this catch-up effect
Table 3.3: European Regional Database Coverage
Indicator Units Years Disaggregation
Gross Domestic Product  m PPS and euro 1995m 1980 - 2001 n/a
(GDP)
Gross Value Added  m PPS and euro 1995m 1980 - 2001 15 sectors (ESA95)
(GVA)
Employment 000s 1980 - 2001 15 sectors (ESA95)
Hours worked average number per week 1980 - 2001 Total 
Population 000s 1980 - 2001 selected age cohorts within 
working age population
Employment in  000s 1994 - 2001 total and 3 sub-sectors  
high-tech areas (manufacturing, services 
and knowledge-intensive 
services)
Human resources in  000s 1994 - 2001 total and high-tech
science and technology 
(HRST)
Number of students 000s 1993 - 2001 total and those in tertiary
sporadic coverage education
Investment m PPS and euro 1995m 1980 - 2001 5 sectors (ESA95)
Employee compensation Euros 1980 - 2001 5 sectors (ESA95)
Research & Development  m PPS and euro 1995m 1980 - 2001 total and across three
expenditure 1999 and 1997 as  institutional sectors
most complete
Research & Development  head count 1985 - 2001 total and across three 
personnel 1997 and 1995 as  institutional sectors
most complete
Patent applications  number of patents 1989 - 2001 total and high-tech
to European Patents  reasonable coverage across 
Office most Member StatesEuropean competitiveness report 2003
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by displaying a negative relationship between
productivity growth over the period 1980-2000 and
its initial level in 1980. A negative correlation exists,
although there is a multitude of other factors,
mentioned in section 3.2, which can help to
improve the explanation of productivity growth.
3.4.1.2 Productivity and R&D
Growth theory views R&D expenditure as an indi-
cator positively linked to productivity. To make the
indicator relative, a measure of intensity has been
calculated, i.e. the ratio of R&D expenditure to
Graph 3.2: Productivity level and growth
Note: 179 NUTS-2 regions used in the correlation.
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Graph 3.3: Productivity level and R&D intensity
Note: 179 NUTS-2 regions used in the correlation.
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regional GDP. Graph 3.3 plots R&D intensity against
productivity and indicates a positive correlation.
However, the postulated positive relationship is
weak.
3.4.1.3 Productivity and high-tech specialisation
The debate on whether regional specialisation —
rather than regional diversity – is more conducive to
innovation and growth remains unresolved in the
literature on specialisation and location. With the
more specific focus of this study on the role of
knowledge in innovation links, a location quotient
has been established to measure specialisation in
high-tech activities63, using employment as the rele-
vant indicator (GVA in high-tech sectors does not
exist in the Regio database).
The location quotient (LQ) is defined as the propor-
tion of high-tech (employment) activity in region r
divided by the equivalent proportion in the European
Union. A value of unity therefore implies no speciali-
sation away from the EU average, while higher values
show an above average proportion of high-tech
activity. The results for 190 NUTS–2 regions are
presented in Graph 3.4. A positive correlation exists
between productivity and the location quotient, the
magnitude of which is comparable to the other indi-
cators. Nevertheless, the correlation does not appear
to be especially strong.
3.4.1.4 Productivity and human capital
The role of the quality and quantity of human
capital as a source of innovation and regional
competitiveness is a key part of new growth theory.
It is, therefore, important to examine whether such
an association exists in the regional EU data.
Data availability becomes an issue, however, as there
is no direct measure of the quality/level of education
of the regional labour force in Europe. There is a
survey of the number of students at various levels of
education, and this may serve as a rather imperfect
proxy for the quality of the regional workforce. The
ratio of students in tertiary education relative to total
population was chosen as the measure most likely to
represent the knowledge-oriented segment of the
labour force. Data is sparse, with Denmark, German
NUTS-2 regions, Portugal and the UK recording
missing values - 1999 is the most recent year with
most observations available. There is also little scope
for analysis over time as the quality of coverage dete-
riorates further in earlier years. 
Graph 3.5 presents the results, with a positive corre-
lation across the regions available. Again, as previ-
ously, the correlation is weak.
63 NACE Rev. 1: 24 (manufacture of chemicals and chemical products), 29 to
35 (manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c., manufacture of elec-
trical and optical equipment, manufacture of transport equipment), 64 (post
and telecoms), 72 (computer and related activities) and 73 (research and
development).
Graph 3.4: Productivity level and high-tech specialisation
Note: 190 NUTS-2 regions used in the correlation.
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As mentioned in section 3.2, little is known about
the mechanism through which students disperse
after their study period has ended. Some larger
regions - possibly capital cities - with a cluster of
universities may retain a large proportion of
students within their boundaries once they start
work, while other (smaller) regions with a strong
university presence may act as feeder regions into
larger urban areas. In this respect, a high correlation
should not be expected, but some positive associa-
tion is nonetheless justified. Unfortunately, the data
do not provide an opportunity to investigate thor-
oughly these possibilities.
3.4.1.5 Productivity and spillovers
Thus far the investigation of the relations between
regional productivity and indicators representing
various facets of the growth literature has focused
on the region as an independent unit. This section
considers the interdependence among regions
through the concept of spillovers, a topic which is
central to new economic geography as a mecha-
nism by which productivity gains are transmitted.
Graph 3.6 presents a cross-plot of productivity in
any one region against the weighted average of
productivity in all other regions. The weighting
mechanism is the inverse of the physical distance
between regions, i.e. the further regions are apart,
the smaller the weight attached to them. The
results show a reasonably high degree of positive
correlation, indicating that the potential for spillover
effects across the 209 NUTS–2 regions in the EU
should be assessed in further empirical work.
3.4.1.6 Productivity rankings
The next two tables present regional rankings (top
and bottom ten) for productivity level (Table 3.4)
and growth rates (Table 3.5) over the period 1995-
2000. The tables also include measures, where data
are available, of the indicators described above. The
purpose of this presentation is to establish an
empirical record of the productivity characteristics
of the top and bottom EU regions.
It is clear from Table 3.4 that the higher produc-
tivity regions tend to more established, urban areas
such as Île de France and Vienna (Wien). The main
exception is Sterea Ellada in Greece. However, and
generally speaking, the data do not suggest that
the top-ten productivity regions have a slower rate
of growth than the bottom-ten. Indeed, where data
are available for comparison, most of the competi-
tiveness indicators seem to be higher in the top-ten
regions than in the bottom-ten, although the
picture is far from conclusive.
The regions experiencing the fastest growth in
productivity over 1995-2000 are predominantly
Graph 3.5: Productivity level and students per head of population
Note: 160 NUTS-2 regions used in the correlation.
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Graph 3.6: Productivity spillovers
Note: 207 NUTS-2 regions used in the correlation.
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Table 3.4: Regional productivity ranking – levels
Productivity Productivity R&D  Regional  Number  of Productivity
Level Growth Intensity share of tertiary students Spillover
high tech  per head of  Index
employment population
Region  Region PPS 1995-2000, 1998 or 1999, Location 
Name Code % pa   R&D / GDP   Quotient
( %) (relative to EU) %
Highest 10 Regions
Luxembourg lu 71.29 4.08 n/a 0.32 0.56 0.62
Vlaams Brabant be24 71.24 2.81 n/a 1.50 3.42 1.06
Île de France fr1 69.83 3.22 3.37 1.21 4.80 0.44
Wien at13 68.85 2.01 3.07 1.10 8.59 0.31
Sterea Ellada gr24 68.69 3.55 0.29 0.35 n/a 0.15
Salzburg at32 67.59 2.28 0.64 0.81 2.75 0.41
Lombardia it2 67.41 1.19 1.72 1.31 2.64 0.36
Vorarlberg at34 66.36 2.28 0.85 1.17 0.17 0.43
Liguria it13 65.61 1.22 1.73 0.93 2.40 0.32
Trentino-Alto Adige it31 65.23 1.69 0.71 0.49 1.70 0.40
Lowest 10 Regions
Thüringen deg 31.81 3.07 1.59 0.93 1.29 0.45
Cornwall and Isles  ukk3 31.53 2.84 n/a 0.69 n/a 0.34
of Scilly
Madeira(PT) pt3 29.47 3.67 0.92 0.00 0.90 0.08
Algarve pt15 28.30 2.90 1.06 0.00 2.22 0.14
Chemnitz ded1 28.25 2.81 1.51 0.89 4.96 0.45
Anatoliki gr11 27.66 3.66 0.99 0.17 5.48 0.15
Makedonia, Thraki
Alentejo pt14 25.36 0.67 1.35 0.00 2.16 0.16
Açores (PT) pt2 25.09 2.01 n/a 0.00 1.11 0.07
Norte pt11 24.23 1.77 1.30 0.40 2.70 0.18
Centro (P) pt12 23.13 1.57 1.89 0.56 3.19 0.17
Source: Cambridge Econometrics European regional database (April 2003).European competitiveness report 2003
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those in Cohesion Fund countries, and therefore
tend to be among those with the lower initial
productivity levels. This is consistent with the
convergence hypothesis. The exception is Southern
and Eastern Ireland, which has caught up suffi-
ciently to have a high level of productivity and yet
has still maintained impressive growth. There is
likely to be less correlation with the competitiveness
indicators as they are represented in levels rather
than growth rates; unfortunately, the lack of data
availability does not permit a comparable average
growth period to be calculated.
3.4.2 Conclusions
The analysis in this section has provided a variety of
findings which can assist in the formulation of the
econometric modelling, but which are also useful in
their own right.
Productivity has been shown to be correlated with a
range of competitiveness indicators suggested by
the economic literature. The associations include:
— the growth of productivity and its level are
found to have a negative correlation, providing
support for the (unconditional) convergence
hypothesis;
— R&D intensity is positively correlated with
productivity, which supports the contribution
that expenditure in these activities has on a
region’s knowledge base and its subsequent
ability to innovate and raise productivity levels;
— specialisation in high-tech activities has a posi-
tive association with productivity, supporting
the argument that these sectors are an impor-
tant factor explaining regional success;
Table 3.5: Regional productivity ranking – growth rates
Productivity Productivity R&D  Regional  Number  of Productivity
Growth Level Intensity share of tertiary students Spillover
high tech  per head of  Index
employment population
Region  Region 1995-2000, PPS 1998 or 1999, Location 
Name Code % pa   R&D / GDP  Quotient
( %) (relative to EU) %
Highest 10 Regions
Peloponnisos gr25 7.83 35.98 0.85 0.21 n/a 0.15
Ipeiros gr21 6.98 38.20 1.52 n/a n/a 0.17
Dytiki Makedonia gr13 6.67 41.70 0.15 n/a n/a 0.17
Southern i.e.02 5.84 57.43 n/a 1.10 4.78 0.24
and Eastern 
Notio Aigaio gr42 5.53 46.35 0.11 n/a n/a 0.11
Voreio Aigaio gr41 5.42 43.83 0.44 n/a n/a 0.13
Dessau dee1 4.91 34.84 0.64 0.92 n/a 0.46
Kentriki Makedonia gr12 4.89 37.82 1.14 0.34 n/a 0.16
Thessalia gr14 4.85 33.82 0.55 0.19 n/a 0.16
Border, Midland  i.e.01 4.68 40.03 n/a 0.90 2.78 0.25
and Western
Lowest 10 Regions
Groningen nl11 0.19 53.46 2.56 0.67 6.14 0.51
Berlin de3 0.18 41.54 3.62 0.94 4.49 0.38
Gelderland nl22 0.15 38.95 2.76 0.74 2.19 0.62
Overijssel nl21 0.14 39.88 1.63 0.73 3.30 0.57
Saarland dec 0.07 41.20 0.94 0.93 2.57 0.58
Drenthe nl13 -0.13 38.99 0.73 0.77 0.41 0.55
Münster dea3 -0.19 40.75 0.84 1.04 n/a 0.57
Zeeland nl34 -0.54 43.61 0.89 0.63 0.90 0.63
Valle d’Aosta it12 -0.60 59.20 0.53 n/a 0.00 0.37
Kent ukj4 -0.96 40.51 n/a 1.00 1.44 0.48
Note: 207 NUTS-2 regions used in the analysis. Data are for 2000 unless otherwise stated.
Source: Cambridge Econometrics European regional database (April 2003).Chapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
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— the number of students in tertiary education
per head of population (used as a proxy for the
presence for higher education establishments
and/or the educational quality of the work-
force) is positively related to the level of
productivity;
— spillover effects, measured through the
distance-weighted productivity effects in other
regions, seem to be present and may therefore
be considered in any econometric work.
These correlations provide some evidence of a rela-
tionship between productivity and key indicators of
knowledge and innovation, but the fact that most
of the variables are trended over time, and possibly
influenced by the year chosen for the correlation,
make conclusions difficult. The next section adopts
a more robust framework by using a well-estab-
lished econometric methodology to test the influ-
ence that many of the above indicators may have
had on productivity growth (and the aspect of the
theory they are representing) through the period
under analysis.
3.5 Econometric Analysis
Following the work on analysing regional produc-
tivity by association/correlation, this section looks
more at causality through an econometric frame-
work, specifically the Barro regression (Barro and
Sala-i-Martin, 1995) and the associated β - and σ -
convergence estimates64. The objectives are to
assess the degree of convergence across the EU
NUTS-2 regions using the latest data, test the asso-
ciation of this convergence with human capital and
R&D inputs if possible, and provide a sound basis
for choosing particular case study examples for
further analysis of convergence forces. The method-
ology and technical results are discussed in detail in
Appendix 3.2.
The Barro test for β -convergence is that the value of
β is non-zero and negative, that is, the lower the
initial level of productivity, the higher the growth
rate. Thus, poorer regions on average grow faster
than rich ones and, as a consequence, productivity
levels are expected to converge. This property is
consistent with the neo-classical approach to
convergence whereby trade provides efficiency
advantages for all regional participants through
specialisation, with factor-price equalisation then
bringing ultimate convergence in productivity65. 
To undertake such empirical testing, it is not
absolutely necessary to have developed specific
hypotheses about the exact role played by the factors
that are perceived as important in driving regional
competitiveness and growth. Since many of the
theoretical perspectives emphasise in different
degrees the overlapping effects of a diverse set of
components, the need for a comprehensive detailed
empirical explanation is less essential. This is espe-
cially useful since the empirical correlates of many of
the required variables at NUTS–1 and –2 levels are
poorly proxied or often missing.
In the context of this study, the Barro regression is
being used to explain growth in productivity over
1987-2001 by a number of factors. First, an uncon-
ditional Barro regression (which are specified as a
relation between productivity growth and the level
of productivity in the starting year) is used. Here,
one generally expects a negative correlation
because if the level of productivity of regions
converge over time, it must be those regions with
the lowest starting value which grow fastest, and
vice versa.
Adding more explanatory factors – such as R&D
expenditure and the level of education of the popu-
lation – can help to provide a richer description of
the determinants of productivity growth and
convergence. This is called the conditional Barro
regression, because it is conditioning on other
factors which are expected to explain that different
regions begin with different qualities and quantities
of the various factors of production. One would still
expect a negative (i.e. converging) coefficient on
starting level productivity, while the other factors
should also contribute in line with prior beliefs.
The main results from the unconditional and condi-
tional Barro regressions are outlined below.
Appendix 3.2 contains more detailed discussion.
3.5.1 Unconditional Barro regression
Estimation results, based on a sample of 207 regions
for the period 1987-2001, and shown in Table 3.6,
demonstrate a significant and negative coefficient on
the starting level of productivity. They imply a rate of
β -convergence of 1.5 % per year over 1987-200166.
65 An extensive and interesting discussion of these issues can be found in
chapter 5 of European Commission (2000).
66 The estimated coefficient value of (1-e-β T)/T= .0165, where T = 14, solves to
give a rate of β -convergence value of β = 0.15 (see Appendix 3.2).
64 β -convergence indicates how much poor economies grow faster than rich
ones while ó-convergence measures the dispersion of regional measures (ref.
Appendix 3.2).European competitiveness report 2003
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This and the associated σ -convergence analysis show
a consistent story of the rate of convergence slowing
during the fastest growth phases of the European
economy and accelerating during the slower phases,
a common finding in other studies. For example,
Appendix 3.2 shows that the rate of regional conver-
gence accelerated to 2_ % per year over the slow-
growing period for the EU of 1991-96, while
remaining at close to 1.5 % per year for the preceding
and following faster growing periods of 1987-91 and
1996-2001 respectively. The 1991-96 acceleration in
convergence was marked by the strong productivity
catch-up in the Eastern Länder of Germany as unifica-
tion progressed into integration, while a sharp decline
in the position of the highest value regions in Finland
reflected the experience of these export–led regions
from the direct loss of trade associated with the trou-
bles of the Russian Federation. 
While comparisons are not direct, a rate of β -
convergence of about 2 % per year for GDP per
capita has been found in many cross-section studies
in different regions of the world. A notable Euro-
pean example is Sala-i-Martin (1996) who esti-
mated a convergence rate of 1.5 % per year for
GDP per capita for a set of 90 European regions
over the period 1950-90. Neven and Gouyette
(1994) estimate convergence in GDP per capita
over 1980-89 for the set of EU NUTS -2 regions at
just 0.5 % per year, while European Commission
(2000) reports a rate of convergence of 1.3 % per
year over 1980-96 as a whole. 
The analysis of σ -convergence over 1987-2001
shows systematic convergence over the period, with
divergence in the fast growing years of the late
1980s and slower convergence at the end of the
1990s, with more rapid convergence experienced in
the early 1990s. Analysis of the most disadvantaged
regions in the EU, i.e. those covered over this period
by the Objective 1 support framework, demon-
strates that these regions in particular provided a
strong component of this σ -convergence with their
productivity position as a whole also improving rela-
tive to the rest of the EU. While this stronger σ -
convergence may equally well be a result that is
compatible with the Objective 1 regions falling into
a low-equilibrium ‘convergence club’ (see Durlauf
and Quah, 1998) the relative improvement in
productivity levels in these regions is more consis-
tent with a positive effect from Structural Fund and
Cohesion Fund support, enhancing productivity
and competitiveness through improved infrastruc-
ture and increased human capital stocks.
One potential problem when using Barro regres-
sions is spatial autocorrelation, which means that
issues such as spillover effects between regions
cause the unexplained part of the model (residuals)
to be related spatially. 
Graph 3.7 provides evidence of clustering of resid-
uals (EHAT), providing primary evidence that addi-
tional explanations are required apart from the
starting level of productivity. The graph suggests
that there are strong regional clusters of positive
residuals in the eastern Länder of Germany,
southern Greece and southern Ireland (suggesting a
better than average ‘catching up’ of these regions
from their low starting productivity levels), with
other strong positive residual growth peaks in a
number of high starting-level productivity regions.
These are in and around the capital cities of London
and Paris, the regions in southern Germany and
Austria, and the northern border regions of France
and Benelux. Other peaks are located in the south
east of Sweden and southern Finland. Particularly
negative residual peaks are located in the regions of
southern and eastern Spain and Portugal.
3.5.2 Conditional Barro regression
The introduction of additional variables into the Barro
regression is designed to capture other factors that
would move the long-term equilibrium or help to
Table 3.6: Results from unconditional Barro regression (1987-2001)
Dependent variable:  Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio T-Prob
Productivity Growth
Intercept 0.0182 0.0007 24.6386 0.0000
Productivity Level -0.0165 0.0017 -9.6726 0.0000
R-Squared 0.31337 207 observations (regions) used
Durbin Watson-statistic 1.3492
Aikaike Info. Criterion -290.80
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion -294.13
Analysis of spatial autocorrelation
Source: Cambridge Econometrics European regional database (April 2003).Chapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
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explain faster growth in some regions. There is a
limited set of data that is currently available at regional
level to assess the contribution that theory suggests
comes from human capital factors. The results reported
here are illustrative but suggest some of the possible
drivers of faster convergence come from increased
tertiary education and R&D inputs by region.
The results in Table 3.7 confirm that the catching up
effect (implied by the coefficient of the productivity
level variable) continues to be of correct sign and
significant. The other variables in the regression are
correctly signed but do not have a significant influ-
ence on the results. It should also be noted from
Table 3.7 that more than a third of the observations
were left out in this regression due to missing data on
the additional explanatory variables.
Graph 3.8 displays the map of conditional regres-
sion residuals (EHAT) and also illustrates the
problem for analysis of missing data for the human
knowledge variables in many regions. The nature of
the spatial correlation effects seems broadly to
match that in the unconditional case. Thus, as
before, Greece stands out but also Denmark and
the eastern parts of Austria as well as the region in
the gulf of Taranto in Italy show a high concentra-
tion of clustering of positive residuals. 
Graph 3.7: Map of unconditional residuals
Source: Cambridge Econometrics European regional database (April 2003).
Table 3.7: Results from the conditional Barro regression
Dependent variable: Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio T-Prob
Productivity growth
Intercept 0.0194 0.0026 7.5510 0.0000
Productivity level -0.0143 0.0020 -7.2379 0.0000
Proportion of higher-education students 0.0008 0.0007 1.1491 0.2528
R&D intensity 0.0001 0.0004 0.3059 0.7602
R-Squared 0.34414 124 observations (regions) used
Durbin Watson-statistic 0.92400 83 observations (regions) dropped
Aikaike Info. Criterion -134.99
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion -140.63
Analysis of spatial autocorrelation
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3.5.3 Conclusions
Over the period 1987 to 2001, productivity
converged across the NUTS–2 regions of the EU.
There is some evidence associating this process of
convergence with human knowledge factors, partic-
ularly high-tech specialisation in employment and
high rates of investment in research and develop-
ment, although the quality and quantity of data to
not permit a statistically robust conclusion. There is
also strong evidence of spatial clustering of produc-
tivity growth, with a number of effects distinguish-
able:
— A catching up process in the disadvantaged
regions of southern Greece, southern Ireland
and the eastern Länder of Germany, the targets
of the Structural Fund and Cohesion policies for
the last decade;
— Growth peaks in and around the capital cities
of London and Paris associated with agglomer-
ated concentrations of international financial
and business services;
— Growth peaks in the northern border regions of
France and Benelux, where the removal of
trade barriers and investment in trans-European
transport has been especially supportive to
growth;
— Growth peaks in the south east of Sweden and
southern Finland, and in southern Germany
and Austria, where high-tech clustering and
associated spatial spillover effects are
supporting faster growth;
— Growth troughs in southern and eastern Spain
and Portugal where periphery effects operate.
On the basis of the analysis of those regions
displaying the strongest growth differentials over
what would have been predicted since 1987 in
terms of starting productivity values and measured
Graph 3.8: Map of conditional residuals
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endowments of resource, the case study regions
analysed in the next section have been selected. 
3.6 Case Studies
The purpose of the regional case studies is to look
at successful regions and investigate ‘beyond the
data’ those additional factors which might help to
explain competitive position. This may then yield
additional measures supporting high productivity
which could be adopted by other regions that are
not as successful.
The regions used in the case studies were selected
by use of the Barro regression methodology
discussed in the previous section. The logic was to
select outlying regions where, even when taking
account of catching-up and the additional condi-
tioning factors such as educational levels and R&D
expenditure, productivity growth was still higher
than expected. The evidence is that there is some-
thing in these regions that has given them a better
performance, and the task of the case study analysis
is to understand what this might be and assess
whether this provides a general insight into factors
that are driving competitiveness across all regions.
The following five regions were selected on the
basis of this analysis:
— Oberbayern (de21)
— Darmstadt (de71)
— Sterea Ellada (gr24)
— Île de France (fr1)
— Niederösterreich (at12)
3.6.1 Regional characteristics
Graph 3.9 shows an outline NUTS-2 map of Europe
with the case study regions marked. With the
exception of Sterea Ellada, all the other regions lie
within the high productivity area between Milan
and London, containing Northern Italy, Southern
Germany, South East France, the Ruhr area, Île de
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and South East
England. Three of the regions also contain sizeable
urban areas (Oberbayern - Munich, Darmstadt, -
Frankfurt, Île de France - Paris) while Niederöster-
reich has the Vienna region at its centre.
Table 3.8 shows the profiles of the various regions
according to the indicators used in this chapter. All
regions are above the EU average level of GDP per
hour worked by the end of the sample period, and
all have above-average growth rates for the period,
with Île de France standing out as the strongest
performer. In terms of urbanisation, Île de France
again stands out as the most densely populated,
followed by the German regions. Niederösterreich
and Sterea Ellada are relatively sparsely populated.
Across those indicators representing the regional
knowledge base and innovative activity, there are
greater differences. The more densely populated
regions (Oberbayern, Darmstadt and Île de France)
have R&D expenditure of between 3-5 % of GDP,
whereas in the smaller regions the proportion is
much smaller67. A similar picture emerges for the
tertiary student population, although lack of data
prevents complete coverage. For specialisation in
high-tech activities most of the regions have a loca-
tion quotient above unity, indicating relative
Table 3.8: Key indicators for case study regions
GDP per  High tech R&D Per capita Population 
GDP per hour worked  hour worked employment intensity students in density
(PPS, EU=100) (1995m euro,  (LQ) ( %) tertiary (per square
%pa) education km)
(% )
Region 1980 1990 2000 1980-2000 2000 1999 Various years 2000
Oberbayern 106.5 110.3 125.9 2.60 1.28 4.65 n/a 230
Darmstadt 101.0 113.6 119.2 2.59 1.15 3.03 4.49 500
Sterea Ellada 96.2 99.4 124.8 2.47 1.00 0.29 n/a 41
Île de France 132.3 146.5 159.0 3.15 1.13 3.37 4.80 918
Niederösterreich 123.3 120.7 134.3 2.26 1.06 0.62 0.16 80
EU Average 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.86 1.00 n/a n/a 116
Source: Cambridge Econometrics European regional database (April 2003).
67 It should be noted that R&D data are measured at the enterprise level so that
there may be a bias in the data favouring large cities as the location of head-
quarters where accounts are collected.European competitiveness report 2003
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specialisation in the area when compared to the
country average, although again the highest
quotients are for the more densely populated areas.
3.6.2 Additional (qualitative)
information
This section discusses some key features of the case
study regions to help provide additional explana-
tion for the ‘unexpected’ productivity performance.
There are a number of factors which could
contribute to the faster-than-expected productivity
growth (that is, those which could not be captured
in the Barro regressions) but which were identified
as important in the literature review. These include:






The Oberbayern region is dominated by the city of
München, which is among the wealthiest and
economically most successful of German cities. The
region has the highest purchasing power and retail
turnover per capita in Germany and stands third in
terms of public investment per capita. München
itself accounts for about 18 % of Bayern’s GDP and
is the driving force of an economy that achieved the
highest growth rate among all German Länder in
1998, and was second only to Baden-Württemberg
in 2000. The region’s international airport comes
second only to Frankfurt in passenger numbers,
more than 20 million per annum.
New jobs are almost exclusively in services. The rate
of new firm creation is also well in excess of the rate
of business closures. The very success of the
economy has led in recent years to serious skills
shortages and determined efforts are being made to
recruit skilled personnel from abroad. Immigration
from abroad is the main source of population
growth, with particularly large flows from the
Balkans over 1999-2000 as people fled the conflict
in Yugoslavia. This process of immigration helps to
revitalise the region’s economy.
The kind of continued dynamic growth seen in
Oberbayern requires and sustains a corresponding
sectoral structure: very modern manufacturing and
a rapidly expanding services sector. The city of
Graph 3.9: Case study regionsChapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
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München is particularly strong in such services as
legal, technical and business consultancy, banking
and insurance and last, but by no means least,
tourism. Tourism draws also on the region’s estab-
lished reputation in high culture and stimulates
growth in other services. Manufacturing covers
traditional machinery and car makers, but also new
areas such as biotechnology and new materials. In
spite of the predominance of services there is a
policy of seeking to retain manufacturers in the city
by the provision of specially-designed industrial
sites. The financial sector is another source of
strength, with some 12 % of all German insurance
companies have their headquarters in the city, while
other business services are also well-represented in
the city, especially the advertising industry.
Economic policy has played an important role in
Bayern’s success. Accelerating growth was stimu-
lated and sustained by the provision of adequate
supplies of inexpensive energy, as well as transport
infrastructure and educational facilities. Policy also
helped to promote a deeper and more widespread
awareness than in many other places of the prob-
lems of business and the potential of new techno-
logical developments. So it is no matter of chance
that München has become Germany’s leading
centre for ICT, computing and electronics. In the
recent past, receipts from the privatisation of state-
owned companies were used to implement an
industrial policy directed at establishing centres of
excellence in a limited number of specific techno-
logical fields in the region. The rationale was that
encouraging scientific/academic co-operation with
business would help to create industrial clusters
operating at the cutting edge of technology. Several
clusters have grown around the region, and the
most important are:
— ICT, grouped around Infineon, Siemens, Oracle
and the Microsoft subsidiary: some 8,000 firms,
including 2,500 in microelectronics and software;
— Media (long a strength of München’s
economy): from print to films and new media;
— Biotechnology: a more recent cluster, employing
about 2,500 people, and centred mainly on the
research institutes, innovation and start-up
centres on the Großhadern-Martinsried Science
Park in the south of the city.
The city of München is now ranked second only to
London among European biotechnology centres
and its resources are soon to be extended by a
second science park in the north of the city.
Darmstadt (de71)
Darmstadt, containing the Frankfurt city-region, is
the economic center of the Rhein-Main region, one
of Europe’s most productive regions in terms of
manufacturing, banking & financial services,
communications and data processing. The
dynamism of the region’s economy has long
attracted people from other parts of Germany and
beyond. Between 1987 and 2000, the population
of Rhein-Main increased by about 470,000, that is
almost 11 %, but the percentage of the population
originating from outside Germany rose from 10 %
to 14 %, which indicates the importance of immi-
gration.
Not only is Frankfurt the leading financial center in
continental Europe, but the whole region is a major
European center of modern industries such as
telecommunications and pharmaceuticals.
According to a recent industry survey, Frankfurt ranks
fourth after London, New York and Amsterdam
among the top 50 Internet hub cities. The registra-
tion office for German internet addresses is located in
Frankfurt and the Commercial Internet Exchange
handles more than 85 % of German and 35 % of
European internet traffic. The region’s telecommuni-
cations infrastructure is first-rate and boasts a new,
700-km optical fibre network along with a rising
number of data-interchanges.
There is a well-developed public transport system
and very easy access to the national highway and
railway systems, especially to the high-speed ICE
links with Berlin, München and Hamburg. The
Rhein-Main international airport is the major inter-
national gateway to Germany. Since the completion
of the Rhein-Main-Donau Canal in 1992, Frankfurt
also lies on the main water transport route from
Rotterdam to the Black Sea. However, the high
density of land use in the entire Rhein-Main conur-
bation poses serious congestion problems.
The presence of many leading pharmaceuticals
companies and prestigious research institutes makes
the region one of the top locations for life sciences.
Aventis, Merck, Degussa, Fresenius and Boehringer
Ingelheim have major research and production facil-
ities in the Rhein-Main region. The region’s research
infrastructure includes some 70 biotech-oriented
firms, five universities and more than 100 research
institutes with a strong focus on biotech research
and bio-informatics. The links between the pharma-
ceuticals industry, biotech companies, research insti-
tutes and venture capital are reinforced by the
Frankfurt Biotech Alliance, which brings together all
interested parties so as to stimulate new projectsEuropean competitiveness report 2003
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and processes and promote the region abroad.
Moreover, the city authorities have recently begun
to plan a Frankfurt Innovation Centre for Biotech-
nology to facilitate co-operation between scientific
research and life sciences businesses and start-ups.
In anticipation of the enlargement of the European
Union, the public authorities have taken steps to
strengthen its position of the region in continental
Europe by promoting Frankfurt as the leading finan-
cial centre and as a leading internet hub city.
Furthermore, new investors can find a skilled and,
for the most part, multi-lingual workforce in and
around the region.
Sterea Ellada (gr24)
The region borders Athens and has a pronounced
dualistic economy with a strong emphasis on agri-
culture and mining matched by a dynamic service
and manufacturing sector. In the last 15 years, the
region’s orientation, as a whole, has shifted towards
the services. However, the agricultural sector
remains dominant and employs more persons than
the manufacturing sector and nearly as many as the
service sector. The area has a large tourist industry
given the presence of beaches, famous archaeolog-
ical sites and ski resorts. 
The company structure is somewhat polarised with
the presence of large national manufacturing and
mining companies and a significant concentration
of economic activity in family owned SMEs. A
concentration of large industrial companies along
the “national road” north of Athens ensures that
the region has one of the highest levels of R&D
business expenditure of the Greek regions.
However, a majority of companies in the region are
small family run enterprises with limited emphasis
on innovation. The district of Fthiotida has a signifi-
cant industrial activity, especially in regard to food
processing that has taken advantage of local
produce. 
The economy of Sterea Ellada has also a strong
mining and quarrying sector. The district of Evia,
Greece’s second largest island after Crete, has inten-
sive industrial activities linked to the mining sector
(nickel, marbles, lignite, etc.). The neighbouring
districts of Fokida and Viotia also have economies
linked to mining. Viotia is also responsible for one
third of Greece’s aluminium production. 
Three main centres of technological expertise are to
be found in Sterea Ellada: 
— the Technical Educational Institutes in Lamia
and Chalkida are responsible for post-school
vocational and technical courses in applied
technologies (electrical-mechanical) and health;
— CERECO, a contract research organisation for
ceramics, coatings, materials and cement indus-
tries;
— the Hellenic Aerospace Industry (EAB), a public
company with advanced engineering skills in
the aviation industry. 
Three other organisations are also active in the
innovation process. However, they are located in
the neighbouring Athens and Thessaly regions:
CLOTEFI (textile and clothing), ETAT (food) and
EBETAM (metallurgy). 
In terms of innovation initiatives, there is a lack of
local support infrastructure due to the region’s
proximity to Athens, where many of the economic
development agencies are located. Excluding the
local Chambers of Commerce, which do not
provide special support to local firms outside their
membership, only three local organisations exist: 
— General Secretariat of Research and Tech-
nology, which manages the EU operational
programme of R&D (EPET II);
— Association of Industries in Thessaly and Central
Greece, which offers commercial information,
representation, training and promotes intra-
firm co-operation activities;
— Evrytania S.A., a rural development company
involved in several EU programmes (Integrated
Mediterranean Programmes, Leader, Valoren,
Now) with the aim of supporting all socio-
economic needs such as infrastructure, raw
materials, commercialisation of products and
improvement of local production.
The region has developed a regional innovation
strategy with an emphasis on:
— raising awareness amongst the local SME base
in regard to issues relating to innovation and
technology management;
— encouraging support organisation both in the
region and located in Athens to work with
more traditional and less innovative SMEs;
— increasing inter and intra regional networking
between local companies and organisations.Chapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
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Île de France (fr1)
The region of Île-de-France comprises Paris and the
municipalities immediately surrounding it. The
region accounts for nearly 30 % of France’s GDP
and is home to nearly 20 % of the population.
Almost without exception large companies (more
than 2,000 employees) in France have their head-
quarters in this region, preponderantly in Paris and
Hauts-de-Seine. More than 90 % of all manufac-
turing employees in France work for companies
with headquarters in Île-de-France. The city is at the
centre of a star-shaped communications network of
five motorways and a growing number of TGV rail
lines. The region is served by the two largest
airports in France, Roissy/Charles de Gaulle to the
north and Orly to the south, which together are
third in Europe for passenger, freight and postal
traffic. Within the region itself, the urban transport
network is comprehensive and well organized.
De-industrialisation started in Île-de-France in the
early 1980s and over the last 20 years manufac-
turing employment has fallen to its present level of
about 17 % of total employment in the region.
Services have become the main motor of job
creation and now account for 81 % of employment,
compared to 74 % in the early 1990s. Despite the
sharp fall in its share of employment manufacturing
succeeded in raising its output steadily through
constant improvements in productivity, outsourcing
of the provision of services and a pronounced shift
to high-tech industries supported by a network of
research centres. Most high-tech R&D and manu-
facturing activity is located in clusters, situated in
modern towns such as Cergy-Pontoise, Evry and,
especially, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines where such
leading companies as Dassault Electronique, Thales,
Alcatel and Nortel GSM are based. At Saclay, to the
south of Paris, there is the most important scientific
and technological centre in the country, where
about 10,000 people are employed, most of them
in a growing number of high-tech SMEs and R&D
subsidiaries of large biosciences companies such as
Pfizer and GE Medical Systems, as well as elec-
tronics and engineering enterprises such as
Cerberus Guinard and the Renault Technocentre.
Île-de-France is also the national leader in defence
manufacturing in a wide range of sectors: arma-
ments, military aeroplanes, nuclear weapons, aero-
space and military satellites, embracing industries as
diverse as plastics, mechanical engineering, metallur-
gical technologies, electronics and optical engi-
neering. In an arc that runs from the north of Hauts-
de-Seine to the edge of Val-de-Marne the large
defence companies, Thales, Matra, Aérospatiale,
Dassault and Snecma, are the core of a sector
employing some 70,000 and containing as many as
900 smaller companies located throughout the
whole Île-de-France region.
Some 10,700 foreign-owned companies are estab-
lished in the region, with a particularly strong pres-
ence in pharmaceuticals, perfumes and chemicals &
plastics. There are also many companies active in
electronics, ICT and business consultancy.
Niederösterreich (at12)
The province is the largest of Austria’s nine
provinces and neighbours Vienna with a particular
boost to its productivity in the 1980s onwards
coming from the decentralisation of manufacturing
out of Vienna. The area has a number of outdated
industrial sectors and the agricultural base,
although shrinking, remains significant. However,
the region is successfully undergoing a process of
economic expansion based on:
— building on existing sectoral strengths that are
internationally competitive and investing in
future technology sectors 
— increased internationalisation of the regional
economy (significant focus on Central and
Eastern Europe)
— innovation and technological upgrading
— networking of economic actors and cluster
development
A number of notable features distinguish the
regional economy:
— the proximity and opening up of central and
eastern Europe has placed significant cost pres-
sures on labour intensive production forcing
the region to move up the value chain;
— an advantageous position in central Europe
with good communications and transport
connections;
— internationally recognised and successful
companies in the above-mentioned industries;
— closely linked to Vienna with its favourable
international reputation as a high quality Euro-
pean urban location;
— strong concentration of knowledge infrastruc-
ture, such as research and technology centresEuropean competitiveness report 2003
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pertinent to local industries (hosts Austria’s
largest technology research centre covering a
wide range of industrial research and three
other centres pertaining to microsystem engi-
neering, agribiotechnology and biotech-
nology), and industry technology centres;
— close co-operation and interaction with relevant
educational and technological institutions in
Vienna, especially in regard to the private
sector accessing educational services and tech-
nology transfer/support organisations;
— high quality business infrastructure, such as
business parks;
— a history of networked economic development
governance and partnership.
By 2010 the region aims to be in the top 10 innova-
tive regions in Europe. This is an aim that is shared by
the public and private sector alike. Since 1997, a
widely agreed Regional Innovation Strategy has been
implemented. Current economic development prior-
ities focus on further embedding the culture and
processes of innovation in SMEs, technological
advice, transfer and adoption, promoting co-opera-
tion amongst economic actors e.g. SMEs, research
centres, chambers of commerce, education facilities
and economic development agencies (although the
region does not have a history of clusters, the culture
of the region supports the current cluster develop-
ment programme); increasing internationalisation
with an emphasis on CEE; and increasing the number
of business start-ups. 
3.6.3 Conclusions
The case studies represent a varied mix, ranging
from the urbanised Île-de-France region, the hub of
the French economy, to the sparsely populated
Greek region of Sterea Ellada. All the regions can be
classed as being successful, having shown above-
average productivity growth over the 1987-2000
period, and the reasons behind this success are
numerous. Table 3.9 summarises the principle
driving forces identified in the analysis.
3.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter considers aspects of regional competi-
tiveness – defined as productivity, that is, GDP per
hour worked – its measurement and its determi-
nants. Apart from improving our understanding of
what is at the background of differential produc-
tivity performance across EU regions, an important
objective is to see whether it may be possible to
replicate the higher level of performance in some
regions in other, less competitive, regions.
Economic theory suggested several factors that
distinguish the concepts of regional and national
competitiveness. Foremost amongst these are the
issues of localisation and specialisation that come
from the field of New Economic Geography. A
number of studies (e.g.. Audretsch and Feldman,
1998) link spillover effects, in particular knowledge
spillovers, with productivity gains providing a
bridge to the ideas of new growth theory where
such effects are regarded as important sources of
externalities.
A review of data availability suggested a limited
number of indicators available, both across regions
and across time, with which to undertake empirical
analysis. However, sufficient indicators were avail-
able to measure productivity by 15 sectors across
the NUTS-2 regions over 1980-2000, and to iden-
tify a selection of knowledge-based proxies such as
R&D expenditure, and students enrolled in higher
education.
Correlation analysis of productivity with the avail-
able indicators suggested positive associations with
R&D intensity, specialisation in high-tech activities,
and proportionate student numbers in tertiary
education, while a negative relationship was
apparent between productivity growth and its
starting level, providing support for (uncondi-
tional) regional convergence. Investigation for
spillover effects revealed that they were likely to be
present.
Econometric results using Barro regressions support
the hypothesis for unconditional and conditional
convergence across the EU NUTS-2 regions, and
provide some support for the hypothesis that
knowledge-based factors such as R&D expenditure
and workforce skills do make a contribution to
regional productivity growth. Indeed, evidence of
spatial autocorrelation is likely to have been caused
by unmeasured spillover effects.
Additional case study work was performed on
selected regions which had produced a ‘better than
expected’ productivity performance once taking
account of possible catch-up effects and contribu-
tions from R&D expenditure and other knowledge-
based indicators. Analysis of the regions’ character-
istics revealed a range of factors which could not be
captured in the empirical work, but which was likelyChapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
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to have contributed to a superior productivity
performance. These included:
— Good links for all major forms of transport, but
particularly access to international airport, and
a modern telecommunications network;
— A strong entrepreneurial culture that provided a
bridge between research undertaken in univer-
sities and innovation activity in business;
— The presence of high-tech clusters in areas such
as bio-technology;
— An active public authority which both provides
links between the academic and business
communities, and promotes the region in the face
of forthcoming challenges, e.g. EU enlargement;
— Spillover effects caused by networking and
common vision among regional stakeholders.
Table 3.9: Key factors of success for case study regions
Region Factors for Success
Oberbayern Good transport links, particularly the airport
High level of firm creation, linked to strong entrepreneurial culture
Immigration supplying skilled labour to support growth in high-tech areas
Very modern manufacturing base and a rapidly expanding services sector
Policy to retain manufacturing through provision of specially-designed industrial sites
Strong public support through energy supply, transport infrastructure and educational facilities
Clusters in ICT, Media and biotechnology likely to lead to large spillover effects
Darmstadt Immigration of skilled, multi-lingual workforce, from within and outside the country, to support
growth in employment
Leading financial centre, together with strength in telecommunications and pharmaceuticals
Well developed public transport system (road, rail water, and air) and modern telecommunications
structure
Cluster of life science research institutes
Strong links between university and business reinforced by public authority support
Active policy to promote the region and city in an enlarging Europe
Sterea Ellada Presence of large, high productivity companies with high levels of innovation created via high R&D
spend
Agencies and institutions supporting innovation and technology transfer in medium sized and large
companies
A regional innovation system in part supported by European funding
Vocational training in relevant applied technologies
Proximity to the capital city and good communications
Île de France Cultural hub of French economy – history of centralist policy-making
Centre of national transport network – well served by TGV and regional train lines, motorways and
international airports
Shift to high-tech industries supported by network of research centres offset helped problems of de-
industrialisation in the early-80s
Policy to locate clusters (particularly bio-tech, electronics and engineering) in modern towns outside
the central city-region
National leader in defence manufacturing, with resulting network of support companies
Strong presence of foreign-owned companies, particularly in pharmaceuticals, chemicals and plastics
Niederösterreich A critical mass of untraded interdependencies (networking, common vision) and spillovers
Economic development governance and the presence of a regional innovation system
An emphasis on internationalisation
An economically embedded and networked research and educational base with an emphasis on
industrial collaboration
Innovation and technology upgrading being seen as the solution to labour cost pressures
Geographic position, proximity to the capital city, good communications, proximity to Central and
Eastern EuropeEuropean competitiveness report 2003
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3.8 Policy conclusions
While the analysis of the overall pattern of regional
competitiveness supports a view that productivity
differences across the regions of the EU are dimin-
ishing over time, the disparities remain substantial
and the pace of convergence remains very slow.
This justifies an active policy stance. 
The evidence is that the fastest-growing regions
have firms that have most successfully integrated
into the international competitive system. This
allows them to harness the human knowledge
resources of their regions and raise their competi-
tive edge. The role of public policy has been subtle
but critical in the success of these regions, providing
a policy infrastructure that supports business inno-
vation. It appears that an active policy stance will be
partly based on the manner in which policy success-
fully operates in those regions with the highest
existing rates of productivity growth. The evidence
suggests that policies that remove barriers to trade
and open up regions to competition across the
single EU market are crucial. However, idiosyncratic
problems of peripheral regions need to be specifi-
cally addressed through improved transport and
communications, especially telecommunications,
and policy everywhere needs to address human
capital requirements. The case studies report these
as important influences in those regions that have
generated a better productivity performance. These
remain as underlying conditions for the improve-
ment of productivity in the most disadvantaged
regions of the EU. 
The evidence for the importance of human knowl-
edge in boosting regional competitiveness is varied,
often difficult to tie down but ultimately compelling
in its message. The fastest-growing regions are
those with firms who are better at harnessing
human knowledge. This is supported in both the
cross-regional statistical analysis and the case study
analysis. The significance of the evidence for the
success of clustering in the high technology and
especially biotechnology areas is that it indicates a
particularly strong role for human knowledge
factors. Clusters not only confer advantages
through common access to knowledge resources –
such as the science and research base of higher
education – or indeed capital resources, but also
facilitate inter-firm communication and entrepre-
neurial activity in those sectors that generate the
highest value-added outcomes. The message for
policy is that it should actively support the agglom-
eration forces generating such human resourceful-
ness and encourage the processes that build such
human capital. 
The implications to be drawn are that active public
support for improved competitiveness will come
from concerted programmes operating at different
levels, such as those co-financed by structural and
cohesion funds, pan-European through to regional,
and covering associated physical and non-physical
infrastructure requirements. This will support better
transport and communications infrastructure and
better support the regional entrepreneurial culture
that allows businesses to build close links with well-
funded and well-organised networks of, especially
science-based, higher education institutions. Policy
support at regional level appears critical in the
better-performing regions and this corresponds to
regional stakeholders subscribing to a common
vision, facilitated by public-private partnerships to
take this vision forward.
References
Acs, Z. J., Audretsch, D. B. and Feldman, M. P.
(1994): ‘R&D spillover and recipient firm size’,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 76, pp. 336-340.
Acs, Z. J., Fitzroy, F. R. and Smith, I. (1999): ‘High
Technology Employment, Wages and University
R&D Spillovers: Evidence from US Cities’, Economics
of Innovation and New Technology, Vol. 8(1-2),
pp. 57-78.
Allansdottir, A., Bonacorsi, A., Gambardella, A.,
Mariani, M., Orsenigo, L., Pammolli, F. and
Riccaboni, M. (2002): ‘Innovation and Competitive-
ness in European Biotechnology’, Enterprise Papers:
7, European Commission, Brussels.
Almeida, P. and Kogut, B. (1997): ‘The Exploration
of Technological Diversity and the Geographic
Localization of Innovation’, Small Business
Economics, Vol. 9(1), pp. 21-31.
Amiti, M. (1998): ‘New Trade Theories and Industrial
Location in the EU: A Survey of Evidence’, Oxford
Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 14(2), pp. 45-53.
Armington, C. and Acs, Z. J. (2002): ‘The Determi-
nants of Regional Variation in New Firm Formation’,
Regional Studies, Vol. 36(1), pp. 33-45.
Arora, A., Gambardella, A. (1994): ‘The Changing
Technology of Technical Change: General and
Abstract Knowledge and the Division of Innovative
Labour’, Research Policy, Vol. 23(5), pp. 523-532.Chapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
121
Arora, A., Fosfuri, A. and Gambardella, A. (2001):
Markets for Technology, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
Arrow, K. J. (1962): ‘Economic Welfare and the Allo-
cation of Resources for Invention’, in Nelson, R. R.
(ed.), Copy-editing: The Rate and Direction of Inven-
tive Activity, University Press.
Audretsch, D. B. and Feldman, M. P. (1998): ‘R&D
Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation and
Production. Industrial policy and competitive advan-
tage’, in Audretsch, D. B. (ed.), Copy-editing: Elgar
Reference Collection. International Library of Critical
Writings in Economics, Vol. 84, Cheltenham, U.K. and
Northampton, Mass., Elgar; distributed by American
International Distribution Corporation Williston Vt. 
Barley, S. R., Freeman, J. and Hybels, R. C. (1992):
‘Strategic Alliances in Commercial Biotechnology’,
in Nohria N. and Eccle, R. G. (eds.), Copy-editing:
Networks and Organizations, Cambridge, MA,
Harvard Business School Press, pp. 311-347.
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995): Economic
Growth, McGraw-Hill.
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997): ‘Technolog-
ical Diffusion, Convergence, and Growth’, Journal of
Economic Growth, Vol. 2, pp. 1-27.
Baumol, W. J. (1986): ‘Productivity Growth, Conver-
gence and Welfare: What the Long-Run Data Show’,
American Economic Review, Vol. 76(5), pp. 1072-85. 
Besson, P. and Montgomery, E. (1993): ‘The Effect
of College and Universities on Local Labour
Markets’, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.
75(4), pp. 753-761.
Braczyk, H.-J., Cooke, P. and Heidenreich, M. (eds.)
(1998):  Regional Innovation Systems, UCL Press,
London.
Brülhart, M. (1998): ‘Trading Places: Industrial
Specialisation in the European Union’, Journal of
Common market Studies, Vol. 36 (3), pp. 319-346.
Cantwell, J. and Iammarino, S. (2000): ‘Multina-
tional Corporations and the Location of Technolog-
ical Innovation in the UK Regions’, Regional Studies,
Vol. 34(4), pp. 317-322.
Cooke, P. (2002): ‘The Governance of Regional
Innovation Systems’, paper presented at UNIDO
conference, Shenzen, China, December 2002.
Davis, D. R. and Weinstein, D. E. (1999): ‘Economic
Geography and Regional Production Structure: An
Empirical Investigation’, European Economic Review,
Vol. 43(2), pp. 379-407.
Davis D. R. and Weinstein, D. E. (2001): ‘Bones,
Bombs and Break Points: The Geography of
Economic Activity’, NBER Working Paper, 8517,
Cambridge, MA.
De Gaudemar, J.-P. (1996): ‘The Higher Education
Institutes as a Regional Actor: Some Introductory
Thoughts’, paper presented at Centre for Educa-
tional Research and Innovation.
Department of Trade and Industry (1999): Biotech-
nology Clusters, London, DTI.
De Vet, J. (1993): ‘Globalisation and Local and
Regional Competitiveness’, STI Review, Vol. 13,
OECD, Paris. 
Dineen, D. (1995): ‘The Role of a University in
Regional Economic Development; A Case Study of
the University of Limerick’, Industry and Higher
Education, Vol. 9(3), pp. 140-148.
Durlauf, S. N. and Quah, D. T. (1998): ‘The New
Empirics of Economic Growth’, Centre for Economic
Performance Discussion Paper, 384, January 1998.
European Commission (1999): Sixth Periodic Report
on the social and economic situation and development
of regions in the European Union, Brussels.
European Commission (2000): ‘Real Convergence
and Catching Up in the EU’, European Economy,
chapter 5, pp. 185-221, No. 71, May 2000, Brus-
sels.
European Commission (2003): Second Progress
Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, Communi-
cation from the Commission, COM (2003)
Feller, I. (1997): ‘Manufacturing Technology
Centers as Components of Regional Technology
Infrastructures’,  Regional Science and Urban
Economics, Vol. 27, pp. 181-197.
Fosfuri, A. and Ronde, T. (2002): ‘Hi-tech Clusters,
Technology Spillovers, and Trade Secret Laws’,
Mimeo, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain.
Fujita, M. and Thisse, J. F. (1997): ‘Economie
Géographique. Problèmes Anciens et NouvellesEuropean competitiveness report 2003
122
Perspectives’, Annales d’Economie et Statistiques, Vol.
45, pp. 37-87.
Gambardella, A. (1995): Science and Innovation: The
US Pharmaceutical Industry During the 1980s,
Cambridge, MA, Cambridge University Press.
Glaeser, E. L., et al. (1992): ‘Growth in Cities’,
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100(6), pp. 1126-
52.
Goddard, J. (1997a): Universities and Regional Devel-
opment: An Overview, CURDS website:
http://www.ncl.ac.uk.
Goddard, J. (1997b): The Local and Regional Role of
Higher Education: Comments on the National
Commission of Inquiry Report, CURDS website:
http://www.ncl.ac.uk.
Grossman, G. and Helpman, E. (1991): Innovation
and Growth in the Global Economy, MIT Press,
Cambridge (Mass.).
Haaland, J. I., Kind, J. H., Midelfart Knarvik, K. H.
and Torstensson, J. (1998): ‘What determines the
Economic Geography of Europe’, Discussion Paper,
19/98, Department of Economics, Norwegian
School of Economic and Business Administration.
Jacobs, J. (1969): ‘Strategies for Helping Cities’,
American Economic Review, Vol. 59(4), pp. 652-56.
Jaffe, A. B., Trajtenberg, M., et al. (1993):
‘Geographic Localisation of Knowledge Spillovers as
Evidenced by Patent Citations’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 108(3), pp. 577-98.
Kogut, B., Shan, W. and Walker, G. (1992): ‘Knowl-
edge in the network and the network as knowl-
edge: The structuring of new industries’, in
Grabher, G., Copy-editing: The embedded firm: on the
socioeconomics of industrial networks, Routledge:
London, pp. 67-89.
Krugman, P. (1991a): Geography and Trade, MIT
Press, Cambridge (Mass.), London, England.
Krugman, P. (1991b): ‘Increasing Returns and
Economic Geography’, Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 99(3), pp. 483-99.
Lösch, A. (1940): The Economics of Location, Jena,
Fischer.
Lucas, R. E. (1988): ‘On the Mechanics of Economic
Development’,  Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol.
22, pp. 3-22.
Marshall, A. (1890): Principles of Economics, London,
MacMillian.
Moran, P. (1948): ‘The interpretation of statistical
maps’,  Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol.
B10, pp. 243-251.
Nelson, R. and Phelps, E. (1966): ‘Investment in
humans, technological diffusion, and economic
growth’,  American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings, Vol. 51(2), pp. 69-75.
Neven, D., Gouyette, C. (1995): Regional conver-
gence in the European Community, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 33(1), pp. 47-65.
Orsenigo, L., Pammolli, F. and Riccaboni, M.
(2001): ‘Technological Change and Network
Dynamics. Lessons from Pharmaceuticals’, Research
Policy, Vol. 30, pp. 485-508.
Owen-Smith, J., et al. (2002): ‘A Comparison of U.S.
and European University-Industry Relations in the
Life Sciences’, Management Science, Vol. 48(1),
pp. 24-43.
Porter, M. (1990): The Competitive Advantage of
Nations, Free Press, New York.
Powell, W. W., Koput, K. and Smith-Doerr, L.
(1996): ‘Technological Change and the Locus of
Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology’,
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 44(1), pp. 116-
145.
Prevezer, M. (1997): ‘The Dynamics of Industrial
Clustering in Biotechnology’, Small Business
Economics, Vol. 9(3), pp. 255-271.
Romer, P. M. (1986): ‘Increasing Returns and Long-
run Growth’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94(5),
pp. 1002–37.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1996): “The Classical Approach to
Convergence Analysis”, The Economic Journal, Vol.
106, No 437, pp. 1019-1036.
Saxenian, A. (1994): ‘Regional Advantage: Culture
and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128’,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.).Chapter 3 — Regional Aspects of Competitiveness
123
Schmutzler, A. (1999): ‘The New Economic Geog-
raphy’,  Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 13(4),
pp. 355-79.
Simmie, J., Sennett, J., Wood, P. and Hart, D.
(2002): ‘Innovation in Europe: A Tale of Networks,
Knowledge and Trade in Five Cities’, Regional
Studies, Vol. 36(1), pp. 47-64.
Solow, R. (1956): ‘A Contribution to the Theory of
Economic Growth’, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 70(1), pp. 65-94.
Stadler, M. (1999): ‘Demand Pull and Technology
Push Effects in the Quality Ladder Model’, Tübinger
Diskussionsbeitrag, Vol. 172.
Storper, M. (1992): ‘The Limits to Globalisation:
Technological Districts and International Trade’,
Economic Geography, Vol. 68, pp. 60-93.
Storper, M. (1995): ‘The Resurgence of Regional
Economies, Ten Years Later: The Region as Nexus of
Untraded Interdependencies’, European Urban and
Regional Studies, Vol. 2(3), pp. 191-221.
Temple, J. (1999): ‘A positive effect of human
capital on growth’, Economics Letters, Vol. 65,
pp. 131-134.
Von Hipple, E. (1994): ‘Sticky information and the
locus of problem solving: Implications for innova-
tion’, Management Science, Vol. 40, pp. 429-439.
Weber, A. (1909): Über den Standort der Industrien,
Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr.
Wolfe, D. and Gertler, M. (2001): ‘Globalisation and
Economic Restructuring in Ontario: From Industrial
Heartland to Learning Region?’, European Planning
Studies, Vol. 9(5), pp. 575-592.
Zucker, L. G. and Darby, M. (1997): ‘Present at the
Biotechnology Revolution: Transformation of Tech-
nical Identity for a Large Incumbent Pharmaceutical
Firm’, Research Policy, Vol. 26(4-5), pp. 429-446.125
APPENDIX 3
Appendix 3.1: NUTS-2 regional codes and NACE sectoral codes
APPENDIX 3
Table A.3.1: Sectoral links between NACE-CLIO and ESA95
Sector Heading ESA95 Sections ESA79 Codes
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing A + B B01
Energy and Manufacturing  C + D + E
Mining and quarrying + Electricity, gas and water supply C + E B06
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco DA B36
Manufacture of textiles and textile products + Manufacture of leather 
and leather products DB + DC B42
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel +  DF + DG + DH B13 + B17 + B50 (part)
Manufacture of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres + 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment DL B24 (part)
Manufacture of transport equipment DM B28
Other Manufacturing (Manufacture of wood and wood products +  DD + DE + DN +  B15 + B24 (part) +
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and  DI + DJ + DK B47 + B50 (part)
printing + Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products + 
Manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products + 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. + Manufacturing n.e.c.)
Construction F B53
Market Services G + H + I + J + K B 68
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles  G B58 (part)
and personal and household goods
Hotels and restaurants H B58 (part)
Transport, storage and communication I B60
Financial intermediation J B69
Real estate, renting and business activities K B74
Non-market services L + M + N + O + P B86
(Public administration and defence; compulsory social security + 
Education + Health and social work + Other community, social and 
personal service activities + Private households with employed 
persons + Extra-territorial organisations and bodies)European competitiveness report 2003
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Appendix 3.2: A note on Barro
regressions
Methodology
The general estimating equation in a Barro regres-




r) = β 0 - [(1-e-β T)/T]lnY 0
r + λ X
where the average annual growth rate of produc-
tivity68 in region r from year 0 to t is related to the
initial level of productivity and a set of conditioning
variables (vector X). The Barro-test for convergence is
that β > 0, i.e. the lower the initial level of produc-
tivity, the higher the growth rate69. The estimate of
coefficient β and the expression in brackets multi-
plying the log of Y0 can be used to solve for the rate
of β -convergence per year. Thus, poorer regions on
average grow faster than rich ones and, as a conse-
quence, productivity levels are expected to converge.
This property is consistent with the neo-classical
approach to convergence whereby trade provides
efficiency advantages for all regional participants
through specialisation, with factor-price equalisation
then bringing ultimate convergence in productivity.
Conditioning variables
Subsequent work in this area (see Durlauf and Quah,
1998, Table 2 for a comprehensive listing) has
expanded the range of conditioning indicators in
country studies to include knowledge-based factors
alongside others reflecting more traditional explana-
tions such as trade, investment, and population
growth as well as a range of socio-political factors.
The variety of productivity-related drivers linked to
deepening human knowledge are suggested by the
earlier associative analysis, although both population
activity rates and cost of living measurements may
themselves mean that measured real productivity
differences across regions can display somewhat
anomalous outcomes.
The estimation work undertaken with the regional
database concentrates on assessing the evidence for
knowledge factors in regional competitiveness using
a Barro-type approach. 
The literature indicates that the determinants of
regional growth, apart from capital and population,
are human capital accumulation (innovation) and
the diffusion of technology from leading regions. In
the endogenous growth literature two major frame-
works are distinguished, the Lucas (1988) approach
and the Nelson-Phelps (1966) approach. In both of
these, inputs of knowledge factors come in the form
of growth, educational attainment and R&D inter-
dependencies. Diffusion of technology in particular
is emphasised by Nelson-Phelps, with education
speeding the process of catch-up by facilitating the
high rates and levels of trade in ICT products. This
suggests increases in educational attainment would
be the most clearly specified determinant. 
For regional econometric analysis of the role of
knowledge factors, the growth accounting
approach is felt to be over-demanding and the
chosen approach rather seeks to assess competitive-
ness and convergence associations with knowledge
factors based on the substantial literature (see
Durlauf and Quah, 1998 for a literature review)
derived from the work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995). This builds on earlier work by Baumol
(1986), with the empirical formulation having a
number of features that make it attractive for use.
The primary unconditional regression equation is
based on a neo-classical view but the conditional
regression can be thought of as a reduced form for
a number of alternative models. Its principal prac-
tical advantage in regional analysis is that it requires
little substantial variable measurement apart from
productivity at two points in time and knowledge
input factor proxies. It therefore provides a simple
opportunity to test for convergence, both uncondi-
tional and conditioned by knowledge factors. It also
provides a basis for classifying regions by the resid-
uals from such regressions in relation to other
possible explanatory inputs, including the popula-
tion and technology diffusion determinants associ-
ated with knowledge factors. The OLS estimation of
Barro regressions is also generally considered to be
robust to mis-specification. 
The simplest β -convergence Barro regression has
been used to exploit more fully the cross-section
and time series information in available datasets
(e.g. a panel data approach can be used to deal
with temporal and spatial correlations) but a basic
finding of their analysis has generally been shown
to hold true. This is that absolute convergence
tends to exist for homogenous regions (particularly
in regional studies the states of the US and in
country studies the OECD) but not for the world as
a whole. Convergence for the heterogeneous sets of
68 Traditionally the indicator of interest has been GDP per capita, but as
productivity (GDP per hour worked) is the chosen measure of competitive-
ness, this has been chosen as the dependent variable in the Barro equation.
69 Testing, without any other explanatory variables, for whether higher produc-
tivity growth rates are associated with lower initial productivity levels would
correspond to the simplest type of ‘unconditional beta’ convergence testing.economic links to a capital city region or the influ-
ence of concerted national policy across all regions,
such as changes in a tax regime. 
(iv) Heterogeneity
Specification both of the form of the regression
equation and the nature of residual shocks at
regional level will also potentially mean that
possible variable parameters associated with size
and heteroscedastic residual effects will be associ-
ated with both the level of starting productivity and
the duration of the time period measured. While a
logarithmic form of regression will help to accom-
modate such heterogeneity, the effect within the EU
data set is in any case likely to be less problematic
than in more broadly based comparisons across
very different regions or countries.
Estimation sequence
To begin with, a general equation was estimated
covering all regions where data were available. The
time period for productivity growth was 1987-
2001, with unconditional Barro equations estimated
for some 200 NUTS-2 regions in the EU. In the
event only the following variables could be used
due to lack of data availability: R&D expenditure in
share of GDP, high tech share of total employment,
and the number of enrolments in tertiary education.
Unconditional Barro regression
Equation parameters and diagnostics
Results for the unconditional Barro regression are
presented in Table 3.6 and show a highly significant β -
convergence over the regional space, with the
hypothesised negative coefficient on the starting level
productivity indicating convergence over the period.
The overall fit is relatively poor as expected and
residual diagnostics show considerable information
content is left in the residuals, which give evidence of
misspecification, non-normality and show serial
dependency for the country-based ordering of the
regions in the regression analysis. Graph A.3.1 pres-
ents evidence that there is systematic variation in β -
convergence rates over three selected time periods
and this is inversely associated with the speed of
growth of the EU economy. This is consistent with the
view that short-term faster growth is driven by inter-
national macro-economic conditions that impact first
on the highest productivity regions before spilling over
into the rest. Graph A.3.2 reports in more detail on
this, showing the consistent decline in dispersion as
measured by σ -convergence over the period, espe-
cially for the most disadvantaged regions.
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countries is only apparent when one controls for
other variables (conditional convergence).
Additional complications
(i) Outliers
Temple (1999) has drawn attention to the sensi-
tivity of cross-country regressions to influential
outliers. The empirical work at EU regional level
inevitably has to deal with higher residual variance
from Barro regressions as regions themselves are
more heterogeneous than in say OECD country
studies, although the EU member states are more
homogeneous than the OECD countries as a whole.
With larger average residuals the use of outlier
analysis is therefore more important. In order to
assess both the robustness of results and test for
influential effects of data measurement at regional
level, outlier analysis is essential. It also provides the
methodological approach at regional level for classi-
fying regions and for assessing possible additional
explanatory factors. Tests for spatial autocorrelation
and heterogeneity in residuals are also more appro-
priate in regional analysis, with theory suggesting
that spatial proximity may boost trade, associated
technology diffusion and hence accelerate growth
so that outliers associated with missing variables are
likely to be correlated in space.
(ii) Spillover effects
Specification of the manner and route through
which the spillover effects associated with such
knowledge factors operate is problematic at
regional level. This is principally because of the
general absence of regional trade information and
missing or poor quality information on the critical
knowledge inputs. One expected outcome from
missing such effects will be spatial correlation in
growth regression residuals. These were indeed
found and discussed in the main text. 
(iii) Spatial autocorrelation
Both cluster theory and endogenous growth theory
suggest that missing factor effects and any
economic shocks over time are likely to be corre-
lated between adjacent regions. This may reflect
regional club effects with regionally contiguous
groups seeing their productivity performance
moving together. Correlations in shocks may also
reflect the common external trade experience of
such regional clubs and stronger links to leading
regions, but may also be associated with nationally-
based economic interdependencies, such as theEuropean competitiveness report 2003
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σ -convergence
The significant evidence for unconditional β -conver-
gence across the whole of the 1987-2001 period
means that there is a justification for exploring σ -
convergence, the changing dispersion of measured
productivity across regions, and this is also amenable
to decomposition into particular regional groupings
relevant to policy. 
Graph A.3.2 plots σ -convergence in productivity
across the 207 EU NUTS-2 over the period and for
the subgroup of Objective 1 regions. The plot relies
upon the evidence of the Barro regressions and
indicates more clearly that convergence in regional
productivity has systematically occurred over the
whole period 1987-2001 but that during the
periods of fastest growth in the EU, particularly in
the buoyant years up to 1989, there had been an
associated widening of the dispersion between
regions. More recent convergence, on this measure,
has taken place during the more modest growth
(1996-2001) period across the EU.
Graph A.3.1: β -convergence rates over time - Unconditional model



















Graph A.3.2: σ - convergence rates over time - Unconditional model
Source: Cambridge Econometrics European regional database (April 2003).
y = -0.0048x + 9.937
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The Moran scatter plot70 of Graph A.3.3 shows clear
and statistically significant spatial dependency in
the residuals.
Conditional Barro regression
Equation parameters and diagnostics
The β -convergence results remain significant in the
reported conditional Barro regression of Table 3.7
with the additional coefficients positive, as hypothe-
sised, on the conditioning variables of R&D expen-
Graph A.3.3: Residual spillover effects - unconditional model
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70 See Moran, P. (1948). The measure looks at spatial correlations in the resid-
uals, an aggregate measure associating in turn each region’s residual with the
size of residuals in adjacent and more distant regions, with weights varying
inversely with distance away. The I value can be interpreted in the same
manner as a correlation coefficient, varying between -1 and +1, with zero
indicating no association.
diture relative to GDP and the high tech specialisa-
tion of employment. The coefficient on enrolment
in tertiary education was negative and insignificant
in associated regressions. While suggestive, these
estimates are not statistically robust at the 5 %
level, although the diagnostic results show the
residuals to be much better behaved than in the
unconditional regression with for example the
Ramsey RESET test for mis-specification not signifi-
cant. 
The conditional Moran scatter plot is shown in
Graph A.3.4 providing supporting evidence of
continuing serial correlation but with the effect of
large blocks of missing data affecting the reported
conditional Moran’s I value which is also not signifi-
cant at the 5 % level.European competitiveness report 2003
130
Graph A.3.4: Residual spillover effects - conditional model
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in May 2004 is accompanied by an analysis of the
other two East European candidate countries Bulgaria
and Romania. Section 6 concludes.
Unless otherwise indicated, the country groupings
and acronyms used in this chapter refer to the
following countries:
CEEC-8: Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary
(HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Poland (PL), the
Slovak Republic (SK) and Slovenia (SI)
AC-10: the 10 countries acceding in May 2004, i.e.
CEEC-8 as defined above, Cyprus (CY) and Malta
(MT)71
CEEC-10: the 10 acceding and candidate countries:
CEEC-8 as described above, together with candidate
countries Bulgaria (BG) and Romania (RO)
EU-25: EU after the next enlargement round, i.e.
the present 15 EU members and AC-10 as described
above.
4.2 Macroeconomic
performance in the acceding
countries after 1990
Accession of the ten new Member States will add
some nine per cent to EU’s GDP and close to twenty
per cent to EU’s population (Table 4.1). Given the
lower employment rates in the acceding countries,
total employment will increase by less than total
population, by some eighteen per cent.
Average GDP per capita in the ten countries acceding
in May 2004 (measured at purchasing power stan-
Chapter 4:
EU enlargement and competitiveness 
of manufacturing
4.1 Introduction
On 1 May 2004, ten new Member States will accede
to the EU: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia. The enlargement will create a
larger internal market and lead to changes in the
economic structures of the enlarged Union.
While economic developments in Cyprus and Malta
have been generally stable, the Central and East
European countries have undergone dramatic struc-
tural changes during the 1990s. Their production
structures have changed, and their relations with
the EU – including trade and foreign direct invest-
ment – have intensified. A catch-up process of these
countries towards the living standards of the
present EU-15 has started, although progress has
been uneven among the group.
This chapter seeks to outline the main features of
the changing economic landscape of the EU and to
analyse the competitive position of the acceding
countries within the enlarged Union. Section 2 gives
a broad overview of the macroeconomic perform-
ance of the acceding countries as well as the other
two Central and East European countries, Bulgaria
and Romania since 1990. Section 3 looks at the
changing economic structures in these countries,
including changes in the business environment, the
role of the main economic sectors, and changes in
the manufacturing sector during the 1990s.
Sections 4 and 5 discuss the competitiveness of the
manufacturing industry in the acceding and candi-
date countries: the former on productivity and labour
costs, the latter on trade competitiveness. Due to lack
of detailed data on the manufacturing sector in
Cyprus and Malta, these countries could not be
covered. Instead, where possible, the data for the
eight Central and East European countries acceding
Chapter 4 — EU enlargement and competitiveness of manufacturing
71 Within the AC-10 group, the eight Central and East European countries
(CEEC-8) account for 98 % of total GDP (2002), Cyprus and Malta for the
remaining 2 %.European competitiveness report 2003
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dards, which correct for the undervaluation of the
currencies in many acceding countries) is less than
half of that in the present EU-15, and average labour
productivity just above half of the level in EU-15.
negative growth resulted from both supply and
demand shocks, caused by the loss of traditional
export markets, the break-up of existing supply
chains and decision-making structures, rapid trade
liberalisation and restrictive macroeconomic policies.
From 1994 onwards, economic recovery gained
momentum in the acceding countries and growth
has since exceeded that in the EU. Bulgaria and
Romania, the two Central and East European candi-
date countries, have lagged behind the acceding
countries in this recovery: average GDP growth in
these two countries since 1995 has remained below
1 % per year (Table 4.2).
Employment in the Central and East European
acceding countries declined even more strongly than
GDP in the first years of transition (-2.8 % per year
between 1990-1995). After a modest recovery,
employment has declined again since 1999. The
cumulated decline in total employment in CEEC-8
over the period 1990-2002 amounted to 13.5 %.
Low levels of employment are a major concern in the
acceding countries. Among the acceding countries,
Cyprus, the Czech Republic and Slovenia have the
highest employment rates, all being close to the
present EU-15 average of 64 % (Table 4.2).
Table 4.1 Economic indicators for the countries
acceding in May 2004 in comparison to the
present EU-15
% of the level 
in EU-15
GDP (in PPS, 2002) 9.0
Population (2002) 19.7
Total employment (2001) 17.7
GDP per head (in PPP, 2002) 46.4
Labour productivity (GDP per 
employed person in PPS, 2001) 52.2
Notes: The ten countries acceding in May 2004 are Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta,
Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. PPP and PPS:
Purchasing Power Parities / Standards.
Source: Commission services, using national statistics and Eurostat.
Graph 4.1 Growth of GDP, employment and productivity in CEEC-8 compared to EU-15, 1990-2002 
(1995=100)
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CEEC (8)  EU
GDP Employment (employees and self-employed)
Labour productivity (GDP per employed person) GDP per capita
During the early 1990s, the acceding countries in
Central and Eastern Europe went through a first
phase of the transition process which was charac-
terised by dramatic declines in GDP (Graph 4.1). TheChapter 4 — EU enlargement and competitiveness of manufacturing
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Table 4.2 Economic indicators for individual acceding and candidate countries and EU-15
GDP growth  Employment  Labour Population Employment GDP per  GDP
in 1995-2002, growth in productivity in 2002 rate in 2001, capita  (at PPS)
% p.a. 1995-2002, growth in (EU-25=100) % of (at PPP) in 2002
% p.a. 1995-2000, (EU-25:  15-64-year in 2001 (EU-25=100)
% p.a. 456 mio.) old population (EU-15=100)
Czech Republic 1.7 -0.5 2.2 2.2 65.1 60 1.4
Estonia 5.0 -1.1 6.2 0.3 61.3 41 0.1
Hungary 3.9 0.7 3.1 2.2 56.5 57 1.4
Latvia 5.2 0.2 5.0 0.5 58.7 35 0.2
Lithuania 4.0 -2.2 6.4 0.8 60.1 39 0.3
Poland 4.0 0.2 3.8 8.5 55.0 39 3.6
Slovak Republic 3.8 -0.1 3.9 1.2 56.8 47 0.6
Slovenia 3.9 0.7 3.2 0.4 63.8 74 0.3
CEEC-8 3.6 0.0 3.6 16.1 .. .. 7.9
Cyprus 3.6 1.2 2.4 0.2 65.9 74 0.1
Malta 3.3 0.6 2.7 0.1 54.2 55 0.1
AC-10 3.6 0.0 3.6 16.4 56.7 46 8.1
Bulgaria 0.6 -1.3 1.9 1.7 49.6 25 0.5
Romania 0.4 -1.8 2.2 4.9 62.4 25 1.3
AC-10, BG and RO 3.0 -0.5 3.6 23.0 57.4 40 9.9
EU-15 2.2 1.2 1.0 83.6 64.1 100 90.1
Notes: Labour productivity refers to GDP per employed person (at purchasing power parities, or PPP). PPS: purchasing power standards (Eurostat).
Employment rates for Cyprus, Lithuania and Poland are for 2000. GDP levels for Malta in comparison to the EU are for 1999.
Sources: WIIW database incorporating national statistics; WIFO and WIIW calculations using AMECO; Eurostat.
Average labour productivity increased at a rapid pace
in the acceding countries throughout the past
decade (2.9 % per year during 1990-2002 in CEEC-8,
which compares to 1.4 % in EU-15). However, to the
extent that the productivity gains were the result of
labour shedding, they reflected the painful adjust-
ment processes going on in these countries rather
than a successful modernisation of their economies.
In the second half of the 1990s, productivity gains
were to the main extent related to gains in output,
while employment shedding remained on a lesser
scale than in the first half of the decade.
Growth of GDP per capita in the acceding countries
has mirrored that of overall GDP; given the lower
employment levels in the acceding countries, the
gap vis-à-vis the present EU-15 is larger in terms of
GDP per capita than in terms of average produc-




Economic transition since the early 1990s has
implied major changes in the economic structures
of the acceding and candidate countries in Central
and Eastern Europe. However, progress towards
modernisation of the economies has been uneven
across countries and across policy areas.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD) publishes annually a set of transition
indicators, which measure progress in a wide range
of areas.72 By 2002, all the eight Central and East
European countries acceding in May 2004 were
considered to have reached the level of an advanced
market economy with respect to trade and foreign
exchange systems as well as regarding small scale
privatisation. On the other hand, despite the impres-
sive progress of the past years, problems remain in
several countries with regard to governance and
enterprise restructuring (soft budget constraints,
bankruptcy legislation etc.) and competition policy
(abuse of market power and barriers to entry).
Furthermore, progress in financial sector reforms is
considered to be lagging behind in some countries
(Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia), which
generally implies higher financing costs for enter-
72 For the 2002 transition indicators, see the EBRD (2002). The reader is also
referred to the forthcoming report by the European Commission on the
progress towards accession in the candidate countries as well as the moni-
toring reports on the acceding countries.European competitiveness report 2003
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prises in these countries. There are also delays in
infrastructure reforms, in particular with regard to
the quality of roads and telecommunications; in this
area, Slovakia lags significantly behind.
A joint EBRD and World Bank survey (EBRD, 2002)
suggests that significant improvements took place in
the business environment of the Central and East Euro-
pean acceding and candidate countries between 1999
and 2002. This 2002 Business Environment and Enter-
prise Performance Survey asked 6000 enterprises to
evaluate economic governance and state institutions
and to assess the extent to which the business environ-
ment creates obstacles to the operation and growth of
their businesses. The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary
and Slovenia had the best scores in the general assess-
ment of the business environment. The obstacles to
doing business were still regarded as considerable in
Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania.
Overall, financing and taxation were considered to be
the largest obstacles for doing business (EBRD, 2002).
In contrast, problems with infrastructureand crimewere
considered as minor obstacles to business in most
acceding countries in the 2002 survey, representing a
major improvement on the results of the survey three
years earlier. Also regulation, or the extent of bureau-
cratic hurdles on business, is considered as a relatively
small obstacle, but its importance is increasing again in
several countries, in particular in the Baltic States. 
The judiciary, laws and their enforcement, is consid-
ered as a major obstacle in Lithuania, Slovakia and
Romania. Corruption, which is generally quoted as a
medium-sized obstacle in the acceding and candi-
date countries, is relatively more important in
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania.
However, comparison with the results of the 2000
World Business Environment Survey of the World
Bank, which covers a sub-set of EU-15 Member
States, suggests that the frequency of bribes in
most of the Central and East European acceding
and candidate countries be lower than for instance
in France and Germany.73
The modernisation of existing assets and the
training of people in skills such as managerial know-
how require extensive efforts and large financial
resources.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been
one of the driving forces behind the restructuring
and upgrading of human and physical capital. FDI
can enhance productivity growth and export
expansion by bringing in additional capital, tech-
nology and managerial know-how, as well as easing
the access to markets. 
Havlik (2003) presents robust statistical evidence of
the positive impacts of FDI penetration on produc-
tivity and unit labour costs at branch level. Hunya
(2002) shows that enterprises with foreign invest-
ment participation have labour productivity levels
on average twice as high as domestically owned
enterprises; the former are also more export-
oriented. Damian et al. (2003), using a panel data
set covering more than 8000 firms in acceding
countries, investigate the channels of technology
transfer through FDI and the impact of FDI on
productivity growth. In contrast to the findings of
others, they conclude that total factor productivity
growth in foreign affiliates is much faster than that
in locally owned firms only in some acceding coun-
tries (Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia).
Among the eight Central and East European coun-
tries acceding in May 2004, Poland and the Czech
Republic have attracted the largest stocks of foreign
direct investment (FDI) both in absolute terms and
relative to GDP (Table 4.3). Roughly forty per cent
of the total inward FDI stock is in the manufacturing
sector in five of these countries; the Baltic States are
an exception, as manufacturing accounts for a
smaller part of their total inward FDI.
FDI data by manufacturing industry reveal an uneven
distribution of FDI among the industries. This reflects
not only the varying degree of attractiveness of indi-
vidual industries but also cross-country differences in
privatisation policies. Large FDI inflows have been
recorded in both domestically oriented industries such
as food and beverages (important in all acceding
countries except Slovenia) and predominantly export-
oriented industries such as electrical and optical equip-
ment or transport equipment. In the Baltic States, FDI
plays a major role in textiles and wood.
Accession to the EU will imply a further reduction in
trade barriers and hopefully a still deeper integra-
tion of the new members into the cross-border
production networks. EU membership also involves
the adoption of the existing EU legislation, or the
“acquis communautaire”. 
Compliance with EU standards and safety require-
ments will in many cases lead to quality improve-
ments and constitute a competitive advantage.
Exported products will be subject to one conformity
assessment procedure only, which will in many cases
reduce production costs considerably. However, in
the short run the adoption of the EU rules may
require substantial investments in some sectors, and
73 Comparison of EBRD (2002, Table 2.2) with the World Business Environment


































































Table 4.3 Foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks1) in manufacturing industry, 2001
Czech Republic Estonia2) Hungary2) Latvia Lithuania2) Poland Slovak Republic Slovenia
Total FDI stock in the country (mio euro) 30717 2843 11080 2521 2509 60311 5313 3637
- of which, in manufacturing (mio euro) 11540 613 4079 429 722 24829 2328 1317
Manufacturing FDI stock % of GDP 18.2 11.0 8.1 5.1 5.9 12.2 10.2 6.3
FDI stocks per employee (1000 euro)
D Manufacturing total 10.7 5.2 5.4 2.9 3.0 10.6 6.1 5.8
DA Food products; beverages and tobacco 11.3 6.9 8.1 3.5 5.1 14.1 7.1 3.3
DB Textiles and textile products 3.8 3.8 1.5 2.2 2.0 1.0 0.6 1.2
DC Leather and leather products 0.7 . 1.1 2.4 0.1 0.4 1.1 .
DD Wood and wood products 5.4 7.2 1.9 2.2 1.7 12.7 2.2 0.5
DE Pulp, paper and paper products; 
publishing and printing 20.5 . 5.0 2.3 2.0 15.1 7.2 16.0
DF Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 71.4 . 25.8 . 12.8 . 37.0 .
DG Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 18.6 17.1 6.3 9.6 . 14.0 8.5 18.5
DH Rubber and plastic products 14.4 2.4 6.1 5.9 5.5 6.4 3.0 12.7
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 22.8 . 8.3 7.1 3.5 23.2 5.2 8.0
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal products 5.8 2.9 3.3 5.1 1.3 1.9 16.7 3.0
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 3.7 4.0 3.7 4.2 0.7 1.5 2.0 7.1
DL Electrical and optical equipment 12.6 1.6 5.8 2.0 3.0 11.8 2.4 5.0
DM Transport equipment 22.7 10.7 9.7 0.3 8.3 36.9 5.4 13.1
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 1.9 . 1.5 1.1 0.6 3.4 1.2 0.3
1) FDI coverage by country is as follows: Czech Republic: equity capital, reinvested earnings, loans; Estonia: equity capital, reinvested earnings, loans; Hungary: nominal capital based on corporation-tax declarations; Latvia: equity
capital, reinvested earnings, loans; Lithuania: equity capital, reinvested earnings, loans; Poland: equity capital, reinvested earnings gross; projects over USD 1 million capital based on PAIZ (the Polish Foreign Investment Agency) data;
Slovak Republic: equity capital, reinvested earnings - in the corporate sector; Slovenia: equity capital, reinvested earnings, loans. 
2) Data for 2000.
Source: WIIW-WIFO FDI database, national statistics.European competitiveness report 2003
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these are likely to crowd out other types of invest-
ment. European Commission (2001, 2003) estimates
that the total investment needs in the acceding coun-
tries amount to some EUR 80 to 100 billion.
In most sectors, the largest investments are those
required in order to comply with environmental
regulations. Also requirements arising from occupa-
tional health and safety regulations, employment
legislation, as well as product-specific standards will
impose costs on many industries. The sectors most
affected by the acquis include the chemical and
pharmaceutical sector, basic metals and fabricated
metal products, food industries, and the transport
equipment sector – all important industries in the
acceding countries. 
In some cases, transition periods have been granted
to the acceding countries for the implementation of
the full acquis.
Many industries in the acceding countries have
already undergone restructuring and modernisation
and are well prepared for the adoption of EU legisla-
tion. However, there is a dichotomy between
modern, foreign-dominated industries and domesti-
cally owned enterprises (see Hunya, 2002). Industries
with EU-oriented production, high levels of foreign
direct investment, solid investment growth rates and
a domination of large-size enterprises are generally
best prepared for the obligations of EU membership.
Small companies and companies operating only on
the domestic market are generally less well prepared.
A recent Eurochambres survey indicated that only
half of the companies in the acceding countries had
started preparations for the Single Market, and less
than ten per cent felt they were fully informed of the
existing EU legislation (Eurochambres, 2003).
4.3.2 Main sectoral changes in the
acceding countries, Bulgaria and
Romania, since 1990
The economic transition in the Central and East Euro-
pean acceding and candidate countries has involved
large shifts in the sectoral composition of GDP and
employment. The changes have brought their overall
economic structures closer to those in EU-15. At the
beginning of the transition, the acceding countries had
larger agricultural and industrial sectors, and a smaller
services sector than the EU-15 average (see Graphs 4.2
and 4.3)74. In the course of the 1990s, the general
trend has been towards an increasing share of services
at the cost of agriculture and industry, although in a
few countries the shares of agriculture or industry have
increased as well. In Cyprus and Malta, the sectoral
shifts during the 1990s were less pronounced.
In the period 1990-2001, the share of agriculture in
GDP and in employment fell dramatically in each of the
Central and East European acceding countries. Even in
absolute terms, agricultural employment declined. In
contrast, in Bulgaria and Romania, the share of agricul-
ture in total employment increased. This was essentially
the result of a dramatic decline in industrial employ-
ment and the limited absorption capacity of the serv-
ices sector. Nonetheless, in Romania agricultural
employment increased also in absolute terms.
Agriculture still accounts for a larger share of total value
added in the acceding countries than in the present
EU-15. However, in terms of agricultural employment
the difference between the acceding countries and the
present EU is yet even more significant than in terms of
value added, reflecting the low average labour produc-
tivity in agriculture in the accession countries. After EU
accession, competitive pressures and modernisation
are likely to increase labour productivity in agricultural
production in the new Member States, which could
imply further steep declines in agricultural employ-
ment in those countries.
In all the Central and East European countries, the
share of industry (comprising manufacturing, mining,
water and electricity supply, and construction)
declined in terms of both value added and employ-
ment between 1990 and 2001. The decline was more
pronounced in the first years of transition and
levelled off after 1995. In several countries, industrial
employment declined sharply even in absolute
terms. In terms of gross value added, the share of
industry in most acceding countries is now similar to
that in the EU; as an employer, industry continues to
have a larger role in particular in the Czech Republic,
Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and Hungary.
The Hungarian experience, a renewed increase in
industrial employment after a significant decline,
suggests that also some other acceding countries
might experience a “re-industrialisation” in the
future. Factors such as low labour costs and avail-
ability of skilled labour may attract more export-
oriented industrial production, as has happened in
several South-East Asian economies.75
75 Urban (2001). 
74 Under the previous regime, industry was emphasised at the expense of serv-
ices. Furthermore, service activities were often supplied within big industrial
combines and were consequently classified under “industry” and to some
extent “agriculture” as well. Most services were considered “unproductive
labour” and their contribution to the efficient functioning of the economy
was neglected (Stare and Zupancic, 2000). Also, many modern services that
play an important role in market economies (such as marketing, financial
services, real estate and other business services) were not needed under
socialism. (Soubbotina and Sheram, 2000).Chapter 4 — EU enlargement and competitiveness of manufacturing
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As the role of agriculture and industry declines, services
have increased their share in both value added and
employment in each of the ten Central and East Euro-
pean acceding and candidate countries. However, at
the beginning of the transition, the rising share of serv-
ices essentially reflected less pronounced employment
losses relative to industry and agriculture. Only when
growth gained momentum in the total economy,
employment in services started to rise in absolute terms.
The increasing share of services in the Central and
East European countries reflects a ‘catch-up’ of the
tertiary sector, which still accounts for a distinctly
lower share of total value added and employment
than is the case in the present EU-15. The gap vis-à-
vis EU-15 is largest in the field of financial and other
business services (marketing, consulting, auditing
etc.)76. Given the large scope for catch-up, the serv-
ices sector can be expected to continue to grow
and account for the main part of employment
76 For a more extensive analysis of the development of the services sector in the
accession countries, see Vidovic (2002).
Graph 4.2 Sectoral composition of value added in the acceding countries, Bulgaria and Romania in
comparison to EU-15 in 1990, 1995 and 2001 (% of GDP)
* Year 2000.
Note: Sector shares are defined as gross value added (GVA) in each sector relative to gross domestic product (GDP). Because of the so-called ‘Finan-
cial intermediation services indirectly measured’ (FISIM), which are included in GDP but not in gross value added, the shares of the three
sectors will not add up to 100 %.
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growth in the Central and East European acceding
and candidate countries.
In Cyprus and Malta, where tourism is of key impor-
tance for the economy, the services sector has tradi-
tionally been large and the changes during the
1990s were less dramatic.
4.3.3 The manufacturing sector 
in Central and Eastern Europe
The remainder of this chapter will focus on the
competitiveness of the manufacturing industries in
the ten Central and East European acceding and
candidate countries. The present sub-section
outlines the main trends in the manufacturing
sector of the ten acceding countries, trends which
are not dissimilar from those in the total economy
described above.77 Manufacturing production
increased strongly during the 1990s, while manu-
facturing employment declined significantly (Graph
4.4). Against the major reductions in employment,
labour productivity in manufacturing increased at a
dramatic speed, significantly exceeding productivity
growth in the total economy.
77 Appendix 4.A.5 outlines the trends in manufacturing specialisation and
concentration in the enlarging area, defined as EU-15 and the ten Central
and East European acceding and candidate countries.
Graph 4.3 Sectoral composition of employment in the acceding countries, Bulgaria and Romania in
comparison to EU-15 in 1990, 1995 and 2001 (% of total employment)
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Graph 4.4 Developments in the manufacturing sector in Central and Eastern Europe and EU-15 in
1994-2001 (1995=100)
Notes: In this graph, CEEC-10 refers to the eight Central and East European countries acceding in May 2004 together with Bulgaria and Romania.
Labour productivity refers to output per employed person. 
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After a decade of downsizing and re-structuring,
most Central and East European acceding and
candidate countries now have an industrial struc-
ture somewhere between that of “EU-South” (here
defined as Greece, Portugal and Spain) and “EU-
North” countries (here covering Belgium, Germany,
France, Italy and the United Kingdom). In particular,
production structures in Czech, Hungarian,
Slovenian, and Slovak manufacturing are very close
to the EU-15 average and those in Poland slightly
different, while the Baltic states, Bulgaria and
Romania differ significantly from the average
production structures of the present EU-15.
In general, the most important manufacturing
sectors in the Central and East European countries
are food, beverages and tobacco, transport equip-
ment, as well as basic metals and fabricated metal
products (Table 4.4). In the Baltic countries, textiles
and wood products have a large weight. In compar-
ison to the present EU-15, the acceding countries
have lower production shares in paper and printing,
chemicals, machinery and equipment and – with
the notable exception of Hungary – in electrical and
optical equipment.
The acceding countries will have a relatively small
weight in total manufacturing production in the
enlarged EU. Measured at current exchange rates in
2000, the eight Central and East European coun-
tries acceding in May 2004 accounted for 4.4 % of
total manufacturing production in an enlarged EU
(comprising themselves and the present EU-15).
However, if expressed in terms of purchasing power
parities, which correct for the undervaluation of the
currencies in some of the acceding countries, their
share would double to 9.0 %. If Bulgaria and
Romania were added to the group acceding in May
2004, the total weight of the ten Central and East
European acceding and candidate countries in the
larger EU, measured at purchasing power parities,
would rise to 10.7 % (Table 4.4).
The relative size of the acceding countries in terms
of manufacturing employment is significantly higher
than their share in total manufacturing production,
reflecting the lower level of labour productivity rela-
tive to the present EU-15. In 2000, the eight Central
and East European countries acceding in May 2004
accounted for 15.0 % of manufacturing employ-
ment in an enlarged EU. Adding Bulgaria and
Romania increases the weight of the Central and
East European group to 20.9 % (Table 4.4). The
acceding countries have particularly high employ-
ment shares in textiles, leather, wood, coke and
refined petroleum (coke and refined petroleum is an
important employer in particular in Romania).
Changes in the structure of manufacturing in the
eight Central and East European acceding countries
after the mid-1990s have been similar to those in
the present EU-15 (Graph 4.5). The fastest growing
industries in both country groups were transport
equipment, and electrical and optical equipment.
The main loser – again in both country groups –





Labour productivity measures the average amount of
output per employee. Productivity is determined by
factors such as the capital-intensity of production,
labour skills or the efficiency of management, and is an
important indicator of competitiveness. This section
analyses first the relative levels of labour productivity in
the manufacturing sector of the Central and East Euro-
pean acceding and candidate countries, then reviews
average labour costs in the same industries and coun-
tries. Finally, a comparison of unit labour costs, the
joint outcome of productivity and labour costs, is
presented at the end of the section.
In the eight Central and East European countries
acceding in May 2004 (CEEC-8), average labour
productivity in manufacturing rose by an impressive
8.7 % per year in the period 1995-2002. Average
annual growth rates over this period varied from
3 % in Slovenia to 13 % in Hungary. These compare
to average annual productivity growth of 2.2 % in
EU-15 over the same period. The rapid productivity
growth in the eight Central and East European
acceding countries was partly the result of labour
shedding: employment declined by an annual
average of 2.1 % in 1995-2002.
Despite the catch-up, levels of labour productivity in
Central and Eastern Europe are significantly lower
than in the present EU-15. Average labour produc-
tivity in manufacturing in the ten Central and East
European acceding and candidate countries varies
between 25 % (Latvia) and 71 % (Hungary) of the
EU-15 level (productivity is defined as output per
person using PPPs for total GDP, see Table 4.5).
There is a clear gap between a more advanced
group – Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, the
Slovak Republic and Poland – which are in the
range of 48-71 % of the EU level, and a less

































































Table 4.4 Structure and size of the manufacturing sector in Central and Eastern Europe in comparison to EU-15, 2000
Industry share in  Production share2 of Employment share of
manufacturing total1, % CEEC-10 in an enlarged EU3, % CEEC-10 in an enlarged EU3, %
CEEC-10 EU-15 Using exchange rates Using PPPs
D Total manufacturing 100.0 100.0 5.0 10.7 20.9
DA Food products; beverages and tobacco 19.1 13.7 6.8 14.3 24.2
DB Textiles and textile products 4.9 3.9 6.3 13.5 36.9
DC Leather and leather products 0.9 0.9 5.0 10.9 32.6
DD Wood and wood products 3.2 1.9 7.9 16.0 28.4
DE Pulp, paper & paper products; publishing & printing 5.5 7.6 3.6 7.7 11.8
DF Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 7.1 6.0 5.8 13.2 36.6
DG Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 7.2 10.1 3.6 8.0 16.7
DH Rubber and plastic products 3.9 3.8 5.1 10.6 16.0
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 4.8 3.4 6.8 14.3 24.8
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal products 12.5 11.1 5.5 12.2 17.5
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 5.7 8.9 3.2 7.1 19.1
DL Electrical and optical equipment 10.2 12.0 4.2 9.1 16.2
DM Transport equipment 11.3 13.6 4.2 9.0 16.0
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 3.7 2.9 6.2 12.9 23.3
1 Shares in total manufacturing production (in nominal terms, converted using exchange rates).
2 Production values in the year 2000 converted using current exchange rates and using purchasing power parities (PPP) for 1999.
3 In this table, “enlarged EU” refers to the sum of the present EU-15 and CEEC-10. CEEC-10 refers to the eight Central and East European countries acceding in May 2004, Bulgaria and Romania.
Sources:Shares in total manufacturing: WIIW database incorporating national statistics, WIFO and WIIW calculations using SBS; shares in enlarged EU: WIIW and WIFO estimates based on national statistics and AMECO.European competitiveness report 2003
142
Graph 4.5 Structural changes in manufacturing production in CEEC-8 and EU-15, 1995-20001
1 Change in the share of each industry in total manufacturing production between 1995 and 2000, percentage points.
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Bulgaria and Romania – where labour productivity is
between 25-30 % of that in EU-15.78
Productivity differences across manufacturing indus-
tries (Table 4.5) tend to follow a similar pattern in
all the countries. Labour-intensive industries, most
significantly textiles and leather, show productivity
levels significantly below other industries. In
general, highest productivity levels are found for
coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel, for chem-
icals and for transport equipment.
Data on productivity growth by industry point to a
faster catch-up towards productivity levels of EU-15
in medium- and high-technology sectors, while
catch-up is slower in the more labour-intensive
sectors such as textiles and leather, where the gap
against EU productivity levels is larger. In most of
the ten Central and East European acceding or
candidate countries, the fastest productivity growth
rates during 1995-2001 were registered in the
production of electrical and optical equipment, and
transport equipment.79 In general, the lowest
productivity growth rates were recorded in the food
and beverages industry, textiles and leather as well
as in the production of coke, refined petroleum and
nuclear fuel.
4.4.2 Labour costs
Price competitiveness improves if wage increases
are below those of competitors, or if the average
output per employee (productivity) increases. Simi-
larly, cost competitiveness remains unchanged if
wage increases are compensated by corresponding
improvements in productivity. The evolution of unit
labour costs measures the joint effect of these two
(Box 4.1). In the following, wage developments in
the Central and East European acceding and candi-
date countries will be reviewed, followed by an
overview of unit labour costs by industry.
79 Details by country and by industry are given in Appendix 4.A.1.
78 International comparisons of productivity levels are hampered by the conver-
sion of output data from national currencies into a common currency. The
use of market exchange rates is not appropriate for this purpose (in particular
not for the accession countries, the currencies of which may still be grossly
undervalued and which experience wide currency fluctuations). Alternative
converters are purchasing power parities (PPPs), or – preferably – branch-
specific unit value ratios (UVR) which compare prices of representative prod-
ucts. UVR estimates for the year 1996 are available for the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland relative to Germany from a recent research project
jointly conducted by the WIIW and the University of Groningen [see
Monnikhof and van Ark (2002)]. This study estimated labour productivity in
the Hungarian manufacturing industry in 1996 to be just below 40 %, that
in the Czech Republic 35 % and in Poland 25 % of the German level.
Box 4.1 Decomposition of Unit Labour Costs (ULCs)
Unit labour costs (ULC) are defined as labour costs per unit of gross manufacturing output (OUT). Labour costs are
average gross wages plus indirect wage costs per person (W) multiplied by the number of persons employed (EMP).
ULC = (W * EMP) / OUT
Labour productivity (LP) is defined as output per employed person:
LP = OUT / EMP
Changes in labour productivity (dLP) can be approximated as:
dLP = dOUT – dEMP
Thus, unit labour costs may be rewritten: 
ULC = W / (OUT / EMP) = W / LP
Accordingly, any change in unit labour costs (dULC) can be decomposed in the following way:
dULC = dW – dLP = dW – dOUT + dEMP
ULC will rise (and cost competitiveness decline) when the increase in labour costs is higher than the increase in produc-
tivity, and vice versa. Productivity changes are determined by the relative growth rates of output and employment: labour
productivity will increase (decrease) if output growth is faster (slower) than employment growth. At given labour costs,
increased productivity will reduce unit labour costs and increase cost competitiveness.
For cross-country comparisons, labour costs in national currency are converted into a common currency (in the analysis
of this chapter, into the euro, using current exchange rates). Thus, also variations of the exchange rate will have an







































Table 4.5 Labour productivity levels in manufacturing in 2001 and average growth in 1995-2001 (%)
Czech Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovak Slovenia Bulgaria Romania
Republic (year 2000) (year 2000) Republic
% of EU-15 level in 2000, using 1999 PPPs for gross fixed capital formation
D Manufacturing total 40.6 17.4 47.9 14.9 16.5 36.2 36.5 40.4 18.6 19.3
% of EU-15 level in 2000, using 1999 PPPs for total GDP
D Manufacturing total 58.6 29.8 71.3 24.5 28.9 48.5 62.1 47.5 29.2 27.1
Comparison to the national average for total manufacturing
D Manufacturing total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
DA Food products; beverages and tobacco 132 129 88 126 1) 114 1) 118 106 160 133 215
DB Textiles and textile products 48 65 26 54 69 37 25 49 33 35
DC Leather and leather products 30 68 20 39 97 44 31 45 34 29
DD Wood and wood products 106 113 41 101 70 78 53 54 83 79
DE Pulp, paper & paper products; publishing & printing 116 142 96 105 98 128 135 103 95 143
DF Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 1103 . 245 . 692 614 599 31 841 751
DG Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 166 164 130 96 274 158 129 211 183 180
DH Rubber and plastic products 104 107 85 160 147 106 111 90 77 118
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 90 129 68 129 68 87 72 88 120 78
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal products 88 89 77 79 2) 68 99 106 79 132 165
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 76 79 58 74 45 67 64 114 64 68
DL Electrical and optical equipment 80 80 163 113 3) 109 114 69 80 79 70
DM Transport equipment 159 113 280 71 85 135 296 237 59 71
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 72 67 4) 37 78 61 69 77 86 47 53
Other 210 5)
Average growth of labour productivity in 1995-2001, % p.a.
D Manufacturing total 7.2 10.6 12.7 7.5 6.4 9.6 8.2 3.6 2.2 5.4
Notes: 1) Without ISIC 16: Tobacco products. 2) Without ISIC 27: Basic metals. 3) Without ISIC 30: Office, accounting and computing machinery and ISIC 33: Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks. 4)
DF+DN. 5) ISIC groups 16, 23, 27, 30 and 33.
Methodological note: Productivity is defined as gross production per employee. 
For a cross-country comparison, data in national currencies were converted with purchasing power parities (PPPs). PPPs were adopted from the European Comparison Programme 1999 – see Eurostat (2001). The first set of
estimates above is based on a conversion of national productivity figures using 1999 PPPs for gross fixed capital formation. Given their close correspondence to the theoretically superior unit value ratio (UVR)-based produc-
tivity data (see footnote 78) for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (UVRs are not available for other ACs), and assuming that a similar correspondence between UVR and PPPs for gross fixed capital formation exists for
other acceding countries as well, productivity levels expressed at PPPs for gross fixed capital formation should be closer to reality – at least for the manufacturing industry as a whole. However, for reasons of consistency with
the presentation of average labour costs in Table 4.5, the above presentation by industry is based on 1999 PPPs for total GDP. These give higher estimates of relative productivity levels in the acceding countries (prices of 
fixed capital in the Central and East European countries are relatively high, presumably due to imports of machinery and equipment).
Sources:WIIW estimates based on national statistics, OECD, EUROSTAT and UNIDO.Chapter 4 — EU enlargement and competitiveness of manufacturing
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Average monthly labour costs in manufacturing in the
ten Central and East European acceding and candi-
date countries are significantly below those in EU-15.
If average monthly labour costs in manufacturing are
converted into euros using current exchange rates,
the acceding and candidate countries fall between 5
(Bulgaria) and 34 (Slovenia) % of the EU level (Table
4.6). Given the lower overall price levels, the
purchasing power of wages in these acceding and
candidate countries is higher: when converted using
purchasing power parities for total GDP, labour costs
in the acceding  and candidate countries are between
16-53 % of the EU level.
The higher-productivity acceding or candidate
countries also pay higher wages than the lower-
productivity group. In Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic, average
labour costs per employee are in the range of 14-34
% of those in EU-15 (using current exchange rates).
In the lower-productivity group – the Baltic States,
Bulgaria and Romania – average labour costs per
employee vary between 5-9 % those in EU-15.
Comparisons at the level of individual manufacturing
industries similarly show a link between productivity
and wages: wages tend to be higher in the higher-
productivity industries. Nonetheless, productivity
differences across industries are much wider than
wage differences. Furthermore, the differences in
wage growth across manufacturing industries have
been small in comparison to differences in productivity
growth, implying that the differences in cost competi-
tiveness across industries continue to increase.
Since 1995, real wage growth – expressed in
national currencies – in the Central and East Euro-
pean acceding and candidate countries has varied
between an annual –2 % (Bulgaria) and +6 %
(Poland; see Table 4.6). However, given the appre-
ciation of the currencies of these countries, labour
costs expressed in euros – converted using current
exchange rates – have risen clearly faster (between
8 and 21 % per year in nominal terms, except in
Slovenia where growth averaged 3 %).
Average manufacturing productivity in the Central
and East European acceding and candidate countries
is lower than in EU-15. However, their lower wages
more than compensate for the competitive disad-
vantage on the productivity side. Average labour
costs per unit of output in total manufacturing range
from 17 % (Bulgaria) to 72 % (Slovenia) of those in
EU-15 (Table 4.7). More detailed comparisons with
Austria (data to allow comparisons with EU-15 were
not available) show that in some industries – leather
and wood – the price competitiveness of Slovenia is
actually inferior to that of Austria. Of the ten Central
and East European acceding and candidate coun-
tries, Slovenia has the second highest labour produc-
tivity after Hungary, while labour costs – though far
below those in EU-15 – are higher than in the other
countries, which reduces the relative cost competi-
tiveness of Slovenia.
In all the other Central and East European acceding
and candidate countries, unit labour costs are less
than half of those in EU-15. The cost competitive-
ness of Hungary, the Slovak Republic, the Czech
Republic and Poland is based mainly on their rela-
tively high labour productivity, while the competi-
tive advantage of Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic
States lies essentially in the low level of labour costs.
Over the period 1995-2001, unit labour costs in
manufacturing increased in all countries except
Hungary, where they declined at an average rate of
just above 1 per cent (Table 4.7). Differences in the
growth of unit labour costs across individual indus-
tries are determined mainly by differences in labour
productivity growth (differences in wage growth
across industries are typically much smaller, while
exchange rate movements have the same impact
on all domestic industries). Industry data confirm
that industries with higher productivity growth
have improved their price competitiveness faster
than others.80 In general, competitiveness gains in
terms of unit labour costs have been strongest in
the technologically more sophisticated industries
such as electrical and optical equipment, and trans-
port equipment, but also in the residual group
“manufacturing n.e.c.” in which the manufacture of
furniture accounts for a large part. Industries with a
weaker performance in terms of cost competitive-
ness include in most acceding countries the food
and beverages industry, textiles, leather, wood,
paper and printing, coke and petroleum products
and chemicals.
Data presented in this section have shown that
productivity catch-up towards the levels in the
present EU-15 is underway. However, a full catch-up
will be a long process which will take place over a
number of years. If wage levels converge before
productivity levels, price competitiveness will suffer
a serious setback. Moreover, exchange rate move-
ments may have significant effects on price compet-
itiveness - the currencies of many acceding coun-
tries are currently undervalued, and their apprecia-
tion would have adverse effects on price competi-
80 Appendix 4.A.2 gives the details on the evolution of unit labour costs in








































Table 4.6 Average monthly labour costs per employee in manufacturing in 2001 and average growth in 1995-2001 (%)
Czech Estonia1) Hungary Latvia 1) Lithuania1) Poland Slovak Slovenia Bulgaria Romania
Republic (year (year  Republic
2000) 2000)
% of EU-15 level in 2000, using current exchange rates
D Manufacturing total 17.7 9.3 20.5 8.0 7.2 22.2 13.6 34.0 5.1 6.8
p.m. Manufacturing total (euro) 581 305 673 263 235 729 446 1117 167 222
% of EU-15 level in 2000, using 1999 PPPs for total GDP
D Manufacturing total 40.1 19.9 42.8 16.5 16.1 39.5 37 52.7 18.9 19.3
Comparison to the national average for total manufacturing
D Manufacturing total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
DA Food products; beverages and tobacco 96 100 98 104 4) 97 4) 94 92 110 100 88
DB Textiles and textile products 70 81 60 91 88 63 66 75 70 66
DC Leather and leather products 64 80 59 68 81 65 69 78 65 65
DD Wood and wood products 78 100 63 87 66 72 75 84 71 63
DE Pulp, paper & paper products; publishing 
& printing 115 165 109 143 136 128 118 118 107 130
DF Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 155 103 5) 231 . . 202 166 109 247 233
DG Chemicals, chemical products 
and man-made fibres 124 . 160 123 172 150 118 160 144 164
DH Rubber and plastic products 102 99 103 80 97 97 115 101 88 106
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 106 135 105 101 103 104 108 100 120 103
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal products 105 116 90 93 6) 96 107 120 99 131 134
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 105 104 100 95 105 108 99 97 108 119
DL Electrical and optical equipment 100 113 107 100 7) 132 120 92 101 102 122
DM Transport equipment 121 121 129 107 150 121 127 110 111 130
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 84 92 66 87 86 77 85 85 70 71
Average growth in 1995-2001, % p.a.
— nominal growth, in national currency 10.2 14.5 2) 16.5 8.2 13.1 2) 18.5 11.2 9.5 72.1 3) 58.3
— real growth, in national currency 
(deflated by national CPI) 3.5 4.4 3) 2.1 1.9 5.0 2) 6.3 2.9 1.1 -2.0 3) -0.4
— nominal growth, in euro 
(current exchange rates) 10.3 13.3 2) 7.9 11.8 20.9 2) 15.4 9.0 3.3 8.1 3) 8.0
Notes: 1) Monthly labour costs are approximated by monthly gross wages. 2) 1995-2000. 3) 1996-2001. 4) Without ISIC 16: Tobacco products. 5) DF+DG. 6) Without ISIC 27: Basic metals. 7) Without ISIC 30: Office, accounting and
computing machinery and ISIC 33: Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks.
Methodological notes: Labour costs refer to average gross wages, including indirect labour costs, per manufacturing employee per month. PPPs are purchasing power parities for total GDP.

































































Table 4.7 Unit labour costs in manufacturing in 2001 and average growth in 1995-2001 (%)
Czech Estonia1) Hungary Latvia1) Lithuania1) Poland Slovak Slovenia Bulgaria Romania
Republic (year (year  Republic
2000) 2000)
% of EU-15 level in 2000
D Manufacturing total 30 31 29 33 25 46 22 72 17 25
% of Austrian level in 2001
D Manufacturing total 28 40 26 42 32 42 20 66 16 23
DA Food products; beverages and tobacco 24 37 34 42 34 39 20 53 14 12
DB Textiles and textile products 31 38 48 54 32 56 41 78 27 34
DC Leather and leather products 74 58 96 89 35 78 55 144 39 65
DD Wood and wood products 23 39 46 40 36 44 32 113 15 20
DE Pulp, paper & paper products; publishing & printing 27 45 30 56 40 41 17 74 18 20
DF Coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel 21 . 135 . . 75 30 . 26 41
DG Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 26 . 40 69 25 49 23 62 16 24
DH Rubber and plastic products 22 31 26 17 18 31 17 60 15 17
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 25 32 30 25 38 38 22 56 12 24
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal products 29 44 26 41 36 39 19 70 14 16
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 33 44 39 45 63 58 27 48 23 33
DL Electrical and optical equipment 32 52 16 34 34 40 24 76 19 35
DM Transport equipment 30 60 17 88 82 53 12 43 43 59
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 25 . 37 37 37 37 18 52 19 26
Average growth in 1995-2001, % p.a.
D Manufacturing total 3.3 2.4 -7.8 6.0 13.8 3.0 1.5 3.6 4.7 0.0
Footnote: 1) Calculated using gross wages.
Methodological notes: Unit labour costs were calculated using 1999 purchasing power parities (PPPs) for total GDP from Eurostat (2001) to convert the value of output (productivity) into euros, while labour costs were converted into
euros using current exchange rates. In other words, output comparisons across countries are based on the real value of production (“physical units”), while labour costs are compared in nominal terms. Labour is seen as immobile,
while output is considered a tradable good (the last should be a reasonable assumption for the manufacturing sector).
Because of delays in the release of data for many EU countries and problems of consistency at the level of individual industries, Austria was used as the benchmark for the comparisons of individual industries.
Average growth of unit labour costs is defined as the growth of nominal labour costs (in euros, converted using current exchange rates) divided by the growth rate of labour productivity (output measured in national currency at
constant 1999 prices).
Sources: WIIW estimates based on national statistics and Eurostat.European competitiveness report 2003
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tiveness. These considerations emphasise the need
for further rapid advances in terms of productivity
in the acceding countries.
4.5 Manufacturing trade
performance of the acceding
countries
4.5.1 Market shares and trade balances
Following the liberalisation at the beginning of the
1990s, trade between EU-15 and the Central and East
European countries has increased rapidly. The EU has
become the most important trading partner for all
Central and East European acceding and candidate
countries: now between 50-55% (Lithuania and
Bulgaria) and 75 % (Hungary) of their total exports
go to the EU – shares which are higher than those of
several current EU-15 members. The share of EU-15
in the total imports of these acceding and candidate
countries tends to be lower than its share in their
exports, largely because they import energy and raw
materials from other sources (mainly from the CIS).
This section discusses developments in trade in
manufactured goods, which represents more than
90 % of the total trade of the Central and East Euro-
pean acceding and candidate countries with EU-15.
After a short introduction on the changes in market
shares and trade balances, exports of the Central and
East European acceding and candidate countries to
EU-15 are analysed by looking at the role of different
types of industries: technology-intensive industries
are contrasted with labour-intensive, and the
performance of high-skill industries is compared to
that of low-skill industries. Finally, some observations
are made regarding the importance of intra-industry
trade and evidence on quality differentials in the
trade between these countries and EU-15.
Over the period 1995-2001, the share of the ten
Central and East European acceding and candidate
countries in total manufacturing imports into EU-15
(including intra- and extra-EU trade) increased by 1.8
percentage points to 5 %. Preliminary data from
national statistics indicate a further improvement of
trade balances and additional market share gains in
the EU in 2002 [see Podkaminer et.al. (2003), UN
ECE (2003)].
Not only the acceding and candidate countries, but
also China recorded a significant increase –
1.5 percentage points – in its share of manufac-
turing imports into EU (Graph 4.6). China’s largest
gains were partly in the same industries where also
the acceding and candidate countries increased
their market share: textiles, electrical engineering
and in the residual category manufacturing n.e.c. In
addition, China recorded large gains in leather
industry. The market share of US exporters in EU-15
manufacturing imports rose by 1.2 percentage
points, with particularly large gains in transport
equipment and chemicals.
The increasing share of several third countries in
total EU-15 manufacturing imports coincided with a
decline in the relative importance of imports from
other EU-15 countries: the share of intra-EU imports
in the total declined by 4.6 percentage points. Also
Japanese exporters experienced a loss in their EU-15
market share, equal to 0.7 percentage points; their
losses were particularly large in the electrical engi-
neering industry. 
Among the individual acceding and candidate coun-
tries, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland
recorded the largest gains. The main losers in terms of
market shares were Italy, Germany, France and Sweden.
Looking at individual manufacturing industries, the
market share gains of the acceding and candidate
countries after 1995 were largest in wood and
wood products, transport equipment, rubber and
plastic, textiles, electrical engineering and manufac-
turing n.e.c (mainly furniture). In these industries,
the market shares of the ten Central and East Euro-
pean acceding and candidate countries increased
by 3-4 percentage points. These countries increased
their market shares both in sophisticated engi-
neering industries, such as electrical engineering,
and in more labour-intensive, low-skill industries
such as textiles or wood.
Correlation analysis between market share gains
and losses on an enlarged EU market was carried
out in order to get some indications on which
countries the future EU members mainly compete
with. The analysis looked at changes in market
shares across all 3-digit NACE subsections of manu-
facturing in an “enlarged EU-25”, that is, covering
trade flows within the present EU-15 (“intra-EU
trade”) and between EU-15 and the ten Central and
East European acceding and candidate countries.81
Within an EU-25 so defined, the ten Central and
East European acceding and candidate countries
accounted for 6.1 % of all trade in manufactured
goods in 2001 – an increase of 2.6 percentage
points from 1995. 
81 Data for trade among the accession countries were not available and are thus
not included.Chapter 4 — EU enlargement and competitiveness of manufacturing
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The results suggest that the ten Central and East
European acceding and candidate countries
compete mainly with exporters from Spain, Portugal,
Ireland, Austria, Germany and France. On the basis of
the statistically significant correlation coefficients, the
Czech Republic appears to compete on the European
market mainly with Ireland and Spain; Hungary with
Austria, Germany and France; Poland with Austria
and France; Estonia with Sweden and Denmark.
Bulgaria and Romania compete mostly with Portugal
and Greece, but also with Italy.
Trade balances of the ten Central and East European
acceding and candidate countries with the EU have
traditionally been negative. Nevertheless, their
overall manufacturing trade deficit has declined
from the peak of EUR 18.4 billion in 1997, reaching
EUR 10.9 billion in 2001. At present, Hungary (since
1997), the Czech Republic and Slovakia (both since
1999) record surpluses in their trade with EU-15.
In the period 1995-2001, the strongest exporting
industries of the Central and East European
acceding and candidate countries were wood,
textiles and manufacturing n.e.c. (mainly furniture),
in which most of them recorded growing surpluses
with EU-15. In contrast, most of these countries
registered large trade deficits with the EU in the
chemicals, rubber and plastic, machinery as well as
pulp, paper and printing industries.82
4.5.2 Trade in technology- 
and skill-intensive products
Earlier studies [e.g. Dobrinsky and Landesmann
(1995); Landesmann (2000)] have shown that in
1989, before the transition, the structure of trade of
the Central and East European countries with EU-12
had a profile that was typical of less developed
economies. Their exports to the EU focused on
labour-intensive and energy-intensive products (the
latter reflecting the heritage of cheap energy
supplies within the CMEA), while the role of capital-
, R&D- and skill-intensive exports was limited.
This section reviews the subsequent evolution of manu-
facturing exports from the ten Central and East Euro-
pean acceding and candidate countries to the present
EU-15 using two different groupings of industries:83
82 Details on the evolution of trade balances with EU-15 by country and by
industry are given in Appendix IV.A.3. Analysis based on conventional indica-
tors of revealed comparative advantage [RCA; see Havlik (2003a)] gives
similar results with regard to the competitive strengths and weaknesses of
the ten Central and East European accession countries.
83 The division of individual industries (NACE Rev. 1, 3-digit level) according to
these two typologies is presented in Appendix 4.A.4. For details on the
underlying methodology, see Peneder (2001).
Graph 4.6 Imports of manufactured goods into EU-15: changes in market shares between 1995 and 2001
Notes: The changes depicted in the graph indicate the difference between a country’s market share in 1995 and its share in 2001 (positive values are
gains, negative values represent declining market shares). The countries covered are EU-15 members, the ten Central and East European acces-
sion countries, China, Japan and the US. Since not all the trading partners of EU-15 are covered, the gains and losses do not sum up to zero.


























































s— The first typology is based on cluster-analytic
techniques. It groups industries into five cate-
gories by using criteria on industrial organisation
and input use: mainstream, labour-intensive,
capital-intensive, marketing-driven and tech-
nology-driven industries.
— The second typology groups industries into
four categories according to their skill intensity:
low-skill, medium-skill/blue-collar, medium-
skill/white-collar, and high-skill industries.
The evolution of market shares, by industry type, of
the ten Central and East European countries on the
“enlarged EU” market is illustrated in Graph 4.7. The
largest absolute market share gain was recorded for
the labour-intensive industries. However, it is worth
noting that in relative terms, the by far most impres-
sive growth took place in technology-intensive indus-
tries, the – initially very low – market share of which
increased nearly threefold between 1995-2001.
In terms of the skill intensity of manufacturing
industries, the Central and East European countries
recorded the largest absolute market share gains in
the medium-skilled categories (Graph 4.7).
However, it is important to realise that in relative
terms, the fastest growth took place in the high-skill
industries. The evidence thus points to a catch-up:
the technology- and skill-intensive industries which
started off with the largest initial gap are now
recording the highest relative growth rates.
An analysis of the export structures, by industry type,
of the ten individual Central and East European
acceding and candidate countries points to important
differences within the region (see Graphs 4.8 and 4.9).
However, the general conclusion of rapid growth in
exports of technology- and skill-intensive industries
remains valid for the majority of these countries.
In general, labour-intensive industries are still strongly
represented in the exports of the Central and East
European countries to the EU (Graph 4.8). For
Poland, the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania, the
reliance on labour-intensive exports is particularly
strong. Moreover, the share of labour-intensive
industries in total exports to the EU increased
between 1995-2001 for Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia
and Lithuania. In the other countries, the share of
labour-intensive exports declined, for some – in
particular Hungary – quite sharply.
The most dramatic changes in the export structure
since 1995 have taken place in the group of tech-
nology-driven industries where also the hetero-
geneity among the group of ten Central and East
European acceding and candidate countries has
increased most rapidly. In Hungary and Estonia, but
also in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and
Poland, the importance of technology-driven indus-
tries has increased strongly (in fact, in many of these
countries this trend had started already before
1995). Hungary’s exports to EU-15 are already more
focused on technology-driven industries than is the
case for the exports of the present 15 EU members
European competitiveness report 2003
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Graph 4.7 Changes in the market share of Central and East European countries in the enlarged EU
market between 1995 and 2001, by manufacturing industry type
Notes: “Enlarged EU” refers to the sum of the present EU-15 and ten Central and East European accession countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia (CEEC-8), together with Bulgaria and Romania. 
Market shares within each industry category are calculated as per cent of the sum of trade flows within EU-15 (“intra-EU trade”) and between
EU-15 and the above mentioned ten acceding and candidate countries. Data for trade among the acceding and candidate countries were not
available and are hence not included. Market shares within each industry category sum up to 100 %.
The changes depicted in the graph indicate the difference between the market share the ten acceding and candidate countries in 1995 and
their share in 2001 (positive values are gains, negative values represent declining market shares). An increase in the market share of the ten
acceding and candidate countries implies a decrease of an identical size in the market share of EU-15.
For the classification of industries into the two typologies used in the graph, see Appendix 4.A.4.
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Graph 4.8 Structure of manufacturing exports of ten Central and East European countries to EU-15 by
industry type (input intensity) in 1995 and 2001, % of a country’s total manufacturing exports to EU-15
Notes: For the classification of industries into the input taxonomy, see Appendix 4.A.4.





































Mainstream industrieson average. In contrast, in Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia
and Lithuania, the role of technology-driven indus-
tries in exports to the EU remains marginal.
The share of low-skill industries in exports to EU-15
declined particularly strongly between 1995-2001 in
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland and
the Slovak Republic (Graph 4.9). In Hungary and the
Czech Republic, low-skill industries have a smaller
share in total manufacturing exports to EU-15 than is
the case for intra-EU-15 manufacturing exports. In
contrast, Bulgaria and Romania continue to rely on
European competitiveness report 2003
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Graph 4.9 Structure of manufacturing exports of ten Central and East European countries to EU-15 by
industry type (skill intensity) in 1995 and 2001,% of a country’s total manufacturing exports to EU-15
Notes: For the classification of industries into the skill taxonomy, see Appendix 4.A.4.
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low-skill industries, which account for some two
thirds of total manufacturing exports to EU-15.
The share of high-skill industries in total manufac-
turing exports to EU-15 has increased in all the
Central and East European acceding and candidate
countries except Estonia. Nevertheless, high-skill
industries are still “underrepresented” in the exports
of each of these ten countries in the sense that their
share is lower than that in intra-EU-15 trade. In
particular in the three Baltic States, the share of
high-skill industries is marginal, four per cent or less
of total manufacturing exports to EU-15.
Map 4.1 gives an overview of the present structure of
manufacturing exports of each of the present 15 EU
Map 4.1 Specialisation in manufacturing exports to EU-15 by skill- and input-intensity in 2001
Note: For the two industry typologies used, see Appendix 4.A.4.
Source: WIIW calculations based on Eurostat COMEXT.
Skill content of exports
High skill and white
collar workers >40%
High skill and white
collar workers >30%
Low skill and blue
collar workers >70%
Low skill and blue
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members as well as 11 acceding and candidate coun-
tries including Turkey but excluding Cyprus and
Malta. The large differences across the acceding and
candidate countries in the shares of technology-
driven and labour-intensive exports suggest a “core-
periphery” pattern, with the trade structures of the
most advanced acceding countries having become
rather similar to those of the present EU members.
In terms of skill intensity, the export structures of
Hungary, Estonia and the Czech Republic are rather
similar to those of the more advanced EU-15
members. High- and medium-skill industries are
also relatively important for Slovenia and the Slovak
Republic, the export structures of which are similar
to Spain. In the remaining acceding and candidate
countries, as well as Greece, the export structure is
more biased towards the lower-skill industries.
Developments in skill intensity of manufacturing
exports highlight the importance for acceding and
candidate countries of implementing the range of
reforms and initiatives in the areas of education and
training that have been agreed in the context of
accession negotiations.
4.5.3 Intra-industry trade 
and quality competition
Traditional trade theories predict that economic inte-
gration will lead to a higher degree of specialisation
according to comparative advantages, the latter
resulting from cross-country differences in produc-
tivity or in endowments. Thus, high-income countries
which are characterised by a large stock of physical
capital, well educated workers, and a high potential to
innovate, are predicted to specialise in capital-inten-
sive, technology-, skill- and research-intensive indus-
tries. The traditional trade theories are helpful in the
analysis of inter-industry trade, i.e. trade where coun-
tries exports the products of industries in which they
specialise, and import products of other industries.
However, the bulk of trade between developed
countries takes the form of intra-industry trade,
where a country is simultaneously both an exporter
and an importer of goods that fall into the same
product category. One of the contributions of the
new trade theories is to show that increasing
returns to scale give an incentive for countries to
specialise and trade even in the absence of differ-
ences in endowments and technologies between
countries. Countries specialise in different variants
of a product, and the gains from trade result from
an increased choice of differentiated products.
The new trade theories suggest that between coun-
tries which are similar in their factor intensities and
technologies, there will be little inter-industry trade
and intra-industry trade will dominate. Between
countries which are very different in their factor
intensities and technologies, specialisation occurs
Graph 4.10 Intra-industry trade between ten Central and Eastern European countries and EU-15
(Grubel-Lloyd index)
Note: The Grubel-Lloyd (GL) index = 1 – Σ [ABS(xij-mij) / Σ (xij+mij)] where xij and mij are exports and imports respectively of country i in sector j in
trade with EU-15; calculated from data at NACE rev.1 at 3-digit level.
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according to comparative advantages and inter-
industry trade will dominate.
There is ample evidence for growing intra-industry
trade between the Central and East European
acceding and candidate countries and EU-15. Intra-
industry trade is of particular importance in textiles as
well as in electrical, optical and transport equip-
ment.84 Of the individual countries, intra-industry
trade is most pronounced for the Czech Republic,
Slovenia and Hungary, and least important for
Lithuania and Latvia (Graph 4.10). Between 1995
and 2001, intra-industry trade with EU-15 grew most
rapidly for the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania,
whereas it declined slightly for Latvia and Estonia.
Intra-industry trade may reflect a different speciali-
sation of countries in a particular production stage
or product quality segment within an industry (a
phenomenon referred to as “vertical intra-industry
trade”).85 Vertical intra-industry trade also takes
place even within large multinational enterprises,
which fragment their production process geograph-
ically in order to take advantage of cross-country
price differences in production factors. Previous
studies have suggested that vertical intra-industry
trade be particularly relevant in the trade relations
between East and West European countries
[Burgstaller and Landesmann (1999), Aturupane,
Djankov and Hoekman (1999)].
Differences in export prices may reflect differences in
product quality and give evidence of specialisation in
different quality segments of a market. The position
of a country at the low-, medium- or high-quality end
of the product range can serve as an indicator of its
competitive strengths and weaknesses.86
Evidence for the ten Central and East European
acceding and candidate countries shows that the unit
values of their manufacturing exports are signifi-
cantly below the average import prices, within
narrowly defined product categories, in the EU-15
market (Graph 4.11). This gives some evidence of a
“quality gap” – quality being defined in the broad
sense, comprising consumer loyalty to particular
producers, differences in marketing and product
design, and after sales services. The average price gap
across the different manufacturing products varies
from 16 % of the average price in Bulgaria to 4 % in
Slovenia and 1 % in Lithuania. Hungary is a major
exception: it is the only acceding country which
currently sells its export products at prices which are
above the average import prices into the EU.
Notwithstanding the – in most cases still large –
existing price gaps, there has been remarkable
progress in the Central and East European countries
in closing the gaps during the past years. In addition
to Hungary, where the price gap disappeared,
Lithuania, Estonia and Romania eliminated two thirds
or more of their 1995 gap in the successive six years.
For all the current EU-15 members, the export price
“gaps” are positive (lower panel in Graph 4.11),
reflecting specialisation in the higher-quality
segment in trade in manufactured goods. Ireland,
Denmark and Austria sell at the highest prices (30-
40 % above the average), while for Portugal,
Greece and Spain, the deviations from the average
price level are of the order of 3-4 %.
Looking at industries by their input intensity, export
prices of the Central and East European acceding and
candidate countries increased fastest in technology-
driven industries, followed by mainstream industries
and skill-intensive industries [Landesmann and
Stehrer (2002)]. By 2001, technology-driven indus-
tries of these countries were already exporting to the
EU at prices above the average EU import price.
Within the group of technology-driven industries, the
most successful Central and East European acceding
countries were Hungary, the Slovak Republic and
Estonia.87 Despite the increases in export prices, the
price gap of the Central and East European acceding
and candidate countries is currently largest in the
group of mainstream industries. 
4.6 Conclusions
The analysis of the competitive position of the
Central and East European acceding and candidate
countries has concentrated on competitiveness indi-
cators for productivity, labour costs and market
shares; other important components of competitive-
ness, such as labour skills, were not covered. The
analysis suggests that a general catch-up of the future
EU Member States towards the standards of living in
87 The high unit value ratios for Hungarian and Estonian exports mimic the
experience of Ireland. They partly reflect the practice of transfer pricing by
international companies.
84 Outward processing trade (OPT) is important in these industries. OPT is a
form of international co-operation on a contractual basis between inde-
pendent firms from different countries. The contractor exports mainly semi-
processed goods to the subcontractor, who refines, assembles and finishes
the product, which is then re-imported to the contractor’s country. For a
detailed study on OPT trade in relation to the accession countries see Pelle-
grin (2001).
85 Vertical differentiation refers to different varieties of a product that are of
different quality (e.g. leather shoes, plastic shoes). In contrast, horizontal
differentiation refers to different varieties of a product that are of similar
quality (e.g. different colour and design of shoes of similar quality). 
86 However, one should be aware that, instead of improved quality, increased
relative export prices may reveal that producers have become uncompetitive
in certain branches. A closer analysis of trade competitiveness requires a joint
examination of price and market share movements.the present EU is taking place. However, large differ-
ences in the performance of individual countries
point to a risk of an emerging core-periphery pattern
among the acceding and candidate countries. 
Encouraging features of the catch-up are the rela-
tively rapid progress of many acceding countries in
technologically sophisticated industries, and the
relatively fast upward movement in intra-branch
European competitiveness report 2003
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Graph 4.11 Export price gaps – all manufacturing products traded with EU-15(% of average EU-15
import price)
Note: Export price gaps have been calculated from product-by-product comparisons at 8-digit CN level and are expressed in percentage deviations
from the average price of the products traded in EU markets (i.e. all imports into EU-15, including intra-EU trade).
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product quality. A group of more advanced
acceding countries has moved rapidly ahead in
adjusting their industrial structures to those of the
more advanced EU-15 members. In particular
Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic have rapidly reduced their speciali-
sation in labour-intensive, low-skill production and
made inroads into technology-driven and high-skill-
intensive industries.
More worrying is the evidence of a “lock-in” of
certain countries (in particular Bulgaria, Romania,
Latvia and Lithuania) in labour-intensive or natural-
resource-intensive, low-skill patterns of specialisa-
tion. As a result of the diverse patterns of specialisa-
tion, the Central and East European acceding and
candidate countries have a relatively strong pres-
ence in three groups of manufacturing industries: in
labour-intensive, low-skill branches; in natural
resource-intensive branches and in more sophisti-
cated, medium- to high-skill branches.
Challenges to the acceding countries include the
successful implementation of the existing Commu-
nity legislation. Policy measures required to satisfy
the entry conditions to the monetary union,
including exchange rate policies, are also likely to
affect the competitive position of enterprises in the
acceding countries. At the same time, the formal
accession to the internal market will further
encourage foreign direct investment in the new
Member States, and support their further integration
into pan-European production networks. Available
evidence shows that regions bordering the present
EU-15 have already benefited more strongly from
increased foreign direct investment flows, and have
seen faster improvements in their infrastructure.
Research on the expected impact of enlargement
on the current EU-15 Member States points to two
directions: in the long run, based on their stock of
human capital, the acceding countries should have
a comparative advantage in human capital intensive
industries and thus compete mainly with the
Northern EU-15 members. In the short run, analysis
of trade flows suggests that the acceding countries
have a comparative advantage in capital and labour
intensive industries, and compete mostly with the
Southern EU-15 countries (in that respect, Greece
and Portugal may be most vulnerable to competi-
tion from the new Member States). In addition, EU-
15 regions which are geographically close to the
border with the new members will be more affected
than distant regions (this applies in particular to
Germany and Austria, which already display the
highest degree of trade integration with the
acceding countries).
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Appendix 4.A.1 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing 
by Country and by Industry, 1995-2001
Titolo capitolo
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Relative productivity gains, winner and loser industries, 1995-2001
(average annual change in % for total manufacturing; for each industry, change in comparison to total
manufacturing in percentage points1))
Czech Estonia2) Hungary Latvia Lithuania2) Poland Slovak Slovenia Bulgaria Romania
Republic Republic
D Manufacturing total 7.2 10.6 12.7 7.5 6.4 9.6 8.2 3.6 2.2 5.4
DA Food products; beverages 
and tobacco -3.9 -7.2 -8.8 -4.8 -4.3 -3.6 -4.1 -0.6 -2.0 6.7
DB Textiles and textile products -4.9 2.8 -6.5 0.5 -2.3 -1.4 -8.6 0.2 -0.6 -5.1
DC Leather and leather products -16.1 3.7 -9.1 -2.1 9.8 -2.6 0.3 -6.0 -2.0 -2.8
DD Wood and wood products -1.8 15.4 -8.0 -2.0 0.1 -1.7 -2.9 -8.6 6.1 -4.2
DE Pulp, paper & paper products; 
publishing & printing -1.7 0.8 -0.8 -0.6 -5.2 -1.2 3.6 -7.0 -4.9 -8.2
DF Coke, refined petroleum products 
& nuclear fuel -2.6 . -7.9 . -12.2 -4.7 -4.0 . -1.5 0.5
DG Chemicals, chemical products 
and man-made fibres 0.4 4.8 -9.5 -4.2 11.2 -0.8 -2.2 2.3 1.3 -3.6
DH Rubber and plastic products 1.4 -2.6 -7.4 10.2 0.0 -0.2 -2.9 -2.0 -2.2 -7.6
DI Other non-metallic mineral products -0.4 4.6 -5.0 11.2 1.3 1.0 -2.4 1.6 5.3 1.1
DJ Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products -6.8 4.1 -6.1 3.3 -3.2 -1.7 -6.7 -2.1 2.8 -0.8
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 5.4 3.7 -6.9 -5.3 -2.7 0.7 -0.2 -1.5 3.3 4.6
DL Electrical and optical equipment 13.3 7.0 18.7 18.1 24.0 4.4 2.7 3.3 7.4 -0.8
DM Transport equipment 2.8 5.6 6.7 -0.2 13.3 6.3 18.8 6.5 -3.2 6.0
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 1.2 1.2 -5.3 1.0 -4.2 -0.6 0.8 3.1 7.2 6.3
Notes: 1) Relative gains for each industry represent the difference, in percentage points, between the growth rate of labour productivity in that
industry and the average growth rate of labour productivity in total manufacturing (D). For instance, the relative gain in industry DA= DA
(1995-2001) - D (1995-2001). 
2) 1995-2000.
Source: WIIW estimates based on national statistics, WIIW calculations.160
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Relative changes in unit labour costs, 1995 – 2001 (average annual change in % for total manufac-
turing; for each industry, change in comparison to total manufacturing in percentage points1))
Czech Estonia2) Hungary Latvia Lithuania2) Poland Slovak Slovenia Bulgaria Romania
Republic Republic
D Manufacturing total 3.3 2.4 -7.8 6.0 13.8 3.0 1.5 3.6 4.7 0.0
DA Food products; beverages 
and tobacco 4.0 2.9 7.1 0.7 2.6 3.5 3.9 0.3 0.8 -5.8
DB Textiles and textile products 4.1 -3.3 5.8 0.8 -0.3 0.5 8.5 -2.8 1.9 2.5
DC Leather and leather products 14.9 -4.6 9.8 2.0 -11.5 0.4 -1.1 5.7 2.1 -1.1
DD Wood and wood products 1.0 -10.0 6.5 2.4 -5.3 2.3 -0.4 6.2 -4.5 1.3
DE Pulp, paper & paper products; 
publishing & printing 2.9 3.8 -0.2 4.9 6.5 1.7 -1.0 9.3 6.5 6.7
DF Coke, refined petroleum products 
& nuclear fuel 5.1 . 11.1 . . 2.1 2.1 . -1.8 6.4
DG Chemicals, chemical products 
and man-made fibres 1.9 . 11.7 4.0 -9.7 2.9 1.6 1.9 -1.9 7.0
DH Rubber and plastic products -1.3 0.1 9.5 -13.2 9.2 -1.7 2.2 0.0 -0.4 6.7
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 0.4 1.3 6.8 -5.4 -3.7 0.4 3.3 -0.4 -3.6 -1.8
DJ Basic metals and fabricated 
metal products 4.6 -2.4 4.5 0.8 -0.6 -0.7 5.4 -0.4 -2.5 0.9
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. -4.4 -1.7 5.8 6.1 5.2 -1.0 -0.8 2.4 9.7 -2.5
DL Electrical and optical equipment -10.8 -1.7 -13.1 -10.2 -5.9 -3.5 -2.2 -4.7 -5.3 2.6
DM Transport equipment -2.6 -4.8 -9.4 2.1 -10.7 -4.8 -14.4 -5.5 -0.1 -1.7
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. -1.6 n.a 4.9 -1.9 4.7 -1.1 -1.9 -1.0 -7.7 -8.7
Notes: 1) Relative gains for each industry represent the difference, in percentage points, between the growth rate of unit labour costs in that industry
and the average growth rate of unit labour costs in total manufacturing (D). For instance, the relative gain in industry DA = DA (1995-2001) -
D (1995-2001). Negative (positive) values thus indicate larger (smaller) gains in cost competitiveness than the average for total manufacturing.
2) 1995-2000. 3) 1996-2001.
Methodological note: Labour costs refer to average gross wages, including indirect labour costs, per manufacturing employee per month. PPPs
are 1999 purchasing power parities for total GDP.
Source: WIIW estimates based on national statistics.
Appendix 4.A.2 Growth of Labour Costs in Manufacturing by
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Evolution of trade balances with EU-15 by manufacturing industry in ten acceding and candidate
countries, 1995-2001
CZ EE HU LV LT PL SK SI BG RO Positive Number Number 
countries of “+” of “-”
(max 30)(max 30)
DA Food products; 
beverages and 
tobacco —- — ++ — - - — — ++ — 2 4 15
DB Textiles and 
textile 
products +++ +++ + +++ +++ + ++ —- +++ +++ 9 22 3
DC Leather and 
leather 
products ———— +— - + + + — - + + + + +4 91 4
DD Wood and 
wood products ++ +++ + +++ ++ +++ +++ + ++ +++ 10 23 0




printing — - — —- — — + —- — —- 1 1 20
DF Coke, refined 
petroleum 
products & 





fibres —- —- —- —- — —- —- —- —- —- 0 0 29
DH Rubber and 




products +++ — —- — — — ++ - ++47 1 2
DJ Basic metals 
and fabricated 
metal products + — —- + + + ++ - +++ ++ 7 11 6
DK Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c. - —- —- —- —- —- - - —- — 0 0 23
DL Electrical and 
optical 
equipment - +++ +++ —- —- —- — —- —- —- 2 6 21
DM Transport 
equipment +++ —- +++ —- —- —- +++ - —- —- 3 9 19
DN Manufacturing 
n.e.c. +++ +++ + + +++ +++ +++ +++ - +++ 9 23 1
Number of positive 
industries 6575649266
Number of “+” 
(out of 42 max) 15 15 13 10 13 8 20 4 13 15
Number of “-” 
(out of 42 max) 18 21 19 24 19 24 11 25 19 21
Legend for evaluation:
—- Rising deficit + Small or declining surplus
— Low or stable deficit ++ Stable surplus
- Declining deficit +++ Growing surplus
Note: The evaluation is based on a qualitative assessment by WIIW.
Source: Data from Eurostat COMEXT.
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176 Knitted and crocheted fabrics
177 Knitted and crocheted articles
212 Articles of paper and paperboard
243 Paints, coatings, printing ink
251 Rubber products
252 Plastic products
261 Glass and glass products
266 Articles of concrete, plaster and cement
268 Other non-metallic mineral products
272 Tubes
287 Other fabricated metal products
291 Machinery for production, use of mech. power
292 Other general purpose machinery
293 Agricultural and forestry machinery
295 Other special purpose machinery
296 Weapons and ammunition
297 Domestic appliances n. e. c.
311 Electric motors, generators and transformers
313 Isolated wire and cable
314 Accumulators, primary cells and primary
batteries
315 Lighting equipment and electric lamps
354 Motorcycles and bicycles
355 Other transport equipment n. e. c.
2. Labour intensive industries
172 Textile weaving
174 Made-up textile articles
181 Leather clothes
182 Other wearing apparel and accessories
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur
201 Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of wood
202 Panels and boards of wood
203 Builders' carpentry and joinery
204 Wooden containers
205 Other products of wood; articles of cork, etc.
262 Ceramic goods
264 Bricks, tiles and construction products
267 Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone
281 Structural metal products
283 Steam generators
294 Machine-tools
316 Electrical equipment n. e. c.
342 Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers
351 Ships and boats
352 Railway locomotives and rolling stock
361 Furniture
362 Jewellery and related articles
3. Capital intensive industries
171 Textile fibres
211 Pulp, paper and paperboard
232 Refined petroleum and nuclear fuel
241 Basic chemicals
247 Man-made fibres
263 Ceramic tiles and flags
265 Cement, lime and plaster
271 Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC)
273 Other first processing of iron and steel
274 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
343 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles
4. Marketing driven industries
151 Meat products
152 Fish and fish products
153 Fruits and vegetables
154 Vegetable and animal oils and fats
155 Dairy products; ice cream
156 Grain mill products and starches
157 Prepared animal feeds
158 Other food products
159 Beverages
160 Tobacco products
191 Tanning and dressing of leather




245 Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes
282 Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radiators and
boilers
286 Cutlery, tools and general hardware
335 Watches and clocks
363 Musical instruments
364 Sports goods
365 Games and toys
366 Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c.
5. Technology driven industries
242 Pesticides, other agro-chemical products
244 Pharmaceuticals
246 Other chemical products
300 Office machinery and computers
312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus
321 Electronic valves and tubes, other electronic
comp.
322 TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for line
telephony
323 TV, radio and recording apparatus
331 Medical equipment
332 Instruments for measuring, checking, testing,
navigating
334 Optical instruments and photographic
equipment
341.0 Motor vehicles
353.0 Aircraft and spacecraft
Taxonomy 1 — factor inputs
NACE Industry  clusters
rev.1
NACE Industry  clusters
rev.1
Appendix 4.A.4 Industry groupings (WIFO Taxonomies)APPENDIX 4A
163
1. Low skill industries
151 Meat products
152 Fish and fish products
153 Fruits and vegetables
154 Vegetable and animal oils and fats
155 Dairy products; ice cream
156 Grain mill products and starches
157 Prepared animal feeds





174 Made-up textile articles
175 Other textiles
176 Knitted and crocheted fabrics
177 Knitted and crocheted articles
181 Leather clothes
182 Other wearing apparel and accessories
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur
191 Tanning and dressing of leather




261 Glass and glass products
262 Ceramic goods
263 Ceramic tiles and flags
264 Bricks, tiles and construction products
265 Cement, lime and plaster
266 Articles of concrete, plaster and cement
267 Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone
268 Other non-metallic mineral products
271 Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC)
272 Tubes
273 Other first processing of iron and steel
274 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
2. Medium skill/blue collar workers
201 Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of wood
202 Panels and boards of wood
203 Builders' carpentry and joinery
204 Wooden containers
205 Other products of wood; articles of cork, etc.
281 Structural metal products
282 Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radiators and
boilers
283 Steam generators
286 Cutlery, tools and general hardware
287 Other fabricated metal products
341 Motor vehicles
342 Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers
343 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles
351 Ships and boats
352 Railway locomotives and rolling stock
354 Motorcycles and bicycles
355 Other transport equipment n. e. c.
361 Furniture
362 Jewellery and related articles
363 Musical instruments
364 Sports goods
365 Games and toys
366 Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c.
3. Medium skill/white collar workers
211 Pulp, paper and paperboard
212 Articles of paper and paperboard
221 Publishing
222 Printing
232 Refined petroleum and nuclear fuel
241 Basic chemicals
242 Pesticides, other agro-chemical products
243 Paints, coatings, printing ink
245 Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes
246 Other chemical products
247 Man-made fibres
297 Domestic appliances n. e. c.
311 Electric motors, generators and transformers
312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus
313 Isolated wire and cable
314 Accumulators, primary cells and primary
batteries
315 Lighting equipment and electric lamps
316 Electrical equipment n. e. c.
321 Electronic valves and tubes, other electronic
comp.
322 TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for line
telephony
323 TV, radio and recording apparatus
331 Medical equipment
332 Instruments for measuring, checking, testing,
navigating
334 Optical instruments and photographic
equipment
335 Watches and clocks
4. High skill industries
244 Pharmaceuticals
291 Machinery for production, use of mech. power
292 Other general purpose machinery
293 Agricultural and forestry machinery
294 Machine-tools
295 Other special purpose machinery
296 Weapons and ammunition
300 Office machinery and computers
353 Aircraft and spacecraft
Taxonomy 2 – labour skills
NACE Industry  clusters
rev.1
NACE Industry  clusters
rev.1
Source: Peneder, M. (2001), Entrepreneurial Competition and Industrial Location, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.European competitiveness report 2003
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Appendix 4.A.5: Trends in
concentration and
specialisation of
manufacturing in EU-15 and
the Central and East European
accession countries
4.A.5.1 Introduction
The process of European integration during the past
decade was marked with the Single Market
programme and the Economic and Monetary
Union. The main objectives of the Single Market
programme were the elimination of non-tariff
barriers to trade in goods and services within the
European Union, and the further liberalisation of
cross-border movements of production factors. In
1999, the Economic and Monetary Union rein-
forced the single market by eliminating the
exchange rate risk in trade within the euro area.
These policies significantly reduced the transaction
costs in trade within the EU.
At the beginning of the 1990s, trade liberalisation
between the acceding and candidate countries and
EU-15 led to an intensification of the trade relations
between the two groups. The future EU enlarge-
ment will further deepen the integration of the
acceding countries into the economic structures of
the EU. Differences in geographic proximity to the
acceding countries and in industrial specialisation
suggest that the effects of the enlargement should
on the current Member States.
All the different theoretical approaches to trade
predict that trade liberalisation should lead to
increasing specialisation across countries. High
specialisation can reflect an efficient exploitation of
the comparative advantages of countries, but may
also involve risks. More pronounced patterns of
industrial specialisation across Europe could result in
increasing income differences between a rich core
and a poor periphery in the case where the
periphery becomes locked into mature, declining
industries or low-quality products. Furthermore, a
far-reaching specialisation of individual countries or
regions in narrow product groups can render them
excessively vulnerable to sector-specific shocks.
This Appendix looks at the trends in the location of
industries and country specialisation in Europe
during the 1990s, and makes some suggestions on
potential changes following the forthcoming
enlargement in 2004. The next section reviews the
main predictions of economic theories on location.
The third section surveys the existing empirical
studies on the specialisation of countries and
geographical concentration of industries within the
EU and the Central and East European acceding
countries. The fourth section provides new data on
specialisation and concentration in these countries,
and the final section concludes with some implica-
tions for future location patterns within the
enlarged EU.
4.A.5.2 Specialisation and geographic
concentration in an enlarged Europe:
theoretical background
This section provides a brief overview of the predic-
tions of the main schools in location theory: tradi-
tional trade theory, new trade theory and new
economic geography. This overview is completed
by a brief presentation of multinationalisation theo-
ries, which focus on the role of foreign direct
investment and subcontracting strategies of multi-
national corporations on specialisation patterns.
Location theory88
Most trade models predict that economic integration
leads to a higher specialisation of countries. The para-
digms differ, however, in terms of the determinants
of the specialisation process and, as a consequence,
in terms of the locations where they predict produc-
tion to concentrate. The central assumptions behind
traditional trade theories are perfect competition,
homogenous products and non-increasing returns to
scale. These models predict that economic integra-
tion leads to a higher degree of specialisation
according to comparative advantages. The compara-
tive advantages of countries and regions are deter-
mined by their productivity and by their factor
endowments. High-income countries, which are
characterised by a large stock of physical capital, a
well educated labour force and a high potential to
innovate, are predicted to specialise in capital-inten-
sive, technology-, skill- and research-intensive indus-
tries with a high incidence of product and process
innovations. In industries where product differentia-
tion is important, these countries specialise in prod-
ucts of the upper quality segment.
Traditional trade theory can explain a substantial
proportion of inter-industry trade, that is, trade
88 The review of the location models in this section aims to highlight some of
the main mechanisms at work and not to survey the literature. For a compre-
hensive survey on location theory, see Wolfmayr-Schnitzer (1999). Ottaviano
and Puga (1998) and Fujita and Thisse (2002) provide overviews of new
economic geography, while Neary (2001) provides a critical assessment.APPENDIX 4A
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where the exports of a country belong a different
product category than its imports. However, tradi-
tional trade theory fails to explain why different
production structures are found in regions and
countries which have similar factor endowments
and production technologies. The bulk of the trade
between developed countries is not inter-industry,
but intra-industry trade, that is, a country is both an
exporter and an importer of differentiated goods
that fall into the same product category.
The  new trade theory stresses scale economies,
product differentiation and imperfect (monopo-
listic) competition. The main conclusion is that
increasing returns to scale give an incentive to
specialise and trade even in the absence of differ-
ences in endowments and technologies between
countries. According to one class of new trade
theory models, regional concentration can result
from scale economies which are external to the
firm: specialised supply,89 pooled labour markets, or
knowledge spillovers.90 With external economies of
scale, the larger the size of the local industry, the
lower the costs. Scale economies at industry level
form the basis for a regional concentration of indus-
tries. 
In a second category of new trade theory models,
trade provides a means to extend the market and to
exploit scale economies which are internal to the
firm. In the presence of transport costs, firms with
internal increasing returns to scale concentrate their
production in large regions or more generally in
regions with good market access (‘the core’)
moving away from remote regions (‘the periphery’).
Firms locate in larger markets in order to have lower
transport costs. 
According to new trade theory, a demand bias in
favour of a particular good creates a large home
market for this good, and the interaction of
economies of scale and trade costs typically leads to
net exports (‘home market effect’). Cross-country
differences in expenditure structure can thus deter-
mine the production structure and industry loca-
tion; according to new trade theory, industries are
more concentrated the more concentrated the
demand for their goods. Countries or regions with a
good access to markets tend to specialise in indus-
tries where the home market effect is strong.
Another main conclusion of new trade theory is that
both inter-industry trade, reflecting comparative
advantages,91 and intra-industry trade, reflecting
scale economies and demand preferences, may take
place in parallel. The relative importance of intra-
industry trade in comparison to inter-industry trade
depends on the degree of similarity in demand and
production structures. If two countries are very
similar in their factor intensities and technologies,
there will be little inter-industry trade, and intra-
industry trade will dominate. If, in contrast, coun-
tries differ widely in their factor intensities and tech-
nologies, trade will be based essentially on compar-
ative advantages. Where intra-industry trade domi-
nates, the effects of increased trade on income
distribution between the countries are small, and
the gains from trade are based on economies of
scale and increased choice.
The various models of intra-industry trade distin-
guish between horizontal and vertical product
differentiation.92 Models of horizontal product
differentiation predict that similarities of demand
and per capita incomes between countries favour
horizontal specialisation. The greater the market
sizes of the countries (the greater the potential to
reap scale economies), the greater the amount of
intra-industry trade. Models of vertical product
differentiation, on the other hand, predict that
vertical intra-industry trade increases with the differ-
ences in factor endowments (capital intensity,
human capital, technology), in per capita incomes
and in demand structures.93
Models of new economic geography emphasise
forward and backward linkages, spillovers and scale
economies as centripetal forces. Higher wages and
higher costs of commuting and congestion, or
more generally costs induced by agglomeration, in
turn act as centrifugal forces. While most trade
models predict that specialisation will increase with
reductions in trade costs, the new economic geog-
raphy predicts a u-shaped relationship: when trade
costs are high, production is located close to
demand and geographical concentration is low. At
an intermediate level of trade costs, forward and
91 As in the traditional trade theory, the patterns of inter-industry trade are
determined by underlying differences in production factors and technology
between countries.
92 Horizontal differentiation refers to different varieties of a product that are of
similar quality (e.g. different colour and design of shoes of similar quality).
Vertical differentiation refers to different varieties that are of different qualities
(e.g. leather shoes, plastic shoes).
93 See Falvey (1981), Falvey and Kierzkowski (1985), Greenaway and Millner
(1986), Flam and Helpman (1987).
89 For example, modern firms have an incentive to locate where specialised
human capital is available. On the other hand, labour force with specialised
skills have an incentive to move to areas where more than one potential
employer is established. There is a thus reciprocal advantage to local concen-
tration.
90 Personal contact and the associated knowledge spillovers are an important
determinant of the location decisions of many firms. Geographic proximity
makes it easier to gather information about competitors and about sector-
specific news, to make deals, to negotiate contracts etc. Although new tech-
nologies have allowed the relocation of some activities, proximity remains
important for the vast majority of economic transactions. This is demon-
strated by econometric estimates of gravity models for trade, investment,
equity and technology flows (see Venables, 2001).European competitiveness report 2003
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backward linkages lead to an agglomeration of
production activity. Finally, when trade costs are
low, higher wages and congestion costs in the core
trigger a stronger dispersion of production. The
new economic geography models thus predict that
in a first stage of economic integration, a reduction
in trading costs might favour the core regions and,
in a later stage where trade costs are further
reduced, the periphery could win.94
In new economic geography models, agglomera-
tion forces are weaker if labour is immobile between
regions. If workers do not move, wage differences
between regions persist and act as a dispersion
force by increasing production costs for firms
producing in locations with relatively many other
firms. ‘This dispersion force can moderate agglom-
eration and sustain non-extreme equilibria in which
all regions have industry, even if in different propor-
tions. Thus the lack of interregional mobility both
postpones agglomeration in a process of regional
integration and weakens it when it happens’ (Puga,
2001, p. 17).
Multinationalisation theories
The location theories presented above do not
explicitly account for the specific role of multina-
tional corporations (MNCs). Multinational corpora-
tions influence the location of industries via their
foreign direct investment and subcontracting strate-
gies. According to Zysman and Schwartz (1998),
the principal MNCs operating in Europe will drive
the regional patterns of production, investment and
venture in the acceding countries. The critical issue
is whether Central and East European producers are
considered as economic complements or as rivals to
the international production networks created by
the major MNCs.
Theoretical literature distinguishes between two
polar cases of multinational activity: horizontal and
vertical. Horizontal MNCs produce approximately
the same product or service in multiple locations,
while vertical MNCs fragment their production
process geographically by taking advantage of
cross-country price differences for production
factors. Horizontal patterns of multinational activity
are determined by the size of local markets, prox-
imity to other markets, transport costs and scale
economies, while vertical fragmentation relates to
the comparative advantage of countries, as
reflected in factor prices.
Models of foreign direct investment and subcon-
tracting offer several predictions on the effects of
deeper integration on the behaviour of multina-
tional firms and the consequences for specialisation:
— For horizontal multinationals, market proximity
becomes less important as trade costs decline.
Consequently, the decisions on plant size and
location will be based primarily on the level of
production costs and the importance of
economies of scale. This should lead to more
specialisation within the enlarged Europe.
— Vertical foreign direct investment is predicted
to increase since lower trade costs induce more
intra-firm trade to exploit cross-country differ-
ences in factor prices. Intra-firm specialisation
involves locating the headquarters and skill-
intensive production in skill abundant countries
and labour-intensive production in labour
abundant countries.
Summary
Each of the theories presented above identifies a set
of factors explaining industrial location. While there
are significant differences in approach, some
explanatory factors are common to all the theories.
Three forces which influence specialisation patterns
are of particular relevance in the context of enlarge-
ment: local endowments, trade costs and labour
mobility. In summary, the theories lead to a number
of predictions for specialisation and concentration
patterns in an enlarged Europe:
— All the theoretical approaches predict
increasing specialisation as a result of trade
liberalisation and enlargement. The paradigms
differ, however, in terms of what is seen to
determine the specialisation process and, as a
consequence, in terms of the location where
economic activity is predicted to concentrate.
94 New economic geography also provides an explanation for the increasing
differences in production structures across different core countries as well as
across different peripheral countries in Europe. According to these models,
even regions which a priori are very similar, can end up with very different
production structures and income levels. Agglomeration is determined by
‘accident’ (see Krugman, 1991): if one firm moves, this raises the share of
goods produced locally in the receiving region and the rise in local labour
demand and wages tend to attract more of the mobile workers. This enlarges
the market further and causes positive demand effects and backward linkages
as a greater number of consumers makes the receiving region even more
attractive for firms and causes a concentration of economic activity. The
result of this process of ‘cumulative causation’ is that all firms belonging to
the sectors with increasing returns to scale end up locating within a single
region (the ‘core’), while the other region (the ‘periphery’) specialises in the
traditional sector. The point is that this result is not determined by differences
in endowments, but instead by history. Whichever of the two regions gets a
slight advantage will build on it due to the process of cumulative causation.
But agglomeration may take place even when labour is not mobile, because
of direct input-output linkages: Venables (1996) shows that vertical linkages
between upstream and downstream industries give rise to cost and demand
linkages, which play a role equivalent to that of labour migration in endoge-
nously determining the size of the market in different regions. Cost and
demand linkages of vertically integrated firms constitute the driving force for
the agglomeration of activities, whereas the location of immobile factors of
production and the location of final demand act as dispersion forces.APPENDIX 4A
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— Traditional trade theory predicts a clear-cut
difference in the specialisation of high-, middle-
and low-income countries on the basis of the
differences in their endowments of human
capital, physical capital and technology.
— New trade theory predicts agglomeration in
large markets due to either external economies
of scale – based on specialised supply, pooled
labour markets and knowledge spillovers – or
internal economies of scale.
— According to new trade theory, the share of
horizontal intra-industry trade in total trade is
positively related to the similarities of demand
and production characteristics, while the share
of vertical intra-industry trade is positively
related to differences in factor endowments,
per capita incomes and demand structures.
— Economic geography emphasises centripetal
(forward and backward linkages, spillovers and
scale economies) and centrifugal forces
(commuting, congestion, local competition). It
predicts a u-shaped relationship between trade
costs and specialisation (agglomeration): in a
first stage of liberalisation, more economic
activity concentrates into the core, while
further liberalisation may benefit the periphery.
The attractiveness of the periphery depends
crucially on its comparative advantages (lower
wages).
— According to new economic geography, even
countries which a priori are very similar can end up
with very different production structures and
income levels due to ‘coincidence’ combined with
a process of cumulative causation (centripetal
forces). In the models of new economic geog-
raphy, agglomeration is driven by direct input-
output linkages, while labour mobility further
strengthens the agglomeration forces.
4.A.5.3 Earlier studies on specialisation
and concentration in Europe
This section will survey the results of earlier studies
on the trends in production specialisation of indi-
vidual countries and geographical concentration of
industries within EU-15 and the acceding countries.
The following section provides new data on the
trends in specialisation and concentration in these
countries.
We define specialisation as the extent to which a
given country specialises its activities in a small
number of industries. Specialisation can be meas-
ured in terms of production shares, employment,
exports, or total trade (exports and imports
together). If production, employment or export
structures become more dispersed (the economy
becomes less dependent on a small number of key
industries), we are speaking of de-specialisation.
Geographic concentration is defined as the extent to
which activity in a given industry is concentrated in
just a few countries. Also concentration can be
measures in terms of several variables, such as
production, employment, exports or total trade.
Empirical evidence for EU-15
A number of researchers have studied specialisation
and concentration trends in the EU with particular
attention to the effects of the single market
programme. Helg et al. (1995), Amiti (1999), OECD
(1999), Aiginger et al. (1999), Midelfart-Knarvik et
al. (2000) and Storper et al. (2002) all show that
most EU countries are becoming more specialised in
terms of production activity. On the other hand,
there is a (weak) tendency for export specialisation
to decrease (see Aiginger et al. 1999). Instead of the
relatively strong discontinuous agglomeration
patterns suggested by the new economic geog-
raphy models, these studies reveal a gradual process
of specialisation. Export structures are substantially
more specialised than production activity, which
suggests that a large part of manufacturing activity
remain sheltered from import competition – either
due to trade costs or to a demand bias in favour of
locally-produced goods (see Brülhart 2001a).
Geographic concentration trends in Europe are less
clear-cut. Some studies point to increasing concen-
tration trends (Brülhart, 1995, Amiti, 1999, Haaland
et al., 1999, Midelfart-Knarvik et al., 2000), while
others find that concentration is declining (Dalum
et al., 1998, Molle, 1996, Hallet, 2001, Aiginger et
al. 1999, Aiginger and Davies, 2001, Aiginger and
Pfaffermayr, 2003).95 Davies, Rondi and Sembenelli
(1998) find no change in concentration.
A closer look at the patterns of concentration and
specialisation at country and industry level reveals
considerable volatility in the production structures
of individual countries and markedly different
specialisation patterns across country groups. Brül-
hart (2001b) finds increasing geographical concen-
95 As emphasised by Aiginger et al. (1999), the opposing simultaneous trends
of (slightly) increasing specialisation and decreasing concentration do not
constitute a paradox as such. Since small countries registered higher growth
in the 1990s, the concentration of those industries where large countries
have the highest shares tended to decline, leading to a decrease in aggregate
geographical concentration.European competitiveness report 2003
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tration after 1986 in those industries which were
most affected by the liberalisation measures of the
single market programme.96 He interprets this as
evidence of an unexhausted potential for industrial
clustering within the EU. Geographic concentration
is strongest in labour-intensive and resource-inten-
sive industries, and weakest in technology-intensive
industries. Employment in footwear, pottery and
shipbuilding industries is much more clustered than
employment in the manufacture of plastic products,
electrical apparatus and even motor vehicles.
Brülhart’s findings correspond to those of Amiti
(1999), who finds that footwear, carpets and
jewellery industries were among the most concen-
trated in Europe in 1989, while plastics and iron
and steel industries were the least agglomerated.
These results also mirror Krugman’s (1991) findings
for the United States. The evidence thus suggests
that geographical concentration patterns reflect
primarily the comparative advantages of countries,
rather than being the outcome of agglomeration
forces operating in increasing-returns industries as
predicted by the “new” models.
Brülhart (2001b) finds that market access has
become less important in location decisions.
Industry concentration is less and less determined
by the geographical position – central or peripheral
– of a country. While technology-intensive industries
and industries with increasing returns tended to
concentrate in the centre, the degree of concentra-
tion declined towards the end of Brülhart’s sample
period. Brülhart’s results are in line with the studies
of Aiginger et al. (1999) and Midelfart-Knarvik et al.
(2000), who found decreasing concentration in
high-tech industries over the 1990s. Concentration
of production in central regions declined to the
benefit of fast growing small countries which
hosted successful multinational firms or attracted
foreign direct investment.
Aiginger et al. (1999), Brülhart (2001b) and Midel-
fart-Knarvik et al. (2000) identify exogenous factor
endowments (as emphasised by the traditional
trade theories) and industry-specific, location-inde-
pendent agglomeration economies (which are at
the heart of economic geography models) as key
determinants of geographical concentration in
Europe. Aiginger et al. (1999) find that high wage
industries (agro-chemicals, steam generators,
machine tools, office computers, production of
recorded media) are more concentrated than other
industries, and their concentration did not decrease
in the 1990s. Among the low wage industries,
geographical concentration in most textile branches
increased. Industries with a high degree of product
differentiation, which were highly concentrated at
the start, tended to become less concentrated.
Finally, Aiginger et al. (1999) find no evidence of an
above-average concentration of industries charac-
terised by economies of scale.
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) show that the loca-
tion of R&D-intensive industries has become
increasingly responsive to countries’ endowments of
high-skilled workers. The location of industries
which intensively use non-manual labour remains
sensitive to the proportion of the labour force with
secondary and higher education. On the other
hand, changes in the endowments of low and
medium-skilled labour appear not to play a major
role in determining the changes in production
structures. Finally, the location of industries with
strong forward and backward linkages has become
increasingly sensitive to the central/peripheral posi-
tion of countries.
According to the models of vertical intra-industry
trade, specialisation over the quality spectrum
within industries is explained by differences in local
endowments. Mora (2001) suggests that compara-
tive advantage be an important driver of the
patterns of trade within industries in Europe.
According to her findings, differences in human and
physical capital between countries are important
determinants of specialisation of countries over the
quality spectrum within industries in intra-EU trade.
She also finds that in advanced manufacturing
industries, rubber and plastic products and in the
majority of traditional manufacturing branches,
technological capital has influenced trade patterns.
In manufacturing industries with demand growth
and medium technological content, as well as in
some traditional branches like metal products and
paper and printing products, an abundant endow-
ment of human capital is associated with an
increase in the quality of exports (see also Jansen
and Landesmann, 1999).
Overall, there seems to be a revival of endowment-
based explanations of industrial location in Europe.
However, Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000), after
reviewing the empirical evidence on the determi-
nants of trade costs and the effects of these costs on
trade flows, conclude that not only endowments,
but also geography matters in determining trade
and industrial location. Aiginger et al. (1999)
suggest that integration-induced specialisation in
the EU in the past twenty years could have been
even stronger, but had been tempered by the
96 Textiles, clothing, leather and footwear, chemicals, coal, iron and steel,
motor vehicles and furniture.APPENDIX 4A
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simultaneous convergence of endowments across
countries. Aiginger et al. (op cit.) find that factor
endowments in the EU countries became more
similar between 1980 and 1996 due to a catch-up
of countries like Spain, Ireland, Finland and
Denmark which accumulated R&D capital, and to
some extent also Portugal and Greece, owing to
their investments in physical capital.97
Empirical evidence for Central and East
European countries
Most of the earlier analyses have concluded that the
acceding and candidate countries in Central and
Eastern Europe are specialised in labour-intensive
industries as well as in resource- and energy-inten-
sive industries. In comparison to EU-15, the
acceding and candidate countries have a compara-
tive disadvantage in capital-, technology- and skill-
intensive industries. Hence, it is likely that the
effects of the forthcoming EU enlargement will
differ across countries and industries.
The results of Landesmann (1995, 2000) based on
trade statistics support the hypothesis of a speciali-
sation in labour- and resource-intensive industries in
the acceding and candidate countries, following an
inter-industry trade pattern. Following the intensifi-
cation of outward processing trade, also intra-
industry trade has increased [Landesmann (1995),
Dobrinsky (1995)]. Freudenberg and Lemoine
(1999) conclude that the acceding and candidate
countries have comparative advantages in primary
(upstream production) and in consumption goods
(downstream production), but comparative disad-
vantages in intermediate and capital goods.
Petrakos (1996, 1999) argues that the processes of
internationalisation and structural change in the
acceding and candidate countries have favoured
metropolitan and Western regions, as well as regions
with a strong industrial base. Petrakos expects the
process of transition to increase disparities at the
European level.
Traistaru et al. (2002) and Landesmann and Stehrer
(2002) provide the first comprehensive studies on
the impact of economic integration with the Euro-
pean Union on regional specialisation and
geographic concentration of industrial activity in
acceding and candidate countries. Traistaru et al.
(2002) find evidence of a regional relocation of
industries, leading to an increased specialisation in
Bulgaria and Romania and lower specialisation in
Estonia. In Hungary and Slovenia, the degree of
specialisation has not changed significantly.
Landesmann and Stehrer (2002) find Poland,
Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania ‘locked in’ in
a rather traditional pattern of trade and industrial
specialisation (low-skill, labour intensive branches),
while the other acceding Central and East European
countries show a more dynamic pattern of integration
into the European division of labour. In particular,
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic as
well as Estonia are catching up relatively fast in tech-
nologically more sophisticated branches and are
improving their positions in intra-branch product
quality. Foreign direct investment and educational
attainment were found to be important in deter-
mining the specialisation of individual countries.
4.A.5.4 Specialisation and concentration
trends in manufacturing in the 1990s
This section presents updated statistical information on
the degree of geographical concentration of indus-
tries, and on country specialisation in manufacturing
production in EU-15 and the ten Central and East Euro-
pean acceding and candidate countries. To measure
concentration and specialisation, we use the concen-
tration ratio (CRn), which measures the share of the
largest n units in the total.98 For example, CR3 refers to
the share of the largest 3 industries in a country
(specialisation) or the share of the largest 3 countries in
a specific industry or sector (concentration).
The analysis covers the period 1990-2001 for the
acceding and candidate countries; data for EU-15
are until 2000.99 During the 1990s, Europe faced a
severe recession with devaluations in some EU
countries. Major country-specific shocks during the
period include the unification of Germany, the polit-
ical turmoil in the Balkan region, the crises in South-
east Asia, and the economic transition in the Central
and Eastern European countries. The effects of these
shocks differed across the EU countries and indus-
tries (European Commission, 1999).
The analysis uses aggregate data on gross produc-
tion and exports. Occasionally, also data on imports
and employment are presented. Gross production is
measured in nominal terms, and aggregated using
98 Existing literature proposes several indicators to measure specialisation and
concentration. For the advantages and shortcomings of each of them, see
Aiginger et al. (1999).
99 Longer time series are available on trade, but the period 1990-2001 is the
common ground for the bulk of the data. Even for this time span, many data
points were missing and had to be estimated.
97 According to Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002), EU policies have
contributed to the convergence in R&D capital among the EU countries. EU
support has helped countries to attract R&D intensive industries at the
expense of medium-skilled industries.European competitiveness report 2003
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exchange rates. The choice of gross production
allows comparisons with the acceding and candi-
date countries where data on value added are not
available. Taking the nominal production value is
not optimal in all cases (occasionally, purchasing
power parity –based weights are used in aggrega-
tions for the acceding and candidate countries as
well), but the difficulties in measuring price adjust-
ments and quality changes for all industries in each
member country imposed this choice. Also exports
are measured at current prices. Data for EU-15
cover the countries which joined in 1995 for the
whole period of analysis.
Output and employment specialisation
On average, the degree of production specialisation
at the level of the 14 main sub-sectors of manufac-
turing is roughly similar in the eight Central and East
European countries acceding in May 2004 and EU-
15. In both regions, the 5 largest industries supply
about 60 % of total manufacturing output (Table
4.A.5.1; see also Table 4.4 in the main text). If the
shares of the 3 largest industries (CR3) are used as an
indicator of specialisation, one finds declining
specialisation in the eight acceding countries and a
stable concentration ratio in EU-15.
Turning to individual countries and to a finer disag-
gregation of industries, data at the 2-digit NACE level
again do not show major changes in the degree of
production specialisation of EU Member States over
the 1990s (Graph 4.A.5.1). Finally, at the more disag-
gregated NACE 3-digit industry level, the data show
a considerable degree of restructuring in individual
EU countries. Specialisation (share of the 3 largest
industries in total manufacturing output) increased in
Germany, France, Ireland, Finland, Sweden and
United Kingdom during the 1990s. In the rest of EU-
15, specialisation decreased.
In EU-15 as a whole, transport equipment and elec-
trical and optical equipment increased their shares
in total manufacturing production between 1995
and 2000 by more than other industries. The main
losers in terms of production shares were food
products, textiles and basic metals (see also Graph
4.5 in the main text). The importance of the elec-
trical and optical equipment industry increased in
all individual EU countries except Italy.
Of the individual countries where production
specialisation increased in the 1990s, the driving
forces were roughly the same in France, Germany
and the United Kingdom: transport equipment, and
electrical and optical equipment increased their
production shares. The transport equipment sector
presently accounts for some 19 % of total manufac-
turing production in both France and Germany. All
three countries have rather similar industrial struc-
tures, characterised by high returns to scale, high
technology and a relatively highly educated work-
force. These characteristics have driven the speciali-
sation patterns towards industries which depend on
the supply of highly educated workers and which
rely on the large home markets.
In the other three countries where production speciali-
sation increased, Ireland, Finland and Sweden, the
structure of industry changed strongly towards indus-
tries with high technology and increasing returns to
scale. The structure of Irish manufacturing is highly
specialised: the share of the 3 largest industries in total
production is 76 %. The manufacture of electrical and
optical equipment is the largest industry in Ireland,
while the strongest increase in the output share over
the 1990s was recorded in the chemicals industry. The
food industry, a former stronghold, in turn lost ten
percentage points. The move towards more sophisti-
cated production activities corresponds to the dramatic
increase in the share of employees with higher educa-
tion. The share of research-intensive industries in total
manufacturing is currently higher in Ireland than in any
other EU-15 country, while the share of labour-intensive
industries is the lowest in EU-15.
In EU-15, Finland has the second most specialised
production structure in manufacturing, but remains
far less specialised than Ireland: the 3 largest indus-
tries account for 55 % of total manufacturing output.
Table 4.A.5.1 CEEC-8 and EU-15 industry structures in 1990, 1995 and 2000
CEEC-8 EU-15
1990 1995 2000 1990 1995 2000
Concentration ratio (CR5) 62.5 60.2 60.8 59.3 59.3 60.5
Concentration ratio (CR3) 47.2 45.4 42.7 39.5 39.0 39.3
Note: CEEC-8 refers to the eight Central and East European countries which are due to enter into EU in 2004.
Source: WIIW Database incorporating national statistics, WIFO and WIIW calculations using SBS.APPENDIX 4A
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Finland is characterised by a high ratio of capital to
labour. The rising importance of the electrical and
optical equipment industry – in particular telecom-
munications equipment – has contributed to raising
the degree of specialisation; electronics have
replaced pulp and paper as the largest domestic
industry. In Sweden, both the electrical and optical
equipment industry – telecommunications equip-
ment as in Finland – and the transport equipment
industry – motor vehicles – increased their produc-
tion shares, while the importance of food production,
pulp and paper, and basic metals declined.
Manufacturing employment in EU-15 is slightly
more focused on the 3 largest industries than
output (Graph 4.A.5.2). Most countries show a
stable or rising employment specialisation over the
1990s. Exceptions are Germany, Greece, Spain and
Portugal, where the share of the 3 largest industries
in total manufacturing employment declined. In
many cases, industries which increased their share
in total manufacturing production recorded a simul-
taneous decrease in the employment share. This
suggests a further specialisation towards tech-
nology-intensive and capital-intensive industries
with an above-average labour productivity.
Manufacturing production structures in the ten
Central and East European acceding and candidate
countries are more specialised than those in EU-15.
Specialisation increased dramatically during the first
half of the 1990s. Among the NACE 2-digit indus-
tries, the 3 largest account for between 50-60 % of
total manufacturing output in each of the acceding
and candidate countries (Graph 4.A.5.3).100 In most
EU-15 countries, the production shares of the 3
largest industries are clearly lower, varying between
40-50 % – the most notable exception is Ireland
where they account for almost 80 % of the total.
The higher specialisation of the acceding and candi-
date countries makes them potentially more vulner-
able to asymmetric shocks.
In general, the large structural changes in the ten
acceding and candidate countries were charac-
terised by an increasing importance of the transport
equipment industry and of electrical and optical
equipment, while the production shares of the
food, beverages and tobacco industries declined.
The 3 largest manufacturing industries were the
same in 2001 as in 1995 in all the ten acceding and
candidate countries except Hungary, Poland, the
Slovak Republic and Estonia. In the latter group of
countries, the changes were characterised by the
100 Some inconsistencies remain in the production and employment data for
these countries, which have been collected from national sources (in partic-
ular, in the period before 1995 there were changes in data sources and in
methodological approaches, e.g. the coverage of SMEs). The Vienna Institute
for International Economic Studies (WIIW) has made available a more consis-
tent data set, but only at the level of the 14 main subsections of manufac-
turing (DA-DN) of NACE rev. 1 – see Table 4.A.5.1.
Graph 4.A.5.1 Manufacturing production specialisation in EU-15 (CR3)
Note: Share of 3 largest industries in production, calculated from 2-digit NACE sections of manufacturing.
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rising importance of the transport equipment
industry and, in Hungary, of the electrical and
optical equipment industry. In Estonia, wood
industry became more important, while the relative
importance of the chemicals industry declined.
Manufacturing employment in the ten acceding and
candidate countries is somewhat more dispersed
over the different industries manufacturing output
(Graph 4.A.5.4). During the 1990s, employment
declined in most manufacturing industries and in
manufacturing as a whole. The largest employers are
currently the food and beverages industry, textiles,
basic metals and fabricated metal products, as well as
mechanical engineering. Changes in employment
shares of individual industries over the 1990s were
small compared to the changes in production shares;
the largest changes in employment specialisation
took place in Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, where
manufacturing employment became more focused
on the 3 main industries. In comparison to EU-15
members, manufacturing employment in the
acceding and candidate countries relies more heavily
on the 3 largest industries.
Graphs 4.A.5.5 and 4.A.5.6 look at production and
employment structures in the ten Central and East
European acceding and candidate countries by
country and by industry. Typically, the most important
industries in the acceding and candidate countries
include food, beverages and tobacco, transport equip-
ment, as well as basic metals and fabricated metal
products. In addition, textiles and wood products are
usually among the largest manufacturing industries in
the Baltic States (Graph 4.A.5.5). In general, produc-
tion shares of these sectors in the acceding and candi-
date countries are above the EU-15 average. On the
other hand, the acceding and candidate countries have
lower production shares than the EU-15 Member
States in paper and printing; chemicals; machinery and
equipment as well as – and with the notable exception
of Hungary – in electrical and optical equipment. In
terms of manufacturing employment, textiles and
textile products are more important in the acceding
and candidate countries than in EU-15, while the role
of transport equipment is smaller (Graph 4.A.5.6). 
Export specialisation
In the second half of the 1990s, the general trend in
EU-15 was towards an increased specialisation in
exports. This was reflected mainly in the increasing
shares of six technology-driven industries in total
EU-15 exports: pharmaceuticals, telecommunica-
tions equipment, aircraft and spacecraft, office
machinery and computers, electronic components,
and motor vehicles. Like the data on specialisation
in production, evidence of the export structures
thus point to an increasing role of more sophisti-
cated industries in EU-15 manufacturing.
Graph 4.A.5.2 Manufacturing employment specialisation in EU-15 (CR3)
Note: Share of 3 largest industries in employment, calculated from 2-digit NACE sections of manufacturing.
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Graph 4.A.5.3 Manufacturing production specialisation in 10 acceding and candidate countries (CR3)
Note: Share of 3 largest industries in production, calculated from 2-digit NACE sections of manufacturing.



















Graph 4.A.5.4 Manufacturing employment specialisation in 10 acceding and candidate countries (CR3)
Note: Share of 3 largest industries in employment, calculated from 2-digit NACE sections of manufacturing.

























































Graph 4.A.5.5 Manufacturing production structure in 10 acceding and candidate countries compared to EU-15, 2001
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Graph 4.A.5.6 Manufacturing employment structure in 10 acceding and candidate countries compared to EU-15, 2001
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Over the 1990s, the exports of five EU countries
became more focused on the key exporting sectors
(Graph 4.A.5.7 illustrates the shares of the largest
five 3-digit NACE industries in total manufacturing
exports). The increased export specialisation was
driven by the aircraft and spacecraft industry, motor
vehicles and pharmaceuticals in France; basic chem-
icals and pharmaceuticals in Ireland; office
machinery and computers and electronic compo-
nents in the Netherlands; telecommunications
equipment in Finland; and by telecommunications
equipment and pharmaceuticals in the United
Kingdom. In Greece and Portugal, export structures
became more diversified, while in the rest of EU-15,
changes in the degree of specialisation in exports
were small.
Export specialisation in trade with the EU increased
in most of the ten Central and East European candi-
date countries between 1995 and 2001 (exceptions
are Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – see Graph
4.A.5.8). EU-15 exports from the three Baltic States,
Bulgaria and Romania are more focused on the five
key sectors than exports from the other acceding
countries, with the 5 largest exporting industries
accounting for some 60 % of the total in these five
countries.
Concentration in EU-15
In most industries in the EU-15 area, geographic
concentration of production activity as well as
exports decreased strongly during the 1990s.
Measured by the share of the 3 largest countries in
total EU-15 production, concentration rates rose
only in three out of the 14 main sectors: coke and
refined petroleum products; leather products; and
transport equipment.
Leather products and transport equipment are the
most concentrated industries (Graph 4.A.5.9). In
these two industries, the leading 3 countries
together produce about 90 % of the total EU-15
output. Italy expanded its share in the leather
industry from 46 % in 1990 to over 57 % in 2000.
In the transport equipment industry, both Germany
and France increased their – already high – output
shares. 
Production activity is most dispersed in the wood
industry, where the 3 largest countries account for
some 50 % of total EU-15 production. Geographical
concentration in the wood industry decreased over
the 1990s, but less than in electrical and optical
Graph 4.A.5.7 Export specialisation in EU-15 (CR5)
Note: Share of 5 largest industries in exports, calculated from 3-digit NACE subsections of manufacturing.
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Graph 4.A.5.8 Export specialisation in 10 acceding and candidate countries (CR5)
Note: Share of 5 largest industries in exports to EU-15, calculated from 3-digit NACE subsections of manufacturing.




















Graph 4.A.5.9 Geographical concentration of manufacturing production in EU-15 (CR3)
Note: Share of the 3 largest countries in total EU-15 production by manufacturing industry.
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equipment and in chemicals, which recorded the
largest decreases in their concentration ratios.
Analysis at the more disaggregated NACE 3-digit
level confirms the tendency towards more dispersed
production patterns in EU-15 manufacturing.
Geographical concentration of manufacturing
production (share of the 3 largest countries in total
production) decreased during the 1990s in two
thirds of 95 EU-15 industries. Among the activities
where geographical concentration declined the
most were large industries such as basic chemicals
and the manufacture of television and radio trans-
mitters. In these two industries, the share of the 3
largest countries in total EU-15 production declined
by 7 and 9 percentage points respectively. The
largest increase in geographical concentration
during the 1990s was recorded in the aircraft and
spacecraft industry, where the share of the 3 largest
producer countries in total EU-15 production rose
by 9 percentage points.
The trend towards a stronger geographical disper-
sion was even stronger in exports than in produc-
tion activity. The share of the 3 largest countries in
total EU-15 manufacturing exports increased in only
6 out of 95 industries between 1990-2001. On
average, the export share of the 3 largest countries
decreased by 11 percentage points across the
industries. Most of the decline in the geographical
concentration of exporting activity took place in the
first half of the 1990s, while changes in the second
half of the decade were less significant.
Among the different types of industries101, produc-
tion activity is most concentrated in the technology-
driven branches. This is in line with the predictions of
modern location theory which stresses the impor-
tance of knowledge spillovers and pooled labour
markets in dynamic industries. Mainstream industries
and capital-intensive industries are geographically
more dispersed than other industries.
Overall, the evidence does not support the view
that the internal market should lead to increased
geographical concentration of either production or
exporting activity. In most industries, geographical
concentration declined during the 1990s. New
economic geography models suggest that
economic integration, by lowering the costs of
trade, should favour the core regions and possibly,
in a more advanced stage of economic integration,
the periphery. The above evidence for EU-15 shows
few signs of a strengthening of the core at the
expense of the periphery. On the contrary, in the
majority of industries, geographical concentration
has decreased as core countries – Germany, and to
some extent France and Italy – lose production
shares to the periphery, mainly Ireland, Finland,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and Spain.
One might argue that a decade is too short for
analysing fundamental changes in industry location.
During the 1990s, economic growth in Germany was
weaker than in most other EU-15 Member States; in
particular, some of the peripheral Member States
registered very strong growth rates. This reduced the
strength of the home market effect in Germany and
reduced the centripetal forces in industries which
heavily rely on the home market. The weak perform-
ance of the home market could be one of the reasons
for the declining production shares of German indus-
tries in research- and capital intensive branches.
Haaland et al. (1999) show that the geographical
distribution of expenditure is an important determi-
nant of the location of production activity. Deep-
ening economic integration in Europe has further
strengthened the role of market size in location deci-
sions. Furthermore, industry concentration affects
expenditure concentration and vice versa, triggering
a process of cumulative causation as predicted by the
new economic geography. Another interpretation of
the increasing dispersion of production activity, also
stemming from the new economic geography, is that
the further reduction of trade costs within EU-15 has
made peripheral countries more attractive when
higher wages and congestion costs drive production
activity away from the core.
4.A.5.5 Implications for the future
industrial landscape in Europe
Factors determining the location of industries
Earlier studies which looked at the effects of the
Europe Agreements on individual EU-15 members
came to the general conclusion that the effects of
trade liberalisation would be larger on the candidate
countries than on EU-15.102 Of the Southern EU-15
countries, Greece stood to gain the most due to the
potential for increased exports and foreign direct
investment to Bulgaria and Romania, although some
sectors (chemicals, transport equipment and natural
resource intensive sectors) might lose (Dimelis and
Gatsios, 1995). Spain would benefit from its large
102 The Europe Agreements entered into force in 1994 for Poland and Hungary,
1995 for Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and 1998 for
the Baltic States and Slovenia. 101 The typologies referred to here are described in Appendix 4.A.4 above.APPENDIX 4A
179
domestic market, while it was expected to lose some
market share in exports and suffer from some diver-
sion in foreign direct investment flows (Martin and
Gual, 1994). Portugal was expected to be the main
loser in both export market shares and foreign direct
investment inflows (Corado, 1994).
The post-war experience in the EU is probably not a
good guide for predictions on income convergence
and specialisation patterns following the next
enlargement. Today, the EU market is more inte-
grated due i.a. to the internal market and monetary
union. Restrictions on foreign direct investment
have been dismantled; new forms of inter-firm co-
operation have emerged; and the transport and
communication networks are more developed,
which facilitates the geographical dispersion of
production activities.
Location theories suggest that the impact of the
forthcoming enlargement be larger on two groups of
countries within EU-15: first, countries with industrial
structures that are closer to those of the acceding
countries; secondly, countries which are geographi-
cally closer to the acceding countries. According to
Traistaru et al. (2002), both factor endowments and
geographic proximity to core European countries
determine the location of manufacturing in the
acceding countries. Three groups of factors are
discussed below in view of their importance to the
future industrial structure in Europe: comparative
advantages (factor endowments), trade costs
(including transport costs, which are linked to the
geographical distance to markets), and factor
mobility are particularly important.
— Factor endowments103: Boeri and Brücker (2001)
show that the stocks of physical capital as well
as the human capital endowments in the
acceding and candidate countries are signifi-
cantly below the EU average. The quality of
education in the acceding and candidate coun-
tries falls short of the average standards in the
present EU. However, in comparison to those
EU-15 members which have roughly similar
levels of income as the acceding and candidate
countries, the human capital endowments of
the acceding and candidate countries are high
(see also Landesmann and Stehrer, 2002). In
general, the acceding and candidate countries
have a comparative disadvantage in terms of
endowments in technology, the institutional
framework and public infrastructures.
Most empirical studies show patterns of industry
specialisation across countries which correspond
to the strengths in factor endowments: the
acceding and candidate countries are specialised
in labour-intensive, resource- and energy-inten-
sive production. Relative to EU-15, the acceding
and candidate countries in general have a
comparative disadvantage in R&D- and human
capital-intensive industries. However, cross-
country differences can be significant. The data
on industrial specialisation of countries
presented above suggests that the majority of
the Central and East European acceding and
candidate countries currently have an industrial
structure which is between that of the industri-
ally less advanced EU-South (Greece, Portugal
and Spain) and the more advanced EU-North
countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and
the United Kingdom). At country level, the
production structures in Czech, Hungarian,
Slovenian, and Slovak manufacturing are very
close to the EU-15 average; Poland is slightly
different; while the Baltic States, Bulgaria and
Romania are far apart from the EU-15 structures.
Policy measures can shape the structure of
national factor endowments (Midelfart-Knarvik
and Overman, 2002). Interactions between trade
and education, or between trade and immigra-
tion, as well as technological and pecuniary exter-
nalities can also influence comparative advan-
tages (Venables, 2001). Finally, comparative
advantages of the acceding and candidate coun-
tries can change also as a result of inflows of
foreign capital and foreign direct investment
bringing in technology and firm specific brands.
— Trade costs: EU accession implies a move from
what is close to a free-trade area into a customs
union and into the internal market. Member-
ship in the customs union implies i.a. the aboli-
tion of all the remaining formal trade barriers
such as import tariffs and export subsidies
within the EU. For some acceding and candi-
date countries (Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria and
Romania), the adoption of EU’s common
customs tariffs implies reductions in the tariffs
on imports from outside the EU.
The accession to the internal market reduces also
non-tariff barriers to trade and is hence likely to
lead to an increase in trade volumes (see Lejour
et al., 2001). First, administrative barriers to
trade, such as customs formalities, will be elimi-
nated or reduced to levels comparable to those
between current EU members. Secondly, the
internal market reduces technical barriers to
103 There is ample evidence of the differences in factor endowments between
the accession countries and the EU; see e.g. European Commission (1994),
Dobrinsky and Landesmann (1995), Landesmann (1995), Boeri and Brücker
(2001).European competitiveness report 2003
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trade by means of a harmonisation of rules,
introduction of common minimum safety
requirements, or the mutual recognition of
different national technical regulations. Finally,
EU membership will also reduce other types of
risks and uncertainties related to trade.104
The abolition of formal and administrative trade
barriers will considerably reduce transaction
costs between the acceding countries and the
rest of the EU. However, although transport costs
may decline, they will not disappear completely,
and geographical proximity to the largest
markets within the EU will continue to play a
significant role. Transport costs can also be an
important obstacle to vertical fragmentation, i.e.
carrying out different stages of production in
different locations. The relative importance of
intra-industry trade and outward processing
trade seems to be stronger among regions with
territorial contiguity, suggesting that the interna-
tional division of labour is not influenced only by
production cost differentials, but also by trans-
port costs (Caetano et al. 2002). A further
geographical fragmentation of production
activity can affect middle-income countries in
EU-15 for example when the processing of
primary or labour-intensive products is relocated
to low-wage regions near the borders.
— Labour mobility and migration: migration rates
in Europe are low in comparison with the US.
Present migration rates are low also by histor-
ical standards.105 Temporary restrictions on
labour mobility from Portugal and Spain after
their accession to the EU appear to have had
relatively small effects on migration flows (Boeri
and Brücker, 2001). However, drawing on past
experience to predict the implications of the
next EU enlargement in the EU may be a
mistake. In the past enlargements, the income
differentials between the new (Southern)
members and the rest of the Union were not as
large as those between the present EU-15 and
the majority of the acceding Central and East
European countries. Furthermore, while past
migration flows mainly involved blue-collar
workers in manufacturing and unskilled labour
in services, future migration might be more
dispersed. The formal education levels of
migrants from the acceding countries are high,
and over time they may increasingly compete
with high-skilled workers in modern industries
in the present EU.
Also geographical factors affect migration flows.
Around 80 % of the current migrants from the
acceding and candidate countries reside in Austria
and Germany. Migrants tend to move into pros-
perous industries and regions, where output and
investment adjust to accommodate the increase
in labour supply (Boeri and Brücker, 2001). A
higher propensity to migrate to the EU-15 coun-
tries which are geographically closer to the
acceding and candidate countries can strengthen
the agglomeration forces in these countries.
Existing studies on the effects of enlargement on
industry structures point to two directions. Analysis
of trade flows suggests that in the short run, the
acceding and candidate countries appear to have
comparative advantages in capital- and labour-
intensive industries, and thus compete primarily
with the Southern EU-15 members. In the long run,
the relatively high stock of human capital in the
acceding and candidate countries could give them
a comparative advantage in human capital intensive
industries. In the latter case, they would compete
mainly with the Northern EU-15 members.
The studies of Brown et al. (1997) and Baldwin et
al. (1997) based on general equilibrium models
conclude that EU-15 as a whole gains from enlarge-
ment, although the South gains much less than the
North. In particular, Germany would gain the most,
whereas Portugal would be the only country losing
due to its heavy reliance on textiles, the sector most
likely affected by enlargement. 
Studies based on new economic geography models
show gains for the East, while the expected effects
on EU-15 depend strongly on the scenario consid-
ered (see Forslid et al. 1999, Baldwin et al. 2000,
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. 2000). Forslid et al. (1999)
found that the effects on enlargement will be less
favourable on the countries which are geographi-
cally closer to the new Member States (Austria,
Denmark, Germany and Switzerland) than on other
European regions; the overall effect on these four
countries will be negative due to significant losses of
production activity in labour-intensive sectors. 
In the acceding countries, peripheral regions may
lose in industries where transport costs are impor-
tant. On the other hand, it is possible that regions
situated closer to Eastern urban centres are better
positioned to exploit potential economies of scale
and hence to register significant production growth
(Palme, 1999).
104 One type of such a risk is the possibility that one agent defaults in the chain
from producer to consumer. This is especially important for goods moving
from East to West as export credit guarantees are less well developed in the
accession countries.
105 In the 1960s migration rates in Europe were much higher than in the 1990s.
Puga (2001) discusses several possible reasons for the low mobility in Europe. APPENDIX 4A
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Sensitive regions in EU-15
The proximity of Germany and Austria to some of
the more advanced acceding countries makes them
more sensitive to the effects of enlargement than
the more distant EU regions. On the other hand,
the similarities in factor endowments between some
of the lower-income Southern EU members and the
acceding countries suggest that the next enlarge-
ment might have stronger effects on countries such
as Greece and Portugal. In the following, the situa-
tion of these four countries is briefly reviewed.
Greece and Portugal
Among the EU-15 members, Greece and Portugal are
considered the most vulnerable to the more intensive
competition resulting from deeper integration of the
acceding and candidate countries. The effects on
these countries are likely to be strongest in low-wage
industries and in industries with little product differ-
entiation and limited spillovers.
The two countries have rather similar industrial
structures. The three most important industries in
Portugal are food, textiles and electrical and optical
equipment (in terms of production) and basic
metals (in terms of employment), while food, coke
and refined petroleum and basic metals are most
important in Greece. Industry is, on average, char-
acterised by low technology and low returns to
scale; the capital-labour ratios are moderate but
increasing. Greece and Portugal are also the two
countries with the lowest shares of non-manual
workers and employees with higher education in
total manufacturing employment. The final demand
bias (the consumer orientation of the industry) is
the highest in the EU (see Midelfart-Knarvik et al.,
2000). Both countries have heavily regulated
product markets, and are relatively weakly placed
with regard to indicators on research, technology
and innovation (see European Commission, 2001).
Ardy et al. (2002) identify four areas where the
economic impacts of enlargement on the relatively
less developed EU-15 countries could be particularly
strong: allocations from the EU Structural Funds and
other fiscal implications; competition; foreign direct
investment; and the widening membership of the
economic and monetary union. Enlargement may
lead to a re-orientation of inward foreign direct
investment away from Portugal and Greece (and
possibly Spain) towards the acceding countries. The
evidence so far, however, does not indicate such a
substantial diversion of foreign direct investment
flows (see UNCTAD 2001, Buch et al. 2001 and
2003).
Existing literature suggests that trade liberalisation
preceding the enlargement has already led to
higher competition between the acceding and
candidate countries and EU-15, in particular in
industries characterised by labour intensive produc-
tion. Analysis carried out for the present European
Competitiveness Report (see Section 4.5.1 of this
Chapter) suggests that Portugal and Greece may
have lost market shares in the EU to Bulgaria and
Romania, both of which show rather similar
patterns of trade and industrial specialisation in low-
skill, labour-intensive as well as natural resource-
intensive branches.
It is likely that Bulgaria and Romania will mirror the
developments in Greece and Portugal after the mid-
1980s, when the latter rapidly specialised in indus-
tries with slow growth and unskilled labour. This
would lead to a further intensification of competi-
tion among the four countries. During the 1990s,
changes in the structure of manufacturing output
were modest in Greece, while Portugal significantly
diversified its manufacturing structures. Among the
EU-15 countries, Greece is among those with the
highest dependence on a small number of the key
manufacturing industries (half of manufacturing
output originates from the three largest industries).
Germany and Austria
Within EU-15, Germany, Austria, Finland and Italy
together account for some two thirds of the trade
with the acceding Central and East European coun-
tries. Conversely, of the acceding countries, the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland account for
two thirds of the trade with EU-15 (WIIW, 2002).
The German regions which are located on the
border with the Czech Republic and Poland trade
twice as much with these countries as do other
German regions (Boeri and Brücker, 2001).
According to Heijdra et al. (2002), Germany and
Austria are the two countries which will be most
affected by East-West market integration, whereas
for the other EU-15 Member States economic inte-
gration seems less important than the fiscal implica-
tions of enlargement.
Effects of trade liberalisation with the acceding coun-
tries have already been felt in Austria and Germany as
an intensification of competition. The market shares
of both Austria and Germany on the EU-15 market
have decreased, and their losses correlate with the
market share gains of the acceding countries. Both
countries are becoming increasingly specialised in
technology-intensive exports, while capital- and
labour-intensive industries and mainstream indus-
tries are becoming less important in total exports.European competitiveness report 2003
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Results of earlier research on border regions are
conflicting. The findings of Hanson (1998) suggest
that better access to a larger market following trade
liberalisation positively affects wages and employ-
ment in border regions. However, numerous case
studies on border regions point to a rather diverse
development of these areas after trade liberalisation.
Niebuhr and Stiller (2002) conclude that neither
theoretical nor empirical studies provide compre-
hensive and consistent results on the impact of inte-
gration on border regions.
Palme (1999) finds that the opening of the markets
in Central and Eastern Europe has benefited
Austrian manufacturing. In a study on the effects of
enlargement on Austrian regions, the authors
conclude that no major structural changes need to
be expected at the regional level (Mayerhofer and
Palme, 2002b). Regarding the competitiveness of
the German manufacturing industry as a whole,
enlargement is not likely to lead to major restruc-
turing in Germany either. However, the industrial
structure of the border regions in Germany appears
more vulnerable to competition from the new
Member States. According to Scharr and Untied
(2001), industry even in the more advanced
Bavarian border regions is characterised by labour-
intensive, wage-sensitive production.
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